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ABSTRACT
Cities and other municipalities
have not been subject to the require-
ments of disclosure to securities in-
vestors that companies are under fed-
eral securities law. Recent events
have resulted in proposed legislation
to require cities to inform bond buyers
about their finances and factors af-
fecting them. This thesis discusses
what kinds of information are involved,
how it will be used, and what the pol-
icy implications for cities are. It
presents original survey research that
sheds light on these questions.
Name and Title of Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Kent Colton, Assistant Professor
(3)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction............. ...... ........................... 6
II. History of marketing and regulation of municipal securities
and of recommended changes in disclosure and analysis practices.....11
A. The early history of municipal bonds and the develop-
ment of federal securities regulation.............
B. Established market procedures, analysis standards,
and ratings of municipal bonds....................
C. Disclosure advice given prior to 1975..........
D. SEC involvement until 1975........................
E. Two municipal financial crises that spurred
interest in regulation ......................
F. Events following the financial crises.............
G. SEC involvement after 1975...................
H. Technical questions in municipal disclosure policy
development that are related to accounting, auditi
and liability assignment.............
D i i C fhesc Ipt Von Lote sur vey researh.......... 
sclosure of revenue information................
General discussion of revenues..............
Year-end balances...........................
Property tax rates and levies...............
Property base...............................
Tax collection rates and procedures.........
Locally generated revenues other than those
from property taxes....................
State and federal aid.......................
Summary and conclusions.....................
sclosure of debt information...................
Short-term debt structures..................
Past and current levels of long-term debt...
Overlapping debt structures.................
Authorized debt and the possibilities of
increasin outst.n.i.n de
gj g ..... . . .. .. . 0. .. .. .......E. The uses of outstanding debt........................
F. Debt retirement schedules....................... ...
G. Legal debt limits and debt-weighting ratios.........
H. Summary and conclusions..... ..................
V. Disclosure of expenditure information.................
A. Disclosure of service expenditures with welfare
as an example.................. .............
B. Disclosure of municipal employment information......
C. Disclosure of employee pension funding information..
D. Summary and conclusions........ ...............
VI. Investor perceptions of local economic factors and
the character of local communities -- disclosure of
information on economic and social factors...............
A. The theoretical importance of nonfinancial factors..
B. Investor opinions of the City of Boston --
results of the Perceptions Survey...............
C. How investors might have formed their impressions
of Boston................. .................
D. Disclosure of nonfinancial information.............
E. Summary and conclusions...........................
VII. Conclusions and policy recommendations..................
.............. 12
........... .. 16
...........23
........... .27
............. 30
............. 36
.. ..........40
ng,
.49
.57
.66
.70
.78
.83
.87
.91
........... 98
.......... 102
. ....... 108
.......... 110
,... ... .115
.. .. .. .125
.......... 133
......... 137
.......... 141
.......... 146
......... 152
..........162
.................. ..........163
.................. ..........167
.......... 174
... ........179
......... 185
..........187
..........191
.................. 195
.........206
.......... 214
.......... 218
.......... 219
I.
III. Di
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
IV. Di
A.
B.
C.
D.
.......
(4)
CHARTS
III-1 Frequency of Reporting Revenue Information in 1975.............67.
111-2 Results of Questions on the Indicator Survey
Concerning Revenue Information....................................68
111-3 Disclosure Recommendations Given for General Information
on Revenues............................................69
111-4 Disclosure Recommendations Given for Information
on Year-End Balances ..................................... 77
111-5 Disclosure Recommendations Given for Information on
Property Tax Rates and Levies.....................................82
111-6 Disclosure Recommendations Given for Property Base:Information....86
111-7 Disclosure Recommendations Given for Tax Collection
Rates and Procedural Information................ ...........90
111-8 Disclosure Recommendations Given for Nonproperty
Tax Revenues............................................... 97
111-9 Disclosure Recommendations Given on
State and Federal Aid Information................. ......... 101
IV-1 Frequency of Reporting Debt Information..........................112
IV-2 Results of Questions on the Indicator Survey
Concerning Debt Information......................................113
IV-3 Disclosure Recommendations on Short-Term Debt
Structure Information ................................... 114
IV-4 Disclosure Recommendations for Information on Past
and Current Levels of Long-term Debt................ ....... 124
IV-5 Disclosure Recommendations on Overlapping Debt
Structure Information .................................... 132
IV-6 Disclosure Recommendations on Information on Authorized
Debt and the Possibilities of Increasing Outstanding Debt........136
IV-7 Disclosure Recommendations for Information on the
Uses of Outstanding Debt.........................................140
IV-8 Disclosure Recommendations for Information on
Debt Retirement Schedules................. ............... 145
IV-9 Disclosure Recommendations for Information on Local Debt
Limits and Debt-Weighting Ratios................. .......... 151
V-1 Frequency of Reporting Revenue Information in 1975.............164
V-2 Results of Questions on the Indicator Survey Concerning
Expenditure Information.............. ........................... 165
V-3 Disclosure Recommendations for Information on Services...........166
V-4 Disclosure Recommendations on Employment Information.............173
V-5 Disclosure Recommendations on Pension Funding Information........178
VI-1 Frequency of Reporting Nonfinancial Information in 1975..........188
VI-2 Results of Questions on the Indicator Survey Concerning
Nonfinancial Information...................................189
VI-3 Disclosure Recommendations forNonfinancial Informati-dn2........213
FIGURES
III-1 Composite of Local Government Revenues Sources in
Metropolitan Areas.......................................74
111-2 Equation Defining Available Revenues.............................-79
IV-2 Nonfinancial Criteria Used by the Rating Agencies................194
(5)
TABLES
III-1 Comparison of Revenue Sources and Levels in Some Cities.
111-2 Comparison of Tax-Burdens in Some Cities............
111-3 Effective Property Tax Rates in 1972-73 in Some Cities..
IV-1 Comparison of Long-Term and Short--Term Interest
Rates and Moody's Ratings of Some Cities............
IV-2 Comparisons Using Debt-Weighting Ratios of the Debt
Burdens of Some Cities..................................
V-1 Comparison of Expenditure Purposes and Levels of Some Ci
APPENDIX I
Indicator Survey Form......... ............
Results of the Indciator Survey.......:.........
APPENDIX II
Perceptions Survey Form....................
Results of the Perceptions Survey...............
APPENDIX III
Form of the Survey of Financial Officers........
Results of the Survey of Financial Officers.....
........ 75
..... 76
.. . .. . 85
.. .. . .120
. . 161
ties.....167
.232
.240
.283
..290
.308
.310
APPENDIX IV
Summary of Reporting Practices (in a Survey of Official Statements)......315
The Disclosure Recommendations of the 1951 New York City Report..........317
The Disclosure Recommendations of the 1963 IBA Format....................318
The Disclosure Recommendations of the 1965 State
Technical Assistance Report..............................................321
The Disclosure Recommendatins of the 1976 MFOA
Disclosure Recommendations...............................................324
The Proposed Disclosure Requirements of the
1976 Williams-Tower Bill.................................................330
BIBLIOGRAPHY
(6)
I. Introduction
The U.S. Congress, underwriting banks, bond dealers, and bond buyers
have discussed increased regulation of municipal securities at various times,
but no legislation has been passed as of this date. Different arguments
apply to a debate about regulation of municipal securites than to any type
of nongovernmental securities and the consequences of regulation might be
different. The practices of the municipal securities market affect most
citizens. Investors may or may not care about the purposes of local govern-
ment. If they were to review the functioning of a muncipal government,
their judgments might be different than those of local elected and appointed
officials. The financial interests of bond owners, bond dealers, and under-
writers might conflict with thepersonal and financial interests of local
citizens and taxpayers. It may be that municipalities should somehow con-
tinue to 12 protected from the disclosure, liability, and other burdens of
regulation placed upon private corporations that issue securities.
Until recently, many bond owners have known almost nothing about the
financial conditions of their debtors. Very few people who have ever lent
municipalities money bybuying their interest-bearing bonds or their short-
term interest-bearing notes have not been repaid with interest at the time
expected. A relatively few people have lost money recently in municipal
bonds, but these are almost the first problems since the Great Depression
of the 1930's.
Municipal bonds are regulated much less than corporate securities.
There are many ways they could be regulated. The one that received the
most attention in the industry and Congress in 1975 and 1976 is mandatory
"disclosure". As the term is used in these discussions, the word "disclo-
sure", also used in many other reform campaigns, means that the particular
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entity informs interested parties or the general public, about itself and
what it does. In this discussion, "municipal disclosure" means that the
municipality's administrators inform the general municipal securities market
or its particular underwriters, dealers, owners, and potential purchasers
of its securities about its finances and other relevant information.
In the past, most municipalities did not have a disclosure policy.
In the last several years, however, some degree of municipal disclosure has
become common because of pressures following financial crises in a few mun-
icipalities. However, varying types and amounts of information have been
released causing uncertainties for people trying to use it. There is con-
tinued pressure for a federally mandated disclosure policy and the proba-
bility that there will be such a policy is much highernow, than ever before.
The increased demand for municipal disclosure and for some sort of federal
regulation of municipal securities may cause a change in the relationships
of municipalities and their creditors.
Some of the important questions on regulation of municipal disclosure
that are being or might be considered by Congress are:
(1) How might municipal disclosure policies affect the interest
rates on municipal securities?
(2) Is it best for Congress or a federal agency to define the
information that must be disclosed? If so, what information
should they require?
(3) Is federal regulation of municipal disclosure polices pol-
itically acceptable?
(4) Is it necessary for local governments to conform to one
standard of accounting practices in order that municipal
disclosure be effective, and, if so, how could this be
implemented?
(5) Who will be responsible if the disclosed material is in-
accurate or incomplete?
(8)
(6) How much might disclosure policies cost local governments?
(7) Will policies of disclosure sufficiently satisfy investors
so that they will continue to buy municipal bonds even if
some local governments have more financial problems?
(8) What indirect effects might municipal disclosure have on
local governments?
Some of the questions that decision-makers for a particular munici-
pality might evaluate in developing a municipal disclosure policy are:
(1) If allowable, will there be advantages in limiting or
expanding the scope of information that is reported
compared to what has been suggested?
(2) How should information be distributed?
(3) What will the disclosure program cost the municipality?
(4) Will the policy cause political conflict?
(5) How will the information be used?
(6) Will the municipality have an advantage in the bond market
if it changes its accounting practices or has more
extensive or more frequent audits or employs a prestig-
ious firm of CPA's?
These sets of questions are further developed in this thesis. The
history and purpose of municipal disclosure and the potential usefulness
and costs of particular information are considered. However, the narrow
range of information concerning the legality and payment provisions of mun-
icipal securities contracts, the special domain of the bond counsel, are
not discussed. The range of possible information that might be used to
describe municipal issuers is very large because municipal bonds are issued
by state governments, county governments, city governments, small town gov-
ernments, school districts, utility districts, airports, port authorities,
highway authorities, etc. The sources of revenues and factors affecting the
security of revenue bonds and of general obligation bonds are diverse. For
(9)
simplicity, therefore, most of this discussion is confined to disclosure
policies of large cities to potential purchasers and current holders of
long-term general obligation bonds.
The second chapter of this thesis discusses the history of the munic-
ipal disclosure controversy. The most important sources cited in this
thesis are briefly described and their use further explained. The third,
fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters consider information describing revenues,
debt, expenditures, and nonfinancial factors, respectively. A short intro-
duction to each of these chapters is followed by charts showing the rele-
vant data and various reporting recommendations. The concluding chapter
discusses the general policy implications of the factors considered in the
body of this thesis.
A number of comissions composed of experts and influential people
have suggested information to be disclosed. However, little data has been
published providing insights into the perceived desire for and possible
uses of such information by the municipal securities market, in general.
Information selected for disclosure may be packaged in prospectus statements
and annual reports. Other information is available through personal
experience, by word-of-mouth, and through the general news media. As part
of the reseach for this thesis, this author developed and administered three
surveys: (]) a survey of "Investor Needs for Information in a Municipal
Propsectus Statement", (2) a survey of "Investor Perceptions of Boston", and
(3) a "Survey of Financial Officers". The results from these questionaires
supplement published recommendations and their implicit theories of the
purposes of municipal disclosure. Some of the recommendations of the com-
missions are supported while others are contradicted. New theories on using
(10)
information describing cities are suggested by the survey results and devel-
oped in this thesis.
For ease of expression, two surveys when discussed in this thesis are
referred to by shorter titles than those used in labelling the forms when
they were distributed. The survey of "Investor Needs for Information in a
Municipal Prospectus Statement"is referred to as the Indicator Survey. The
survey of "Investor Perceptions of Boston" is referred to as the Perceptions
Survey.
How the survey data generally supplements various disclosure guide-
lines and other advice given at various times and their format and dis-
tributions are explained in the last section of Chapter II. The survey data
is used to critique various suggestions for disclosure of information on
revenues, debt, expenditures, and nonfinancial information in the other
chapters. The survey results are cited as sources throughout the thesis.
All of the results are not discussed together in any one section of the
thesis. However, the cover letters, survey forms, and tabulated results of
the Indicator Survey, the Perceptions Survey, and the Survey of Financial
Officers are included in Appendix I, Appendix II, and Appendix III, respec-
tively. Appendix IV includes the major disclosure recommendations cited.
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II. History of marketing and regulation of municipal securities and of
recommended changes in disclosure and analysis practices
Why have investors bought and traded municipal securities while know-
ing very little about their issuers? Why is this currently a subject of con-
cern? Of the reasons that municipal securities were marketed without full
disclosure, which still apply and what are new factors? What recommendations
have been given and how have they been received? What questions remain un-
resolved and what contributions does this thesis make towards their resolution?
This chapter is concerned with these questions and discusses them in
an historical context. In historical order, proposed legislation to regulate
municipal securities information release and analysis and studies making
disclosure recommendations used in Chapters III, IV, V, and VI are described.
The most recent evidence used in this thesis -- the results of three surveys
by the author -- is explained. This chapter has nine sections: (A) The
early history of municipal bonds and the development of federal securities
regulation, (B) Established market procedures, analysis standards, and
rating of municipal bonds, (C) Disclosure advice prior to 1975, (D) SEC
involvement prior to 1975, (E) Two municipal financial crises that spurred
interest in regulation, (F) Responses to the UDC and the NYC financial
crises, (G) SEC involvement after 1975, (H) Technical questions in mun-
icipal disclosure policy development that are related to accounting, auditing,
and liability assignment, and (I) Description of the survey research.
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A. The early history of municipal bonds and the development of federal
securities regulation.
Municipal bonds are promissory notes that enjoy exemption from federal
income taxes and most local taxes. They were developed as a vehicle to dis-
tribute the cost of needed public facilities over the time of their use and
among transient populations. Their tax-exempt status serves to lower the
interest costs municipalities must pay.
Throughout the history of the United States, banks and other capital in-
vestment organizations have financed the development and expansion of towns
and cities. Banks made large loans to finance the development of ports,
railroads, mines, and other private enterprises. To help those investments
succeed, the banks made loans to enable city and town governments to build
roads, schools, and other public facilities needed by people and industry.
If a bank made commercial and municipal loans in only a dozen towns,
the loan officers could become familiar with the characteristics of the pop-
ulance, economy, government, and the political and business leaders. How-
ever, as the capital markets increased in sophistication, there were advan-
tages for the financial institutions in making loans to a greater diveristy
of municipalities and private firms. Because it facilitated management,
bankers traded loan contracts among themselves. This trading increased the
need for formality and made it more difficult for the banks to keep track of
their clients.
Investor services assigned ratings to municipal and private bonds, which
served to facilitate marketing. According to one rating critic:
(13)
"Moody's began rating bonds in 1919, Standard &
Poor's not until 1950. Until the Great Depression,
Moody's rated most issues Aaa or Aa... (In the) pre-
Depression days when the rule of thumb was the number
of railroads passing through a town. One railroad
called for a single A, two for Aa, and so forth."/48, p. 85_7
The "railroad rule of thumb" did not show which municipalities' securities
were the most risky to buy. In the 1930's, 78% of municipal bonds that de-
faulted were rated "triple A" or "double A" at the time. /~49, p. 1357-
The boom of the 1920's and the Depression of the 1930's showed the need
for order in the investment markets. Fortunes were lost in fraudulent
schemes and it was impossible to estimate the risk of many investment possi-
bilities. The powerful provisions of The Securities Act of 1933 and The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are the bases of federal regulation of most
securities investments.
Before corporate securities are distributed to the public, The Secur-
ities Act of 1933 generally requires complete and accurate disclosure of:
the identity of, and renumeration to, the directors, principal officers, and
underwriters of the issuer; the identity and holdings of major stockholders;
the most recent financial statements and material contracts of the issuer;
the proposed use of the funds to be acquired through the issue, underwriting
agreements, and other information relating to the issuer. This disclosure
is to be made in a registration statement that must be filed with the Sec-
urities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and in a prospectus that must be fur-
nished to securities purchasers. Other provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts
provide penalties for fraudulent and deceptive practices, set other business
standards, and require SEC registration of brokers. /.37, p. 569_/
Municipal securities, banks, and broker/dealers effecting transactions
only in municipal securities were exempt until 1975 from all substantive
provisions of the 1933 Act and subsequent securities regulation and legisla-
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tion except for very general "antifraud" provisions. All the SEC rules in-
volving fraud included municipal securities transactions. However, only
dealers who also dealt in corporate securities were forced to register with
the SEC and keep records following SEC standards. If the SEC discovered
that registered dealers were behaving fraudulently, it could easily stop the
offending actions. The Commission has authority to investigate violations
of The Securities Acts by registered dealers, and through administrative
proceedings, to discipline them by suspension or revocation of their regis-
tration, which could force the firm into bankruptcy. /44, pp. 2043-2044_7
Although the SEC staff could try to prove that the firm had acted fraudu-
lently, it did not need to do so to discipline a registered dealer. Effec-
tive discipline could be applied if the SEC could prove that the firm had
violated SEC administrative rules.
If an unregistered dealer or municipal securities issuer were behaving
fraudulently, possibilities for legal recourse were much different. Unreg-
istered dealers in municipal securities who behaved fraudulently had a
smaller risk of being caught and punished. They were not forced to file or
keep records that could be used as evidence. The SEC could not review their
cases in administrative hearings, nor punish them by suspending their li-
censes, as no license was required. If dealers' fraudulent actions were dis-
covered, the SEC could prosecute them in civil court for violations of stat-
utory laws or private citizens could sue them for damages on various grounds.
When unregistered dealers were discovered behaving illegally, the SEC could
charge them with violating the "antifraud" provisions of The Securities Acts
of 1933 and 1934. As discussed later, in 1975 much controversy developed in
the legal system about whether some evidence of deliberate fraud is necessary
for the "antifraud" provisions of The Securities Acts to apply or whether
(15)
negligence and reckless actions are sufficient grounds. Until 1976, the SEC
never brought suit against a municipality (which are never required to reg-
ister with the SEC) under those provisions of The Securities Acts.
The administrative differences in regulation of municipal securities
and other securities were not part of a carefully analyzed policy. In fact,
as The Securities Act of 1933 was originally drafted, municipal securities
were not exempt from any of its provisions. /~44, p. 2044_/ In the Hearings
for the Bill, the President of the New York Society of Certified Accountants
testified in favor of the original version and argued strongly that municipal
securities investors needed more information than was usually available.
This was successfully countered by extensive testimony that full application
of the Act to municipal securities markets would unduly burden the securities
industry and impair the fund raising abilities of municipal issuers.
L 37, p. 570_/ At the last minute, the Bill was redrafted so that municipal
securities "were made exempt for obvious political purposes". /~44, p. 2044_/
If some aspects of the credit extended to municipalities had been brought
under regulation in the time of securities reform following the stock market
crash and the Great Depression, later events might have been different. A
resolution of conflicts between the interests of investors and municipalities
was not even begun. One lawyer who had counselled a bankrupt municipality
wrote in 1935:
"If individual bond holders are permitted to bring
individual mandamus proceedings, the going value of the
municipality will be seriously reduced and there will be
no hope for a settlement short of a time 'when the munici-
pality, by resort to devices like the appointment of
assessors on a platform of resignation or residence in
jail for contempt or like the legislative abolition of
the municipality and the substitution of another, or like
the separation of the tax roll into two, one for current
expenses and the other for debt service, beats the cred-
itors to their knees so that all are willing to get to-
gether on a reasonable settlement." [13, p. 44_/
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Because the question of regulation of municipal securities was dismissed
without resolution in the 1930's, great uncertainty persists as to the rights
of the city, its citizens, and its creditors -- not only when it is bankrupt
but also when it is financially sound.
In the years following The Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, there was
a great deal of abuse of the municipal securities market by individual deal-
ers. As personal incomes increased, the tax-exempt feature of municipal bonds
attracted more non-institutional investors. Some municipal securities deal-
ers were able to take advantage of some investors' lack of sophistication by
using methods the SEC prohibited private securities dealers from using. Un-
qualified commission salespeople used high pressure to sell revenue bonds
issued by small, unknown, and mismanaged municipal corporations and other low-
quality, high-risk bonds. Sometimes they said that a quick purchase was best
because the bonds were in short supply or that the sellers had to take a loss
in the sale because they had immediate personal needs for cash, Sometimes
they misrepresented the sources of funds for repayment of bonds. Some firms
inflated the prices or substituted for the bonds actually ordered by their
customers. /_37, p. 571_7 As discussed earlier, when fraudulent behavior by
municipal securities dealers was discovered, some private citizens sued for
damages, and the SEC prosecuted others in court. However, it was obvious
that many people had been cheated by firms that were never prosecuted.
B. Established market procedures, analysis standards, and ratings of
municipal bonds.
Althdugh they have recently changed somewhat, the following procedures have
been used to market municipal bonds since the Great Depression, When a munic-
ipality had 'special. cash needs, its financial officers first consulted with a
(17)
bond attorney and sometimes with other financial experts. They helped the
municipality's financial officers to check the procedures for authorization
of the bonds. These usually involved voter approval of tax-supported gener-
al obligation bonds, or a pledging.of cash streams from a particular project,
such as a toll bridge, for revenue bonds. The bond attorney and financial
consultants helped to decide exactly how much money was needed, whether the
bonds should be repaid serially or all at one time, and whether the bonds
should pledge the "full-faith-and-credit" of the municipality and its taxing
powers.
Banks usually bid competitively on the bonds, and the municipalities
sold the bonds to the bank charging the lowest interest. When the bonds
were sold in large volumes they were usually bought by bank syndicates
(groups of banks bidding together). If not enough banks bid competitively,
a negotiated sale was arranged. That is, municipal officials arranged
bond terms with a bank that had a special interest or knowledge of the mun-
icipality. In either case, independent dealers or dealers affiliated with
banks sold the bonds to individuals and organizations. Underwriting banks
and dealers both took a commission.
Before the sale, the municipalities notified Moody's and/or Standard
& Poor's, the most prominent rating agencies, of their intentions. Initially,
municipalities were not charged for having a rating assigned to their sec-
urities. To increase profits, the rating agencies began to charge the mun-
icipalities in the 1960's. Even though ratings are a service to the invest-
ors, they had become so necessary for successful sales that practically all
municipalities subscribed. The agencies gave the municipalities alist of
information to provide for their first ratings which municipalities were
required to update. The rating agencies usually reviewed each issuer once
(18)
every three years, although they could change a rating whenever they wished.
The rating applied to all outstanding securities of that issuer. A bond
might receive a-different ratingqfrom Moody's and from Standard & Poor's and
each agency used a slightly different format.
Use of the rating services was convenient for most municipalities even
though those receiving low ratings were hurt. Financial officers merely had
to gather stacks of information and mail them to the rating agencies, They
did not have to summarize or specially prepare the material. The rating
agencies did not require an independent audit. They did not always verify
the accuracy of the material they received. 137, p. 586 7 Because the
rating agencies usually assigned only one analyst to all the issuers from a
state, there was little time for extensive follow-up meetings with the mun-
icipal financial officers.
Before the sale municipal issuers distributed offering circulars with
very little detail, unlike those of private issuers. The notice of sale and
prospectus statement which accompanied municipal bonds and notes were gener-
ally one to four pages long. Most of the statement was devoted to a descrip-
tion of the bond itself and was prepared by the bond attorney. There was
almost no information about the finances, government, population or local
economy of the issuer. The rating and reputation of the bond attorney in
national investment circles were very important in determining the interest
rate.
The costs of the bond rating, bond notice, and the prospectus -were a
very small part of the expenses of marketing gene-ral obligation bonds. A
survey by the Municipal Finances Officers Association (MFOA) of 481 local
governments found that the average expense of marketing municipal bonds was
composed of the following costs:
(19)
Marketing costs per Cost distri-
$1,000 in bonds ($) bution (%)
Special Election Costs 1.25 12.7
Legal and Financial Fees 2.02 62.7
Fiscal Advisor - (31.5)
Bond Notice .06 2.5
Prospectus .10 3.3
Printing of Bonds .20 8.5
Bond Rating .09 2.7
Other Costs .08 2.7
3.80
/54, pp. 135-136_7*
The total of these costs for marketing when the bonds were issued was less
than the interest costs that municipalities usually pay for each year they
are outstanding. The differences in interest rates was caused by many fac-
tors including: capital market interest rates, size of the bond issue, vol-
ume of the bonds issued by other municipalities at the same time, special
securities attached to the bonds, reputation of the issuer, and the rating
assigned by the agencies. If the municipality could influence these fac-
tors so that it could borrow at lower interest, it could achieve consider-
able savings. Although not a standard procedure, some municipalities would
make presentations to the rating agencies to convince them to upgrade their
securities, often resulting in the underwriters' increased willingness to
bid at lower interest rates. Some municipalities hired financial consult-
ants who could maintain trained staff to advise them on these factors. One
financial consultant said that he could sometimes influence the rating agen-
cies in their evaluations. /23 7
If a municipality were downgraded, the voters might blame its admin-
istrator. However, other political costs to the administration were minimal
* as reported by Steiss. This information is useful in comparing marketing
costs to evaluate market strategies. However, the data reported is flawed
because the year in which the survey was taken was not reported and because
the distribution (%) figures do not reflect the "cost per $1,000" figures.
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under the standard process in which bonds were marketed with minimal dis-
closure and ratings assigned by the private investor services. Information
given to the rating agencies is supposed to be confidential, Standard &
Poor's Corporation released a statement that:
"...information received as part of the bond rating
process which has not been publicly disseminated is
to be strictly limited to the parties involved in the
bond rating process, and under no circumstances will
it be available to apy person outside of the depart-
ment." / 60, p. 32_/
If the information given to the rating agencies were publicized, it might
be used as evidence for criticism of the municipality's administration.
The ratings are, and were, convenient tools for the marketing of mun-
icipal bonds. Unlike underwriters of corporate securities, who carefully
analyze all of their purchases, underwriters of municipal securities win
an average of only 24% of their bids, / 59, p. 126_/ so a thorough analysis
of all their potential purchases would be very time consuming. If purchas-
ers were going to buy only a few bonds, they could examine a selection in a
certain range of interest with acceptable ratings for their purposes and
decide on the basis of the convenience of maturity dates. A bond dealer
could bring to a potential purchaser a dozen of the short notices of sale
and discuss them in one appointment. Although the investors could have
considered expensive limited circulation reports compiled by the rating
agencies, few did. /23 7
Use of the rating services of municipal bonds was further strength-
ened by bank regulations and common law. Federally insured banks are not
allowed to buy municipal bonds unless they are rated at least Baa (or BAA),
Bank officers and others administering the investment of funds in trust
are held to have a "fiduciciary responsibility". Their investment purchases
must be of a certain quality to legally satisfy their obligation, The rat-
(21)
ings of Moody's and Standard & Poor's can be used as evidence of the quality
of municipal bond purchases. Even if the bonds were to default, the trust
managers who bought highly rated bonds would not be held personally, legally
responsible. /40_7 Use of the letter ratings made it generally easier to
establish standards for bond purchases. They could be used to describe a
portfolio of bonds. For instance, pension managers could assure employees
that they were taking good care of their money because they bought AAA and
AA rated bonds.
The dependence of the municipal securities market on the two pref-
itable, privately owned rating agencies for bond evaluation became insti-
tutionalized for many reasons, including convenience for busy municipal ad-
ministrators, underwriters, bond dealers, and final purchasers and use of
the ratings to describe portfolios and allowed investment decisions by trust
managers.
The rating agencies have never reviewed the standards that they use
to determine what rating a bond should receive. However, in 1941 a panel of
fifty experts in municipal finance was asked to rate a list of criteria as to
effect on the soundness or unsoundness of the finances of any municipality.
Those criteria were then applied to twenty-five randomly selected cities and
their results correlated highly to Moody's ratings. 148, p. 85_/ These re-
sults support the theory that, if analysts have access to the necessary in-
formation, they can assess the "quality" of a.bond as well as Moody's and the
other rating agencies.
The purpose of municipal credit analysis has been obscure. A bank
vice-president wrote to the Treasurer of Boston that, "The purpose of munic-
ipal credit analysis is not to be able to predict default. The objective is
to be able to rank bonds according to a limited set of criteria.. .Quality is
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a relative thing measured across a spectrum." / 18 7 A statement by a
small service for investors defined the "aim of credit analysis" differently
as being "(A) Evaluate the ability of the issuer to pay its debts, (B) Ev-
aluate the willingness to pay debts, (C) Determine whether there are sig-
nificant features of weakness which may lead to trouble in the future, and
(D) Assist in comparisons of one issuer with another -- to place the credit
in a category as to quality." / 60, p. 36_7
If investors buy a municipal bond to hold it until maturity, their
only risk is of default. Many institutional investors, however, have found
that they can maximi e profits by trading bonds on the secondary market where
prices are affected by many factors including general capital market move-
ments and changes in ratings. They assume a risk of market loss.
Some investors speculate, trying to outguess when the rating agencies
will change a rating. If bonds are bought on the secondary market before the
rating is upgraded, the bonds can often be resold for a higher price. Analy-
sis of bonds' potentials for price movement inthe trading market is different
than analysis of the risks of default.
In 1968, Rabinowitz described his experiences with quality analysis
of municipal bonds:
"This writer has been privileged to work for a number of
years as an independent consultant to major investors in muni-
cipal bonds who have been willing to take the trouble to set
up their own systems of identifying those bonds of high intrin-
sic quality that have equally high possibility of being either
upgraded or downgraded. It is a terrible chore to handle the
incredible mass of statistics concerning the 'objective' facts
concerning municipal finance and urban development; the sta-
tistics themselves are often obsolete, aggregated in difficult
ways, and incomplete, reflecting the diversity of our federal
system and the neglect of urban research in our past, but the
dollar rewards of an improved intution concerning how the rat-
ing services may rate or reclassify certain types of commun-
ities, given certain changes in underlying characteristics of
the local economy and its populace, can be substantial." / 48, p. 807
(23)
Most purchase decisions are, and where, made without the benefit of
detailed analysis such as that described by Rabinowitz. It is not known to
what extent investors and other participants in municipal securities wanted
to do detailed analysis. It is clear that, although many banks had special
divisions to handle the purchasing and dealing of municipal bonds, few
insitutionalized a municipal credit analysis function. In fact, survey
results submitted to the Senate in 1976 show that 53 out of 87 investment
banking firms, commercial banks, and property and casualty insurance compan-
ies with municipal portfolios had no full-time municipal credit analysts.
/_63, p. 271_7 Furthermore, although the libraries of several prestigious
business schools carried extensive works on analysis of private securities,
they carried no works on analysis of municipal securities.
Independent municipal credit analysis has been hampered by these
problems:
(1) The necessity to dig for information. Most municipalities do not
distribute it and the rating agencies do not avail it to others;
(2) Difficulties in comparing financial information. The data vary
becauseof accounting practices, government structures, and ser-
yices offered;
(3) Difficulties in comparing non-financial information. Much of the
data was collected by local agencies in irregular years using in-
compatible defin"itionsarea boundaries, and statistical and sam-
pling techniques;
(4) The lack of a consensus on the purpose of such analysis and on
how it should be done; and
(5) The lack of a policy by institutional purchasers to retain muni-
cipal credit analysts and to take their advice.
C. Disclosure advice given prior to 1976
In practically all capital markets, except that of municipal securi-
ties, many people are employed and great attention is paid to evaluating the
"intrinsic value" of securities and their potential for increasing or decreas-
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ing in trading price relative to similar securities, The idea that very lit-
tle analysis is done of municipal securities is troubling, despite the con-
venience of the ratings. Several prestigious study groups have advised mun-
icipalities to give investors certain types of information that would facil-
itate analysis. In Chapters III, IV, V, and VI, their recommendations are-
compared and evaluated.
In 1951 Dr. Frederick L. Bird, research director of the municipal de-
partment of Dun & Bradstreet and a member of the Mayor's Committee on Manage-
ment Survey of New York, pointed out the potential public realtions advan-
tages of disclosure for the City of New York:
"It is necessary to understand, and have con-
sideration for, the investor's point of view; to
determine what he wants to know, and properly should
know, about the city financial affairs; to provide
such data in readily understandable form... Each
sale should be preceded by publicity designed to
give potential bidders and investors adequate notice -
and also pertinent, up-to-date financial information
well presented as to attract special attention. Thus,
the prospectus should go to a comprehensive audience
well in advance of the date set for receiving bids,
and in a few pages should present as clearly, simply,
and effectively as possible not only basic financial
statistics, but data on the various important security
factors that govern the issuance and administration of
the city's debt. The opportunities for strengthening
the city's financial standing that stem from such a
statement, if skillfully prepared, are_great."
/ 1, p. 36_/
Dr. Bird's comments were contained in a report (hereafter referred to as
the "1951 New York City Report") which also gives a description of the min-
imum information to be reported on the community, financial trends, tax de-
tail, fund assets, bond principal maturities, finances of overlapping units,
etc, L1, p. 37_/ (See Appendix IV, Table A-IV 2)
In 1946, 1955, 1958, and 1963, the Investment Bankers Association pub-
lished guidelines for bond prospectus statements (hereafter referred to as
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the "1963 IBA Format". / 1, p. 38_/ It suggested a standard format for gen-
eral obligation bonds with information on property valuations, bonded debt,
overlapping debt, unfunded debt, sinking funds, debt service requirements
for the next five years, comparisons of operating revenues and expenditures,
property tax collections, and general tax information. / 1, pp. 64-66 7
The format suggested for issuers of general obligation bonds is only three
pages long but much more detailed than most offering circulars which have
been distributed. (See Appendix IV, Table A-IV-2)
In 1964 The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, a
prestigious standing committee with members including mayors, state and fed-
eral congressmen, a governor,and the Secretaries of HEW and the Treasury,
did a thorough study of various problems in municipal finance. The Commis-
sion published a report in 1965 called State Technical Assistance to Local
Debt Management('hereafter referred to as the "1965 State Technical Assistance
Report"). In this report the Commission recommended that states design pro-
grams that would develop and maintain state files on local debt and related
data, disseminate data on local government finances, and prescribe minimum
standards for official statements on local debt offerings. The Commission
recommended information to be included in a notice of sale and information
to be included in an official statement for appraising bond offerings (i.e.
prospectus statement). /1, pp. 37-43_7 (See Appendix IV, Table A-IV-3)
Administration of Local Government Debt, a textbook by the Director
of Finance of the City of Philadelphia, Lennox Moak, which was published in
1970, elaborated on standards for reporting on debt which had been given by
the National Committee on Governmental Accounting, Auditing, and Financial
Reporting (NCGA), The investor, he suggested, is interested in "(A) the
ability of the government to meet the payments of principal and interest
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upon its debt, (B) the willingness of officials to use their powers to ser-
vice the debt, and (C) the record of the community in debt and other finan-
cial management."
Moak's text suggests that fund and combined statements be given for
the balance sheet, revenues, cash receipts and disbursements, delinquent
taxes receivable, and a schedule of investments. It also suggests report-
ing the schedule of bonds payable, by type of security pledged, and the bal-
ances of sinking funds, debt service funds, and other reserve funds. The
NCGA has recommended statistical trend data for ten years for the following:
expenditures by function, revenues by source, tax levies and collections,
assessed and estimated actual value of taxable property, property tax rates
and tax levies for all overlapping governments, special assessment collec-
tions, ratio of annual debt service expenditures for general bonded debt to
total general expenditures, and the schedule of revenue bond coverage. The
NCGA also recommended reporting figures for debt service requirements until
maturity, the value of outstanding direct and overlapping debt, and the legal
debt margin. The NCGA has also recommended a list of miscellaneous data
items of which Moak suggests that the most important information is the fol-
lowing: a description of the general government organization, its physical
improvements and numbers of employees, and a distribution of the property tax
roll by type of property with names and assessments of the largest taxpayers.
Furthermore, the NCGA and Moak suggest that population trends, the bases of
the economy, and percapita and personal income of the residents are important
to the investor.
The information listed by the NCGA and by Moak is much more extensive
than that suggested by the 1951 New York City Report, the 1963 IBA Format,
and the 1965 State Technical Assistance Report. Those recommendations were
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designed for information to be distributed to bond purchasers in an official
prospectus. Moak's recommendations did not assume prospectus reporting. He
suggested disclosure by releasing that information to the rating agencies,
financial journals, the U.S. Census Bureau, banking commissions and state in-
surance departments, principal banks in the region and in the nation's finan-
cial centers, investment banking firms that have bid on the issuer's securit-
ies, associations of investors, the IBA, the MFOA (Municipal Finance Officers'
Association), the bond counsel, taxpayer associations, and various state and
local government agencies. /27, pp. 444-446_/
Most municipalities ignored the advice of the 1951 New York City Re-
port, the 1963 IBA Format, the 1965 State Technical Assistance Report, and
that of Moak. In general, they continued to release the short notice-of-
sale bulletins when selling bonds. They prepared annual reports but did not
design them for use by the bond investor.
D. SEC involvement until 1975
Over the years, various federal legislation has been passed that
helped toclarify and espand The Securities Acts, of 1933 and 1934 as they
applied to regulation of corporate securities. However, municipal securities
retained their exemption from all of the securities regulations except the
"anti-fraud" provisions. The SEC's main administrative powers in municipal
securities regulation were over municipal bond dealers who also dealt in
corporate securities. The SEC made very clear the hard-line approach it
would take towards municipal securities if it had more authority. Its pos-
ition was stated in a 1967 SEC administrative prosecution of a dealer in both
municipal and private securities:
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Walston & CQ,, Inc., and Harrington CCH Fed, Sec, ,, Rep,
77, p. 474 (SEC 1967)
"It is incumbent on firms participating in an offering
and on dealers recommending municipal bonds to their custo-
mers as 'good municipal bonds' to make diligent inquiry,
investigation, and disclosure as to material facts relating
to the issuer of the securities and bearing upon the ability
of the issuer to service such bonds. It is, moreover, es-
sential that dealers offering such bonds to the public
make certain that the offering circulars and other selling.
literature are based on adequate investigation so that they
accurately reflect all material facts which a prudent in-
vestor should kn'ow in order to evaluate the offering before
reaching an investment decision. The offering circular
used by the registrant in this situation fell far short of
this standard of disclosure."/ 44, p. 2046_/
In 1972, the Securities Industry Association (SIA) recommended limited
federal administrative regulation of the municipal securities industry.
/ 44, p. 2048_7 The SIA proposal was debated in Congress and in Congres-
sional Hearings from 1972 to 1975, when The Securities Acts Amendments of
1975 were passed. The SIA had specifically suggested in 1972 that an entire-
ly new, self-regulatory body for the municipal securities industry be created
with a limited oversight power vested in the SEC. The extensive discussion
of the proposed legislation presented an opportunity to suggest mandatory
municipal disclosure, but it was not taken because of bureaucratic conflict.
The SEC had responded to the SIA proposal with a recommendation that
all, brokers and dealers as well as banks be included under the regulatory
provisions of The Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934. The Dealer Bank Associa-
tion, a trade organization representing 130 commercial banks who were under-
writers and traders in all forms of public securities, proposed that existing
bank regulatory agencies be given expanded regulatory powers over the banks
acting as dealers in municipal securities. The banks preferred to be regu-
1ted by agencies with which they had already developed a rapport than by the
SEC which has had no authority over banks, The banks suggested that the same
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regulations be imposed by the SEC on independent dealers and by the several
bank regulatory agencies on bank dealers.
Two important compromises evolved when this legislation was developed,
which limited the expanded powers of the SEC. The first compromise limited
the SEC's authority over municipal securities dealers. All banks and other
brokers and dealers in municipal securities were required to register with
the SEC. The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board was established as part
of the SEC but given a.separate board of directors and a fair degree of ad-
ministrative independence. The MSRB was required to adopt rules regarding
professional standards, prevention of fraud, inspection of dealer records,
etc. The bank regulatory agencies were given primary enforcement over dealer
banks like the Dealer Bank Association had suggested. /44, p. 2048_j
The second compromise, which also conflicted with the SEC's position
at that time, concerned information requirements for municipal securities.
Central to the thrust of regulation of securities to protect investors is ex-
amination and regulation of information given to investors about the security.
This is the strongest point of The Securities Act of 1933 and of SEC regula-
tion of private issuers. Yet a witness representing the Municipal Finance
Officers Association (MFOA) at the 1974 Hearings on this legislation stated
that he had learned, while working previously in cooperation with the staff
of the SEC, that in the "real world" any requirement imposed upon dealers to
provide a customer with information was tantamount to a requirement imposed
upon the issuer. The witness supported an amendment to the Bill that would
have prohibited any requirement that an issuer or a dealer supply information
concerning the issuer of a municipal security to a purchaser or to a prospec-
tive purchaser. £ 44,. p. 2051_
(30)
In response to this testimony and other pressures from the represent-
atives of municipalities, Senator Williams and Senator Tower introduced an
amendment to the bill that prohibited the Securities Rulemaking Board from
imposing standards of disclosure on state and local units. /63, p. 215_/
Section 15 B (d) of the 1975 Amendments to The Securities Act reads:
"The Board is not authorized under this title to
require any issuer of municipal securities, directly, or
indirectly through a municipal securities dealer or oth-
erwise, to furnish to the Board or to a purchaser or pro-
spective purchaser of such securities any application,
report, document, or information with respect to such
issuer: Provided, however, that the Board may require
municipal securities dealers to furnish to the Board
or purchasers or prospective purchasers of municipal
securities, applications, reports, documents, and in-
formation with respect to the issuer which is gener-
ally available from a source other than such issuer.
Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to impair
or limit the power of the Commission under any provi-
sion of this title." /44, p. 2053_/
Interestingly, the senators who proposed and backed this amendment were the
same senators who proposed and backed a bill in 1976 mandating municipal dis-
closure.
At the time of the amendment, Senator Tower stated on the Senate floor
that its purpose was simply to clarify "that the (Securities Acts Amendments
of 1975) bill is not intended to tamper in any way with the prerogatives of
state and local governments in their sale of securities". /44, p. 2061J
Since that time, the validity, implications, and wisdom of the amendment
have been questioned.
E. Two municipal financial crises that spurred interest in regulation
Two large municipal issuers, the New York Urban Development Corpora-
tion and New York City, defaulted bringing renewed consideration of munici-
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pal securities regulation, particularly of mandatory disclosure.
The Urban Development Corporation (UDC) was a special public develop-
ment corporation created to build low-income housing and other public pro-
jects in the State of New York. It financed its projects with "moral obliga-
tion bonds which it issued several times a year to fund the rapid pace of
construction. The bonds were actually housing revenue bonds made more at-
tractive by attaching to them the "moral obligation of the State of New York"
John Mitchell, a bond attorney who later became U.S. Attorney General under
the Nixon administration, designed the enabling legislation for the bonds,
providing that in event of depletion of a reserve of a year's debt service
requirements, the legislature would be notified and would apportion funds.
Although the legislature understood at that time that it would never be ob-
ligated to appropriate funds, some people in the bond market misinterpreted
the statute. /36, pp. 3-6_/ The moral obligation feature of the bonds
was very innovative -- because they were not general obligation bonds, they
did not require voter approval; because they were not plain revenue bonds,
close scrutiny was not given to the flow of funds from the projects.
The UDC was funded by bond proceeds and by the rental income from the
housing projects. Of the total UDC housing units, 90.4% were dependent on
non-guaranteed federal housing subsidies. This rental income was needed to
repay the bonds and to maintain the facilities. The official statement ac-
companying the UDC's Series A 1971 and 1972 bond issues stressed the informal
understanding with HUD officials about continuing subsidies.
Warning signals of the UDC's financial troubles first appeared in -
early 1973. -The finance director had resigned, complaining that agency wide
and individual cash-flow projections had not been prepared on a regular
basis and that those available covered only short-term cash requirements.
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Later in 1973, the UDC's auditors were unable to express an opinion as to
the accuracy of the accounts with respect to fee income, project costs, and
mortgage loans. / 36, pp. 141-144_/
The usual underwriter of the UDC's bonds, First Boston, did not know
what to do when it received the draft of the 1973 audit. It seemed that
the UDC might have trouble repaying outstanding bonds unless the State of
New York contributed funds. The bank lacked the understanding of state
politics to know whether the State would honor its "moral obligation". If
the bank were to refuse to underwrite the new bond issue, the UDC would have
more problems meeting immediate debt service demands on outstanding debt.
Because of the UDC's rapid expansion and the cutback in federal housing sub-
sidies, it used proceeds from new issues,intended for new construction, to
repay outstanding bonds, although this was unethical and risky. Without
more bond proceeds, the risk of default on outstanding bonds would have been
increased. If the rating agencies downgraded the UDC when they reviewed the
damaging audit, the market risk would have been increased. This would have
reflected badly on the bank.
The bank responded to this difficult situation by agreeing to market
the bonds and by insisting on disclosing the situation so that the bank
would not be held responsible. Paul Miller, the President of First Boston,
has been quoted as saying:
"I want you to go up to the-UDC and I want you
to pull out every piece of dirty laundry that you can
possibly find. I want you to hang it all out in the
official statement. We want everything made a matter
of public record and then we will see what value the
market place will put on the moral obligation with
this kind of disclosure in it." / 36, p. 145_/
(33)
The "dirty laundry" was in a special section called "Summary of Certain
Financial Considerations and Risks" in an official UDC offering statement
accompanying bonds offered in May, 1973. This was circulated by the dealers
without review by any state officials with the exception of the New York
State Comptroller, who ignored it (state review of offering statements was
not customary). It was clear to the underwriting bank that the State Leg-
islature was not aware of the UDC's financial condition. However, there
was little communication between the financial community and state execu-
tive leaders.
There was almost no market reaction to the damaging prospectus. In-
vestors continued to rely on the moral obligation feature and purchased
bonds of the newissue at a very low interest rate. Moody's retained the
UDC's "A" rating.
When the UDC financial problems became better known because it fin-
ally defaulted, many purchasers of the 1973 bond issue complained that the
dealers had never shown them the prospectus statement which contained evid-
ence of its financial problems. Although the SEC requires that dealers show
the prospectus statements of private securities to the final buyers before
the purchase, it does not have authority to require the same for municipal
securities. Because detailed prospectus statements were so uncommon when
municipal securities were issued before 1975, buyers might not have known
to ask for one.
The Moreland Commission as appointed to investigate the UDC scandal.
The Commission, which included industry representatives, acknowledged that
although many investors and the rating agencies had understood that the
federal housing subsidies might not continue and that the State of New York
was not legally obligated to fund the UDC's deficits, they had not questioned
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the security of the bonds until it was too late. The Moreland Commission
recommended increased disclosure as a way to insure sound financial practices
and to restore the confidence of investors. The panel felt that if the UDC
had *regularly delivered detailed financial statements to bond purchasers,
investor pressure would have kept the UDC from expanding its operations
to such a risky point. /_36, p. 30_7
The UDC crisis may have contributed to the reluctance of banks in
1974 and 1975 to buy NYC bonds by raising doubt about the value of the
city's bond ratings and the financial support of the State. For years the
budget deficits had been a subject of NYC mayoral campaign discussions.
Until the UDC situation, however, the banks had been willing to buy the
City's frequent and large debt offerings. Usually, the banks located in
NYC negotiated together with the City and were able to distribute part of
the bonds outside the State. For the first time, the bank leaders told
the City's financial officers that the market for NYC bonds was saturated.
The City had no choice but to continue to try to sell its securities.
The bank officers tried to find out more about the City's finances. However,
the City's administration was unable to give the bankers consistent and
reliable information about its cash-flow and numbers of employees. /15 7
The high interest rates that NYC was forced to pay on the securities
it managed to sell during this time placed further strain upon its budget.
Its cash shortage (caused by many factors) made it difficult to repay all of
its bonds and notes that came due in 1975 and it suffered a series of near-
defaults and declared a moratorium on repayment of an outstanding short-term
issue. The uncertainty about the security of its bonded debt has been pro-
longed and caused a great deal of confusion. Even managers of NYC employee
pension funds thought that the city's bonds were too risky, although they
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bought them anyway to avoid increased layoffs of public employees. The pos-
sibility of legal bankruptcy was extensively discussed and the inadequacies
of municipal bankruptcy law were again realized. The City's situation was
somewhat resolved without formal bankruptcy proceedings. The federal gov-
ernment made emergency loans to the City. /15_7 The City's financial
administration was removed from elected officials.and put under an appointed
board with financial experts. This management corporation, "Big M.A.C.",
substituted its bonds for those of NYC and secured them by liens on the
City's tax revenues. It was hoped that investors would place more trust in
the management of "Big M.A.C." then they did in the City's elected officials.
In the Senate Hearings on aid to New York City, Lennox Moak, munici-
pal finance expert and Director of Finance of the City of Philadelphia,
tried to make clear the distinction between municipal bankruptcy and default.
"Potential bankruptcy -- When a corporation's
financial affairs are in such a difficult condition
that a thorough reorganization of these affairs is
a prerequisite to its continuance as a viable organ-
ization and when such reorganization can be effected
only under the protective wing of superior legal pro-
cess that allows time and freedom from harassment,
we must recognize that one is confronted with a de
facto temporary bankruptcy -- the NYC situation
currently.
Potential default -- A default consists of an
impending temporary inability to meet obligations
as they fall due. This can occur to corporations
which are in basically sound financial condition
but which are temporarily unable to secure orderly
access to capital markets for external reasons that
have little relationship to basic financial strength."
/ 62, p. 96_/
If the Big M.A.C. solution and the federal loans had not been pos-
sible, a full bankruptcy of New York City would have had disastrous conse-
quences. The City had already cut back on some "vital services" by closing
some schools and fire stations and by reducing the size of its police force.
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Even without bankruptcy proceedings, national and international capital
markets were shaken. Part of the attention was due to the importance of
New York City and the volume of its outstanding debt.
It is easy to see how a form of panic can build up in such situations
because of damaging and inconsistent statements from people with conflicting
personal interests. The administrators of NYC, for instance, had t6 claim-
that the City was financially sound when they knew it was not so that it
could continue to borrow. They also had to claim that the City was in des-
perate financial trouble, to impress upon the state and federal governments
the urgency of its requests for aid. Each mayor and comptroller needed to
criticize the others to try to save his personal credibility as the contra-
dictory claims became more obvious and the deficit more difficult to manage.
When the City sold a RAN issue at a very high interest, the comptroller said
in,a press release that it was caused by "...the City's ever-increasing cash
needs which have necessitated extraordinary borrowing by the City and every
expectation of a continuing need for high borrowings." /15, p. 152_/
F. Events following the financial crises
The .UDC' and New York City financial crises incited a flurry of
activity and reactions from the market, the news media, the President, and
Congress. Interest rates on all tax-exempt securities went up, and many
cities claimed that they were unable to enter the bond market at all. In
the Senate Hearings on federal loans to NYC, the President of Standard &
Poor's Corporation said:
"There has been a massive erosion in the value of municipal
securities nationwide far out of proportion to the actual risk.
This adverse market psychology has caused many bond issuers to
pay abnormally high interest rates." / 62, p. 305_7
(37)
A bill similar to the 1972 proposals of the SEC was proposed by Sen-
ator Eagleton. This bill would have required municipal securities dealers
to register, file regular statements with the SEC, and comply with all other
provisions of The Securities Act of 1933, but it received little attention.
There are more municipal issuers than there are private issuers, so the SEC
would have had to expand greatly to handle the extra work.
Another bill which deals with municipal disclosure has received much
more attention. The 1976 version of the Williams-Tower Bill (S. 2969 of
the 94th Congress) would require the SEC to set forth the accounting meth-
ods to be followed in the preparation of financial statements, but it does
not contemplate or permit direct regulation of municipal issuers through
registration, waiting periods, or the filing of sale documents with the SEC.
/63, p. 14_1 The bill (herafter referred to as the "1976 Williams-Tower
Bill") would require the preparation and distribution of annual reports and
a notice of sale and prescribes information to be included in each. Much of
this information has seldom been published by municipal issuers. This bill
was sponsored by Senator Williams and Senator Tower, who had also sponsored
the 1975 amendment that prohibited the MSRB from requiring municipal issuers
or bond dealers to provide unpublished information about the issuers's fin-
ances. Hearings for the bill proposed by Senator Eagleton and for the bill
proposed by Senator Williams and Senator Tower were held together in 1976.*
* Ronald W. Forbes (Associate Professor of Finance at the School of Busi-
ness at University Center at Albany) submitted a statement and the tabulated
results of a survey of official statements -- the "Summary of Reporting
Practices" which is used throughout this thesis. This survey was apparently
conducted in late 1975 when the longer statements were beginning to be more
popular and shows the inconsistent and incomplete state of disclosure prac-
tices at that time. It tallied how many times 174 prospectus statements in-
cluded a number of indicators including: unemployment data, personal income
data, identification or accounting practices, and current property tax rate.
(See Appendix IV, Table A-IV-(1))
(38)
Other actions on disclosure were taken by the Municipal Finance
Officers Association. The MFOA has long been active in municipal finance
by publishing textbooks, promoting uniform accounting standards, and giving
certificates to municipalities that have reached their suggested reporting
standards. In 1976, it published and circulated widely a list of proposed
items to be included in a prospectus statement (hereafter referred to as
the 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines). This organization's position is
that municipal disclosure should be voluntary not mandatory.
At least one financial officer used the 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guide-
lines. The Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners of Alleghany
County, Pennsylvania, testified that the county had received only one bid
on an bond issue that had been presented in a four-page prospectus. For-
tunately, representatives from ten major municipal bond underwriters were
willing to meet with him and his staff, and in two weeks his staff was able
to develop a "full disclosure 24-page document" based on the 1976 MFOA Dis-
closure Guidelines, after which the offering received favorable bids. /63,
p. 167_
The rating agencies did not support the 1976 Williams-Tower Bill.
Their executives testified that "full disclosure" involved so much data
that it would be impractical to generally distribute. Mr. Harries, the
President. of Standard & Poor's Corporation, said that the information nec-
essary to evaluate the quality of a recent debt offering of the State of
New Jersey was five inches high when stacked. /63, p. 110_7 The director
of .the municipal bond research division of Moody's Investor Service, Inc.
gave an interesting view of full disclosure for the purpose of analysis:
(39)
"The definition of full disclosure remains vague,
however, and ultimately must embrace everything which
a qualified analyst decides is necessary to his reaching
a conclusion... To have standardized information served
up to him is a time-consuming part of his work. The
provision of a centralized location where all information
would be on file is the dream of the scholar and the hope
of the bond analyst who is dependent on files of infor-
mation which are costly to compile and maintain. / 63, p. 153_/
Further legislation relating to information about municipal bond
issuers was proposed in the House. Representative Murphy of New York intro-
duced H.R. 675, a bill that would require the SEC to prescribe standards for
making accurate municipal bond ratings and to assure that the procedures used
in such ratings are fair to issuers of municipal bonds. /60, p. 3_/ The
SEC opposed it, however, because the bill would "inject this agency into qual-
itative assessments of the merits of municipal securities", which would be
against the "established principles of the federal securities laws whereby the
Commission has tried to steer clear of making a determination of what is or
is not a good security". L19, p. 1_/ Although the Murphy Bill has very
little chance of passing, its assumption that rating standards can be devel-
oped is interesting. At the House Hearings on this Bill, Jackson Phillips,
Executive Vice President of Moody's Investors Service, Inc. said that if it
were passed, the SEC would have two alternatives:
"On the one hand, it could look to the history and experience
of state and local government in the United States, identify those
factors which appear to have been causative of debt difficulties
or protective against them, find in contemporary affairs the evi-
dent counterparts of past precursers- which were of predictive
value relative to the causative factors, and so determine the
relevant information on which critical judgement is to be brought
to bear. This will prescribe a standard as accurate as can be
devised. If this were done with care, scholarship, and experience,
the rating system which would evolve would, we believe, be sub-
stantially indistinguishable from the system used by Moody's.
On the other hand, (the SEC might) try to devise a mechani-
cal or formula approach. This could be done by specifying which
factors may or may not be used in making the appraisal, or even
by stating mandatory weights which must be assigned to permitted
factors." / 60, p. 48J
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In both alternatives, Phillips has divided the analysis process into two
decisions: (1) Which information should be considered? and (2) How should
it be evaluated? The 1951 New York City Report, the 1963 IBA Format, the
1965 State Technical Assistance Report, the 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines,
and the 1976 Williams-Tower Bill address the first question, only.
Because the questions of who should analyze bonds, what information
they should consider, and how such information should be evaluated, were not
resolved, potential bond purchasers were painfully aware that they did not
know what risk they were assuming. The interest rates on the securities of
some cities were very attractive, however. For example, in June 1976,
Detroit sold a long-term bond issue for 9.78% annual interest; in July 1976,
Philadelphia sold a short-term note issue for 8.07% annual interest; and in
October 1976, Boston sold a long-term bond issue for 7.87%. (See Table IV-
p. 121)
One county auditor explained how a disclosure policy became a pre-
requisite for market acceptance of a bond:
"The golden rule has long prevailed in the invest-
ment market and that is, 'those who have the gold, rule.'
When underwriters do not get disclosure, they just don't
have to bid on the bonds and some of us found that out.
The fact has been elementary in the field of investments
for many, many years that an investor would investigate
before he invests and if he has nothing to investigate
he takes his other options and goes somewhere else."
[63, p. 241]
G. SEC involvement after 1975
The disclosure advice given before 1975 in the 1976 Williams-Tower
Bill and in the 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines did not deal with the
following question: If municipalities try to give the investment market
(41)
the information it needs for independent analysis, who should be respon-
sible and what should be done if the information is incomplete, inac-
curate, or misleading? These disclosure suggestions assume that the
information will be reasonably accurate and given with good intentions.
If not, they rely on the traditional penalties for a governmental official
who violates the legal responsibilities of his office. However, punish-
ments and safeguards designed to discourage embezzlement and other corrup-
tion are not appropriate.
A case involving new interpretations of the antifraud provisions of
T-he Securities Act of 1933 (discussed earlier, see pp. 13-15) came up
through the federal court system at the same time in which municipal dis-
closure emerged as a political issue. New development of liability
standards by the courts through the case has influenced the status of
federal government and market demand for municipal disclosure.
The facts of the case, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder (U.S. Supreme
Court Reporter, Vol. 425, pp. 185-218) do not involve municipalties or mun-
icipal securities. The case concerns an investor who sued the auditor of an
investment counselling firm because the audit failed to uncover a fraudulent
scheme perpetrated by the president of the investment counselling firm. The
fraud had not been discovered because the only pertaining evidence of irreg-
ularity was that the president would not allow anyone else to open his mail,
even in his absence. He had defrauded one investor successfully for a number
of years. This activity might have continued indefinitely if he had not com-
mitted suicide and confessed in a farewell note. /_14, p. 185_/
In such situations the investor normally sues the auditor for damages
on grounds of negligence. Hochfelder, however, sued the auditor, Ernst &
Ernst, for violating the antifraud provisions of The Securities Act of 1933:
(42)
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly, by use of any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they
are made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates as a fraud or deceit
upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
[44, p. 2043]
Based upon these provisions, the lower courts found that the auditor had
committed a fraudulent act. /14, p. 185_/
The lower court rulings on the Hochfelder case expanded the type of
actions that would be considered fraud under the Securities Act Rule 10-b.
If the auditor's behavior in that case was fraudulent, the behavior of
auditors of municipalities, bond counsels, underwriters, dealers and
others involved with municipal securities who had inadvertently overlooked
some factor related to the securities might also be considered fraudulent.
Another federal district case seemed to increase the investigatory
burden on underwriters of municipal securities. Sanders v. John Nuveen
involved commercial paper that, like municipal securities, was not covered
by many provisions of federal securities law.. The district court decision
appeared to impose a greater duty on underwriters to ascertain the reli-
ability of information concerning an issuer than that provided for securi-
ties subject to all the provisions of federal securities law. In this
case, the underwriters were held liable for damages to investors for
omission of material facts concerning the financial affairs of the issuer,
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nQtwithstanding the availability of independently audited financial state-
ments upon which the underwriters claimed reliance. The court found that
the underwriter had not been diligent in its investigatory duty. It said
that the underwriter should have reviewed the accountant's workpapers,
thereby exposing the accountant's compliance with the fraud. [ 63, p. 399_7
If the Supreme Court had upheld the lower courts' holdings in Hochfelder
and John Nuveen and applied the same principles to all cases involving sec-
urities that are not registered with the SEC, then underwriters of municipal
securities would have the same investigatory burden as underwriters of com-
mercial paper. If so, a scenario could conceivably develop such as the fol-
lowing: A city does not inform an underwriting bank buying its bonds that
there are material facts missing from the prospectus statement; the bankers
assume the prospectus is accurate and sufficiently complete because its
finances have been audited by an independent accountant; after the underwriter
has distributed the securities it somehow becomes known that material facts
have been omitted from the information received by the final purchaser, and,
finally, the final purchasers sue the underwriting banks for money damages.
Professionals in the securities field were understandably reluctant to
take chances such as these until their potential liability became more clear.
The underwriters and bond dealers were reluctant to accept responsibility for
the completeness and accuracy of information given by municipal issuers. The
director of Moody's Municipal Bond Division said, "Any suppression or failure
to provide information in the municipal market can only lead to suspicion of
the motives of the participants involved." L 63, p. 115j/
The underwriters were able to secure a disclosure policy from most is-
suers- because it was clear that the banks could invest all of their capital
elsewhere, but they still pressed for federal legislation that would mandate
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a standard of disclosure. Their pressure was related to the degree of lia-
bility that it seemed .they could be assigned with the progression of Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder. When a year later, the liability of underwriters
seemed reduced because of later court rulings on the case, one of the Sec-
utities and Exchange Commission.ers said that there were some signs at that
time that some industry participants were no longer anxious to push for mun-
icipal disclosure legislation "they previously considered a desirable means
to clarify the limits of their liability and to provide explicit statutory
defenses against private damage suits." He warned them that they still
needed disclosure legislation. / 11, p. 1_f
Although the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's Hochfelder rulings
(March 30, 1976), it did not sufficiently resolve liability principles that
could apply to municipal securities issuers, dealers, and underwriters. The
Court held that a private cause of action does not lie under the "antifraud"
provision of The Securities Act, Rule 10-B, in the absence of "scienter",
"a mental state embracing an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud".
/12, p. 2_7 The holding was that mere negligence does not create a private
cause of action where the investor has not relied on that person's or firm's
advice in its purchase decision. However, the majority opinion did not view
the reliance or non-reliance of the investor as a factor in whether the aud-
itor was behaving in a fraudulent manner. The Supreme Court left open the
questions of whether reckless behavior short of scienter would support a
claim under The Securities Act [~11, p, 1. and whether scienter is a nec-
essary element in a SEC action, However, a federal district court soon ruled
that 'it. is necessary for scienter to be a factor as a necessary element for
SEC actions under Rule'10-B. L12, p. 2] A Securities and Exchange Commis-
sioner then stated that its enforcement actions "were not intended to and
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should not be subject to a scienter standard", C711, p. 1-/ He also said
that "in any event...there are probably years of litigation ahead about the
exact scope of the Hochfelder decision". L12, p. 2_f
The SEC has been a strong advocate of a policy of mandatory municipal
disclosure. In addition to strong public statements by its commissioners,
the agency has taken official actions that, have affected whether investors
demand disclosure and'that might affect whether federal legislation mandat-
ing municipal disclosure is passed. The SEC is a powerful and respected
agency and is usually effective because it has a large and proficient staff
which is experienced in preparing legal arguments and assembling evidence.
If municipal disclosure were mandatory, capital markets and securities
trading might operate more smoothly -- a goal of the SEC. If another agency
were to regulate municipal disclosure, there might be conflicts between it
and the SEC (as there have been conflicts between the SEC and the bank reg-
ulatory agencies). If the SEC were to regulate municipal disclosure, it
might have to increase its staff and build up new expertise in municipal
finance.
The SEC has announced investigations of New York City and of the City
of Philadelphia. While the credibility of New York City in the securities
market had already been damaged, the City of Philadelphia seemed to enjoy
a better reputation. However, just to be named in a news release as the
subject of SEC investigation brings suspicion on all of the outstanding sec-
urities of an issuer. Legally, the City of Philadelphia must now inform po-
tential bond investors that its finances are under investigation.
/ 47, p. 1_/
If the City of Philadelphia and other municipal issuers had been reg-
istered with the SEC (as required by the original draft of The Securities
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and Exchange Acts of 1934 / 44, p. 2044_J and by the Eagleton Bill), then
they would have had to have complied with the SEC record-keeping rules. Be-
cause municipalities do not register, the SEC must obtain from them material
to review for evidence of fraudulent activity. The SEC has demanded that
the financial offices of the City of Philadelphia produce for scrutiny
copies of thousands of documents, minutes of meetings, tape recordings, and
memos dealing with the preparation of the City's budget. Although most of
this is theoretically open to public inspection, Lennox Moak*, the Director
of Finance, said that it would take months to accumulate it all. He stated
that he has no intention of interrupting "the important work of the City...
to seek to make these records available or to attempt to explain them to
representatives of the SEC." /47, p. 8_7 Because the authority of the SEC
to investigate and to sue municipalities has not been established, both New
York City and the City of Philadelphia have taken legal action against the
SEC. /47, p. 8; 40, p. 5_7
Another case has been cited in the legal and political maneuvering
over the questions of municipal disclosure. Although this case also does
not directly concern municipal securities, some of the findings may be ap-
plicable to the question of whether it is legal for the federal government
to regulate municipal securities.
*Lennox Moak is one of two members of the MFOA Debt Administration Committee
appointed to the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board. /46, p. 5_J
He was an expert witness in the Senate Hearings on loans to New York
City but did not appear for committee discussions of the 1976 Williams-
Tower Bill. His textbooks on municipal finance have been cited ex-
tensively in this thesis and stress the importance of providing accu-
rate and extensive information to investors.
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In late June of 1976 the Supreme Court ruled on National League of
Cities v. Usery, a case dealing with a law extending federal wage-and-
hour standards to municipalities. The court ruling on the Usery case was
that Congress does not have power under the Commerce Clause to pass
legislation displacing the freedom of states and cities to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.
Justice Harry Blackmun, who cast the decisive vote in that case, wrote a
separate concurring opinion. He said that a balancing approach had been
implied that did not outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental
protection, "where federal interest is demonstrably greater". [40, p. 5]
The SEC cited Blackmun's opinion in a case it filed on July 27, 1976,
against a reclamation district, a public agency of the State of Califor-
nia, which the SEC says fraudulently offered and sold about $2,220,000 in
tax-exempt securities. This is the first time the SEC has ever actually
filed a case against a municipal issuer. The SEC's points in its brief
for that case which responded to the Supreme Court findings in the Usery
case were as follows:
"Simply stated, securities fraud is neither an
'attribute of state sovereignty' nor a 'function
essential to separate and independent existence'
"Federal proscription of securities fraud
certainly will not impair the state's ability to
function effectively in a Federal system.
"The Federal securities laws do not supplant any
state policy choices.
"Application of the anti-fraud provisions will
not deny to the States the right to decide whether
or not to sell securities; when, where, and to whom
and in what form to sell securities; what interest
to pay purchasers of their debt securities; and for
what purposes the proceeds of the securities issue
will be applied.
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"Neither, will application of the anti fraud
provisions of the securities laws force the States
to relinquish important government services.
"Maintenance of the integrity of the municipal
securities market will, if anything, preserve the
ability of governmental units to finance those funda-
mental services 'which governments are created to
provide'.
"The federal interest to protect the investing
public and the municipal securities market is very
great." [40, p. 5]
The opposing legal arguments were stated in a legal brief filed in a
suit by New York City against the SEC on the same day that the SEC had
filed the brief described above (in its case against the California
district). N.Y.C. filed its suit against the SEC in response to the SEC
investigation of N.Y.C., mentioned earlier. N.Y.C. is seeking a declara-
tory judgement that would order the SEC to stop its investigation on
these legal grounds:
"Neither the Securities Act nor the Exchange Act
authorizes the SEC to regulate, investigate, or take
any action with respect to states or municipalities or
their officials in connection with the issuance or sale
of municipal securities.
"Congress expressly recognized prior to the passage
of these acts that any attempt to regulate state and
municipal issuers or securities would raise constitu-
tional difficulties.
"There is no function more fundamental to a
sovereign's separate and independent existance than
the raising of funds by borrowing or otherwise, for all
other functions are dependent on it.
"It is unconstitutional for Congress to regulate
or otherwise determine the manner in which states and
their political and governmental subdivisions may incur
and repay their debts, for by doing so Congress would
displace the freedom of states and municipAlities to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions.
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"To the extent that the provisions of the federal
securities laws are interpreted to authorize the SEC
to regulate, investigate, or take action with respect
to municipalities or their officials in connection with
the issuance or sale of municipal securities, such
provisions are unconstitutional." /~40, p. 5_/
Two constitutional issues in federal regulation of municipal securi-
ties have been cited. The one that emerges from Usery and in the suit
filed by New York City against the SEC relies on the 10th Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution which provides:
"The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people."
The second constitutional issue concerns the llth Amendment which some
lawyers claim protects state and local officials from SEC anti-fraud
action. [40, p. 5] The lth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides
that:
"The judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by citizens of another state, or by
citizens of any foreign state."
H. Technical questions in municipal disclosure policy development that
are related to accounting, auditing, and liability assignment
To be most useful in analysis, financial and other information
must be accurate and comparable. Setting of accounting standards would
help to assure the comparability of financial data. Auditing would help
to assure the accuracy of financial data and may also help to uncover in-
efficiency, fraud, or other conditions of interest, As explained earlier,
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pre-assignment of liability -- or responsibility for inaccuracies and
important omissions -- has been an important factor in SEC and investor
pressure for disclosure by municipalities.
1. Questions related to accounting practices
In many fields, accounting practices have been standardized. Be-
cause some local accounting practices are mandated by local government
charters and statutes and because the jurisdiction of the federal govern-
ment in this area is unclear, attempts to standardize municipal accounting
have been unsuccessful. There are a number of different local government
accounting techniques that have been approved by professional accounting
societies. Standard local government accounting practices vary so much
that there are fifteen different ways of representing the financial condi-
tion of the municipality. /62, p. 93_/ Expenditures and revenues may be
recorded using cash, accrual, or partial accrual bases. Under a cash basis,
the item is not shown until cash has been spent or received. Under a full
accrual basis, the tiem is recorded when the liability is incurred (such as
paid time due to employees for sick leave and vacation) or when the legal
action has been taken to obtain a revenue (such as providing a state-reim-
burseable service or mailing a tax bill to property owners). Under a par-
tial accrual basis, some revenues and expenditures are recorded when it is
known how large they will be and when they fall due while others are re-
corded only when cash has been transferred. Some municipal corporations
may assign a cash value to assets such as land and machinery and depreciate
its recorded value every year, but most general governing bodies do not un-
less they operate special enterprises such as auditoriums or waste disposal
plants. Local governments usually use fund accounting because the uses of
certain funds are legally restricted. Usually, changes in the balances of
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all major fund groups are included in the annual financial report because a
totla of the changes may be misleading. Although standard fund categories
have been recommended, others are frequently used. /26 / A major change
in accounting practices used may be expensive and inconvenient. In fact, a
1972 study of the 1, 822 municipalities belonging to the MFOA found that only
133 had agreed to comply with the set of uniform accounting standards pro-
mulgated by that organization in 1947. /56, p. 87_/
It is not at all clear how much more difficult it is for analysts to
compare the finances of municipalities because of variations in their account-
ing practices. Even if accounting techniques were standardized, the finances
of similar cities still might not be comparable because they may be structur-
ally different in other ways. For example, some municipalities may have fin-
ancially independent school or utility districts. In any case, interpreting
the financial statements of a given municipality is more difficult if one
does not know its basis of accounting. However, only six out of 174 issuers
surveyed by Forbes in 1975 bothered to identify their accounting methods in
their' official statements. (Summary of Reporting Practices) -/63, p. 271_7
The Williams-Towers Bill, as drafted in 1976, would go a step further than
reporting of accounting practices but not as far as standardizing them by
assigning to the SEC the power to set standards for the accounting practices
to be used in required propsectus statements and annual reports. /63, p.11-/
However, it might be very difficult to prepare financial information using
a set of accounting practices that is different from those used in all
records. Such a provision might result in increased standardization.
The additional problems presented in development of a municipal
disclosure policy by local government accounting practices are as follows:
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(1) Because accounting practices of individual governments are not
adequately reported, it is more difficult to understand their financial
statements; (2) Because of the diffences between government accounting and
profit accounting, it is more difficult for an investor, who is not a
trained accountant but who can understand a company's annual statement of
earnings, to understand municipal financial statements; (3) Because of the
variations in local government accounting practices, it is more difficult to
compare the revenues and expenditures of municipalities that are otherwise
similar; and (4) Standardization of local government accounting practices
may be expensive and politically difficult and may interfere with home-rule
doctrines.
2. Questions related to auditing procedures
An auditor is a specialized and specially licensed accountant who
normally reviews the accounting records of an entity to see if its Financial
records are in order. Definitions of what an audit should cover vary consid-
erably. One auditing firm, in a report on the advisability of municipal
disclosure policies, stated that an audit should cover fund accounting,
budgetary accounting, legal compliance, and the basis of accounting. An
audit of fund accounting trades the balances and encumbrances of various
funds. An audit of budgetary accounting compares actual revenues and expend-
itures with those that had been anticipated. An audit of legal compliance
checks how well the unit followed its own legalrestrictions and applicable
rules of the federal and state governments. An audit of the basis of account-
ing checks whether the city was properly using one of a generally accepted
set of local government accounting principles. The auditor may recommend
changes in in the units financial record keeping and cash management practices
to make them more efficient. / 16, pp. 8-11_7
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An audit report is technical, detailed, and may be more than a hun-
dred pages long. The auditor may also provide a summary opinion on parti-
cular aspects of its review or a statement that everything is in order.
However, much of the information that has been recommended for municipal
disclosure is not included in an auditor's report. The auditor does not
usually consider revenue sources and policies or the purposes of expenditures.
Some cities have found that it is most efficient to maintain audit-
ing departments. Because embezzlement by city officials is rare and this
risk is usually covered by surety bonds, in the past it was not generally
thought that there were significant dangers or conflicts of interest in
relying on an audit by trained city employees. Lately, however, there is
a greater tendency to use independent auditors who are disinterested parties
and therefore have no reason to cover up fraud or ignore inefficiencies and
irregularities. / 64 / In fact, independent auditors stake their profes-
sional reputations on the accuracy of their reports and may also be held
legally liable for damages. A positive report from an independent auditor
may do a great deal to allay investors' concern over the risk attached to
securities of that city. /723 7
The main reason for a city to object to an audit requirement is its
expense. An audit by a prestigious firm of Certified Public Accountants
commands the most respect from sophisticated investors land is generally
more expensive than one by state- or city-employed auditors. A thorough
audit of a large city takes at least several months and may require a year's
preparation time.
Auditors have been actively involved in discussions of municipal
disclosure. Certain CPA fims have been aggressive in explaining the expanded
role they could take in improving municipal information releases. If more
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municipalities hire these firms and use them for more extensive auditing,
then thier workloads and profits will be increased. However, the types of
auditing these firms are advocating as appropriate in aiding investor scru-
tiny may not otherwise help a city in its financial management.
The 1976 version of the Williams-Tower Bill includes a provision
requiring review of financial statements by an independent or certified
auditor applying to fiscal years starting after December 31, 1978. The
SEC would be given the power to decide which financial statements shall be
audited and what procedurew will be used. 63, p. 7_7
3. Questions related to liability assignment
One reason suggest for legislation mandating municipal disclosure is
to limit the potential liability of underwriters and bond dealers to final
purchasers of securities. The Williams-Tower Bill, as written in 1976, limits
the potential liability of the underwriter to the total price of the bonds.
It does not limit the liability of the issuer or specifically provide that
the antifraud provisions of The Securities Act of 1933 should apply. Under-
writers would still, then, be liable for large sums under the general "anti-
fraud" provisions. /63,- p. 7_7 One SEC Commissioner said that the bill
is inadequate in this respect and should contain:
"remedies and conditions under which participants
in muncipal securities may claim defenses against
liability for the use of false or misleading infor-
mation in connection with the offering or sale." /11, p.1_/
These concerns had been minor when municipal bonds were considered as safe
as Federal Treasury Notes.
After the passage of The Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, a compli-
cated web of case law and administrative regulations was developed to deal
with financial liability due to omissions and errors in corporate financial
statements. Some private companies have found liability for claims about
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their finances is a great burden. In fact, SEC enforcement of their report-
ing requirements has been held to apply also to obscure information of inter-
est only to certain kinds of speculators and chartists whose analysis tech-
niques are commonly considered superstitious. /46, p. 3_/
The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board has suggested that an express
cause of action for damages based on material misstatements or omissions be
created by Congress. They recommend that issuers be included within the
scope of liability established. Certain defenses, reflecting the ability of
the various participants to ascertain the accuracy and completeness of the
information in question, should, they suggest, be established for each cat-
egory of participant in the municipal securities distribution process. Ac-
cording to this principle, the Board suggests that the municipal issuers
should have an absolute liability with respect to all information set forth
in an official statement except for information furnished by an official
source other than the issuer. If an action is taken against them, the Board
suggests that the issuer should be required to demonstrate that it had no
reasonable grounds to believe and didnot believe that other official sources
were materially inaccurate or misleading. /63, p. 403_7
If the city management somehow errs in its financial statements or
other presentations of important financial contingencies and the auditor does
not discover the error in time to correct it before the underwriter, bond
dealers, and final purchasers rely on it in making their investment deci-
sions, who should be liable? Does it make a difference whether the city
deliberately or carelessly misled investors or whether the discrepency was
due to external factors? If the municipality does not default, how impor-
tant in legal proceedings are the dollar amounts of the reporting errors or
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a drop in resale prices of its securities following publication of the
error? In general, how should such damages be measured? Can an acknowl-
edgment of error or other remedial actions somehow substitue for full fin-
ancial acceptance of responsibility and repayment of money damages? These
questions have not yet been legally resolved for municipal securities.
If the liability of the underwriter and bond dealers are limited,
the whole burden might fall upon the city and its contracted auditors, bond
counsels, and financial consultants. It is not at all clear whether the
cities and other municipalities will be able to pay the full costs if com-
pensation is to be made for all direct and indirect investor damages due
to errors in the disclosure material. Also, a full financial burden of
liability may deter broader reporting, cause over-stressing of "dirty
laundry", or interfere with aggressive marketing and public relations.
One exampe of a conflict over misreporting has already arisen in a
situation involving the City of Philadelphia, which, as mentioned earlier,
is under SEC investigation. City administrators had placed an advertisement
for its bonds in The Wall Street Journal that gave a short financial descrip-
tion including a projected surplus that did not actually materialize. / 47,
p. 1_7 Even though Philadelphia has not defaulted, it may be more difficult
for owners of its bonds to resell them. In this example, it is not at all
clear what remedy is appropriate or whether the market will accept the state-
ment of Lennox Moak, the Director of Finance, that there had been "absolutely
no wrongdoing, absolutely no effort to deceive". Even if Philadelphia is
not forced to pay money damages, investors may be less willing to buy its
securities following this incident. This particular situation may be re-
solved by a long, expensive, and politically damaging court battle.
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I. Description of the survey research
As mentioned in the introduction, this author developed and admin-
istered three surveys: the Indicator Survey, the Perceptions Survey, and
the Survey of Financial Officers (See Appendicies I, II, and III). The
results of the Indicator Survey and the Perceptions Survey are very useful
because the circumstances affecting investor demand for municipal disclosure
have changed so much that it is hard to know how most market participants
feel. These survey results describe the opinions a fairly representative
group at a recent data. Also, almost no research at any time has been
concerned with market use of information and opinion formation -- it has
primarily been concerned with the assignment or effect of ratings. The
results of the Survey of Financial Officers are helpful in describing the
recent disclosure experiences of cities and supplement Forbes's "Summary of
Reporting Practices".
The 1951 New York City Report, the 1963 IBA Format, the 1965 State
Technical Assistance Report, the 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines, and the
1976 Williams-Tower Bill were all written by open or closed committees of
experts. Their lists of recommended information for reporting were probably
compiled in customary committee style in which a few people make detailed
suggestions and everyone else approves or disapproves. These sets of rec-
ommendations are not accompanied by any explanations or defenses of why
they recommended or ignored particular information. The 1965 State Techni-
cal Assistance Report includes in its document copies of the 1951 New York
City Report and the 1963 IBA Format. The 1976 MFOA Guidelines include a
mention of the 1965 State Technical Assistance Report. Yet neither is
accompanied by an explanation of why their recommendations vary from the
previous ones.
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Lennox Moak published suggestions for information to be reported to
various groups and a discussion of "factors considered by investors and the
rating agencies in determining preferences". He explains in a very convinc-
ing manner why many financial characteristics and characteristics describing
the local economy and social situation are important in perceptions of bond
security.
This author did a thorough search of industry and academic publica-
tions on municipal securities and finance and was unable to find any pub-
lished data that would support or contradict Moak's descriptions or the
recommendations of other sources. However it seems reasonable that there
should be some guidelines to use in deciding whether a particular piece of
information should or should not be disclosed. In fact, some of the results
of the author's surveys show a gradient of information by importance and
others suggest hypotheses about how such information is and can be used.
The results of the three surveys are used to develop a strategy in municipal
information release.
1. Survey distribution
The Indicator Survey and the Perceptions Survey were distributed by
the author in cooperation with the City of Boston in May, 1976 and July,
1976. There were two mailings of each survey, the second a follow-up to
those who did not answer the first. The mailing list, supplied by the city,
had been compiled for use in mailing prospectus statements and other material
directly related to the marketing of the city's securities. The list of
2,300 independent and bank-affiliated bond dealers was divided (every-other-
one) so that half (1,150) received each survey. The mailing list was sub-
stantially the same as the standard, professionally used Directory of Mun-
icipal Bond Dealers of the United States compiled by the Bond Buyer, the
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leading publisher in the municipal securities market.
The second mailing increased the total response rate and legitimacy
of results. The data from each mailing were similar. A few questions
appeared on only the second mailing. The tabulated results in the appendix
include the total number of responses to each question.
In total, there were 191 responses to the Indicator Survey including
67 bank-affiliated dealers and 124 independent dealers. There were 172
responses to the Perceptions Survey including 55 bank-affiliated dealers
and 117 independent dealers. These response rates (17% and 15%) are
good for surveys distributed by mass mailings. Each survey had a large
response from the New York City and Boston areas but more than two-thirds
were from other areas including every state. Particular responses were
confidential.
The "Survey of Financial Officers" was mailed in August, 1976 and
September, 1976 with a cover letter on letterhead stationary from the
Department of Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT). It was addressed to the treasurer, comptroller, or director of
finances of each of the forty largest American cities. It was returned
by financial officers from thirty-one of those cities. (See Appendix III
fbr a list of responding cities)
2. Description of the Perceptions Survey
Almost all of the questions on the Perceptions Survey concern opinions
of Boston's economy, property, government, and quality-of-life, although a
few questions address opinions of the City's securities. The results can be
viewed not only for what they show about Boston but also as an example of
investor opinion formation. The results of the Perceptions Survey are
discussed only in Chapter VI (Investor Perceptions of Local Economic Factors
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and the Character of Local Communities -- Disclosure of Information on Econ-
omic and Social Factors) and Chapter VII (Summary and Conclusion). As men-
tioned earlier, the survey form and tabulated results are in Appendix II.
3. Description of the Survey of Financial Officers
The Survey of Financial Officers is much shorter than the Perceptions
Survey and the Indicator Survey. Although its results are not drawn explic-
itly into discussion in Chapters III, IV, V, and VI, they are useful in
further establishing cities' initial and recent experiences in implementing
disclosure policies. As mentioned earlier, the survey form and tabulated
results are in Appendix III.
All of the responding cities release some sort of annual report and
a prospectus statement. The annual report may be an auditor's report and
may be released some while after the fiscal year ends. It may also be a
public relations document with picutres of the administration and lists of
goals and accomplishemnts. The annual financial reports released by the
thirty responding cities were written and released by the office of the city
auditor, the city accountant, the city comptroller, the treasury, or the
finance department. Sometimes the annual report and the propsectus state-
ment are released by completely separate offices.
City auditors are infequently used for the annual report -- six
cities used state auditors and thirteen used independent auditors. More
cities brought in independent auditors for preparation of the prospectus
statement than the annual report. City auditors were also more involved
with preparation of the prospectus statement. Often audited annual reports
were used as sources for the prospectus statement. Some cities had only the
financial section of the prospectus statement audited and others used in-
dependent auditors for the financial sections and city auditors for the rest
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of it.
The lenght of the propsectus statements released by these cities varied
greatly. The shortest was only four pages and the langest was 165 pages.
The average length was 44 pages.
The average number of annual reports distributed by these thirty cities
was 369 copies. The range of distribution was between 100 and 850 copies.
They were distributed to the following:
Distribution Count (out of 30)
To local banks 29
To nonlocal banks 22
To local bond dealers 26
To nonlocal bond dealers 25
To a few local citizens 17
To more than a few local citizens 14
To many local citiznes 7
Local journal 2
Local libraries 1
Mailing list 1
Municipal and state govenments 1
Atlanta sends a monthly report to its underwriter. Philadelphia is the only
city that sends out a regular newsletter. Ten of these cities distribute
more annual reports than propsectus statements, four distribute the same
number, and fourteen distribute fewer. The average number of copies of the
prospectus distributed is 467 with a range between 75 copies and 1800 copies
not including a recent distribution by the. City of Boston of 3,000 copies.
All of the cities responding except Oakland and Jacksonville maintain reg-
ular mailing lists.
The only state input into prospectus preparation was a Pennsylvania
guiding statute used by Pittsburgh.
Only Chicago and Detroit would admit to being unable to place a
bond issue and both blamed it on the "New York Situation". Detroit did not
receive an acceptable bid on housing authority bonds that it tried to sell
(62)
three times between December 1974 and March 1976.
4. Description of the Indicator Survey
The questions on the Indicator Survey are of two types. Most concern
particular indicators such as "total population" or "net indebtedness".
The other questions concern reliance on and use of various sources of infor-
mation. The results of the Indicator Survey are cited throughout this thesis
as explained in this section. As mentioned earlier, the survey form and
tabulated results are included in Appendix I.
On the Indicator Survey, seventy-four indicators were grouped into four
sections: (1) population and other characteristics, (2) financial statis-
tics, (3) economic statistics, and (4) property indicators. Questions
concerning these indicators were asked to find out whether each piece of
information should be disclosed, how much description or explanation it
merits, and whether it is worthwhile for a particular city to include it
in its statements if similar data for other cities is not accessible.
Respondents were asked three questions about each indicator: (1) How does
it rank of a scale of importance? (2) Is it one of the three most impor-
tantindicators of that section? and (3) Would it have significantly more
meaning if it was compared to other cities?
The scale of importance used had a range of possible responses of
"1", "2", "3", "4", "5", or "don't know". A response of "1" meant that the
indicator was considered to be "very important", a response of "5" meant
that the indicator was considered to be "irrelevant" and those between de-
scribed a range of average importance. When all of the indicators of the
various sections are ranked together by mean importance ratings, the results
show a fairly even gradation of importance between "1" and "4", although
none have an average below "4". Although there was also a fairly even grad-
(63)
ation within each section, the indicators in the financial section were
generally ranked higher than those in the other three sections. In Chapters
III, IV, V, and VI, the perceived importance of each indicator is discussed
using the rank of the mean of its importance ratings relative to the other
seventy-three indicators on the survey (i.e. the relative importance rank-
ing is 39th out of 74). The mean importance (i.e. 2.39) is reported in the
appendix and in chapter summary charts but is only occassionally mentioned
in discussion.
Of the seventy-four indicators, the ten most important are:
Relative
Importance
Rank
Indicator (out of 74)
Total debt outstanding 1
Debt per capita ratio 2
Funded debt outside of legal debt limit 3
Net indebtedness 4
Records of tax collections compared to
tax accruals 5
Assessed taxable valuation of
commercial property 6
Summary of revenue sources for five years 7
Assessed taxable valuation of
residential property 8
Debt retirement schedule 9
Excesses in operating expenditures over
originally approved budgets 10
All of these ten indicators can be said to be "very important", according
to the bond dealers surveyed. On the "1" to "5" scale with "1"="very impor-
tant" and "5"="irrelevant" used on the survey form, all of the ten most
important indicators had an average importance rating greater than "1.5".
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Although the bond dealers ranked "total debt outstanding" higher in impor-
tance than "debt per capita ratio", the actual difference in their average
importance rankings is only .005.
At the end of each of the four sections of characteristics on the
Indicator Survey, respondents were asked to list the three from that section
that they thought were the most important. The purpose of these questions
was to provide a way to check respondents' ratings of importance on the 1-5
scale. A few respondents, for instance, confused the directions and marked
the most important indicators "5" instead of "1". Responses on these ques-
tions were also used to test the validity of ranking by mean importance
rating. The number of times that each particular indicator was listed as
one of the most important three were adjusted for a few indicators only
appearing on the second mailing. The indicators in each of the four sec-
tions were then ranked by both the numbers of mentions and the mean impor-
tance ratings. (See Appendix I) These rankings differed only slightly
thereby showing the basic consistency of these results.
As mentioned earlier, the survey also asked respondents to check
"yes" or "no" if the information would have significantly more meaning if
compared to other cities. There were twenty-five indicators for which more
than half of the respondents desired comparisons. There is some overlap
with the twenty-five most important indicators -- such as total debt out-
standing, median household income, pension liabilities, and total population.
(See Appendix I) Some other information, not considered relatively impor-
tant, was also considered to be significantly more meaningful if comparisons
were given -- such as energy costs, population by age group, and crime rates.
The other questions on the Indicator Survey, relating to information
use, are not cited as extensively in the body of this thesis but are impor-
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tant to its conclusions. Their results are also tabulated in Appendix I.
Responses to several questions showed the importance of prospectus report-
ing. When asked to rank sources of information used in evaluating the credit
worthiness of a city's specific bond issues, aggregated results adjusted by
mean show the following ranking.
(1) The prospectus statement of the bond issue
(2) Moody's and Standard & Poor's published bond ratings
(3) In-house research
(4) Yields of comparable issues
(5) Limited circulation reports
(6) Informal recommendations of colleagues
In response to another question, 74% said that the poor quality of informa-
tion in a prospectus, independent of other inputs, has sometime detered them
from gurchasing a security. Also, 73% thought that the municipality with the
inferior prospectus will be forced to pay somewhat or significantly higher
interest rates.
Despite the asserted importance of adequate prospectus statements,
62% said that they, their staff, and/or their clients usually spend less
than one hour reviewing a propsectus and only 5% spend more than several
hours. Therefore, 86% said that a short document with note of a bond sale
and key information would be useful if they also had access to a detailed
prospectus. More than half would obtain more information if the sources
of information upon which they usually rely leave them uncertain as to
whether to buy a specific issue. In response to another question, 98% said
they would go to the underwriter, if they would obtain more information, and
91% said they would go to the municipality that is issuing the bonds. By
far the most important part of the prospectus to them is the "analysis of
debt and revenue struc.tures.
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III. Disclosure of revenue information
Are some revenue sources more important to bond security than other
revenue sources? How might disclosure of revenue information affect a city?
What is meant by and how important is the quality of financial management of
revenues? This chapter explores these questions, using some of the results
of the Indicator Survey and the sources identified in Chapter II (the 1951
New Yokr City Report, the 1963 IBA Format, the 1965 State Technical Assist-
ance Report, the 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines, and the 1976 Williams-
Tower Bill).
This chapter has seven sections: (A) General discussion of revenues,
(B) Year-end balances, (C) Property tax rates and levise, (D) Locally
generated revenues other than those from property taxes, (G) State and
federal aid, and (H) Summary and conclusions. The charts preceding the
first chapter show the relevant data from the Indicator Survey and from the
Summary of Reporting Practices so that existing disclosure of revenue inform-
ation may be compared with investor's desires. Other charts, preceding
each section, compare recommendations for disclosure of the type of revenue
information discussed.
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Chart III-1
Frequency of Reporting Revenue Information in 1975
Section of
Chapter III
in which
Discussed
Not
Reporting ReportingIndicator
Operating Statements of Revenues and
Expenditures for the most Recently
Completed Year:
Detailed Statement or Explanation of
Sources of Revenues and Expenditures:
Current Property Tax Rate:
Current Year Assessed Valuation of
Taxable Property:
44
25
109
139
130
149
60
22
(Excerpted from exhibit submitted by Professor Ronald Forbes,
New York University) U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Securities on S. 2969 to Amend the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to Require the Preparation of Annual Re-
ports and Distribution Statements by Issuers of Municipal
Securities, and for Other Purposes, S. 2574 to Amend The
Securities Act of 1933 to Provide for Registration of Secur-
ities Issued by State and Local Governments, February 24,
25, and 26, 1976. 94th Congress, Second Session, Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 271.
Source:
Section of
Chapter III
in which
Discussed
E
D
A,F,G,
D
A,F,G,
G
D,
D
D
Chart 111-2
Results of Questions on the Indicator Survey Concerning Revenue Information
Relative Mean
Importance Importance
Ranking Rating
Indicator as listed on survey form (out of 74) (on 1-5 scale)
Records of tax collections compared to tax accruals: 5 1.3
Assessed taxable valuation of commercial property: 6 1.4
Summary of revenue sources for five years: 7 1.4
Assessed taxable valuation of residential property: 8 1.4
Growth of revenues by source over five years: 12 1.5
Total state and federal aid to city and as
percentages: 13 1.6
Estimated market value of commercial property: 15 1.6
Estimated market value of residential property: 16 1.6
Assessment practice information: 18 1.7
Statement of assets and liabilities over five years: 24 1.9
Percentages of property exempt from taxation by type
of property and adjusted assessment:
Trends in retail trade:
Proportion
Desiring
Comparisons (%)
58
52
48
51
45
65
45
46
45
36
2.0
2.7
Chart 111-3
Disclosure Recommendations Given for General Information on Revenues
Types of Descriptive Information Recommended
Recommending
Report.
1951 New York
City Report
1963 IBA Format
1965 State Technical
Assistance Report
1976 MFOA Disclo-
sure Guidelines
1976 Williams-
Tower Bill
Trends of Sources of
Total Revenues Total Revenues
Yes
Yes
Yes
If required
by the SEC
Yes
Yes
Yes
If required
by the SEC
Trends of
Sources
Yes
Yes
Yes
If required
by the SEC
Fund
Assets
Several Years'
Operating Statements
Yes
Only of
sinking funds
Ambiguous
If required
by the SEC
Yes
required
the SEC
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A. General discussion of revenues.
The three basic sources of government revenues are taxation, service
charges, and grants. On the average, cities receive a large amount of
revenues from federal and state grants. The remaining revenues are raised
from local taxes and service charges. A composite pie chart using U.S.
Census data represents the average of revenue sources for a number of
local government units in 74 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(SMSA's). [See Figure III-1, P. 79]
The total amounts of local government revenues and the amounts re-
ceived from property taxes, non-property taxes, state and federal aid,
and other property sources vary a great deal between cities. Although
per capita data can be misleading, it is useful in showing the range of
variation. Companion tables to Figure III-1 show the per capita revenue
amounts and tax burdens of some of the 74 SMSA's whose revenue figures
were averaged to give the data in Figure I. [See Table III-1 and Table
111-2, pp.
Available resources to the local government unit for each fiscal
year must subtract the amounts due for maturity of bonds and needed for
repayment of any deficit from the previous year. This is represented by
an equation in Figure 111-2 [p.
The implication of revenue disclosure is that the city's financial
management has developed projected streams of revenues under various con-
tingencies. Theoretically, it has used these projections in a prudent
manner when deciding to incur long-term debt. Although optimistic revenue
projections are often published in local economic development plans for
local citizens, they are not included in documents for use by bond buyers
(71)
who are more cynical and in a position to sue should these projections be
inaccurate.
Some favorable and unfavorable factors can be identified as having a
bearing on future revenues. These would include such factors as agreements
between the city and the state governments about state aid, annexations of
suburban areas, legal limits on the tax rate, or major developments affect-
the property base, such as new industrial parks or the closing of a
military base. Analysts who are doing a thorough study of the city's
finances might be interested in making their own projections of future
city revenues under such contingencies or in judging how well the city
management has dealt with similar uncertainties in the past.
The scope of revenue contingencies may be difficult to define and
their disclosure may be expensive, so revenue contingencies should not
necessarily be included in the prospectus. An advisory board for munici-
pal disclosure could help to decide what information about revenue con-
tingencies are "material facts" what the city's liability is. If the
city financial administration has a policy of being open and helpful to
municipal credit analysts, the analysts could ask the city for any other
information they might want and could perhaps make some useful suggestions.
Logically, to understand the revenue situation, analysts must know
about sources so that they may develop hypotheses about continued levels.
The earliest three sets of disclosure guidelines by expert commissions
(the 1951 New York City Report, the 1963 IBA Format, and the 1965 State
Technical Assistance Report) suggest that revenues be reported by source
or major category. The 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines does not recom-
mend that general revenue sources be reported. Because these sets of
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recommendations are not accompanied by explanations, it is not clear why
the MFOA committee dropped this recommendation of the earlier commission.
It might have been an oversight, a deliberate omission to reduce disclo-
sure costs and statement length, or an assumption that the information is
available from other sources. The U.S. Census Bureau does publish infor-
mation about the revenue sources of many large cities, but by the time it
is published, it is two to three year's out-of-date and is not accompanied
by explanation of tax rates or grant programs. [58] Even though they
should know about Census publications, the respondents to the Indicator
Survey gave a relative importance ranking of 7th out of 74 to "Summary of
Revenue Sources for Five Years" when asked whether it should be included
in prospectus statements. The result on this question clearly contradicted
the recommendations given in 1976. Further exploration might be done on
how much detail on revenue investors would want directly from the cities if
they had access to a more detailed or up-to-date Census publication.
Instead of requiring reporting of trends of revenues and expenditures
by category, the 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines suggest disclosing financial
statements on operations for the last five fiscal years. [33, p. 5] Forbes's
study in 1975 found that 44 out of 174 issuers included them for the last
year. These issuers may have included operating statements because of con-
fusion over what revenue information is most important. Government operat-
ing statements cannot be interpreted accurately without knowing the basis of
accounting which were included in only six of the 174 statements analyzed
by Forbes. /63, p. 271_7While statements on operations are normally sup-
plied to rating agencies and are useful for local citizens, such statements
are generally at a level of detail completely inappropriate for mass distri-
bution. Because they are usually given for only one or two years, trends
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cannot be extrapolated without access to earlier statements. The superflu-
ous detail may obscure the most important points. However, the advantages
of release of financial statements on operations are that carefully kept
financial records, often audited, present no collection costs and little
basis for questions of accuracy or completeness.
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Figure III-1
Composite of Local Government Revenue Sources in Metropolitan Areas
Proporti onate
Source Share (%
Intergovernmental aid (excluding interlocal)
Aid from state government
Aid from federal government
General revenue from own sources
Locally generated property taxes
Other local taxes
Local charges
Miscellaneous local revenues
General revenue
38.9
31.3
7.6
46.5
37.2
9.3
9.5
5.2
100.0 Total
(Compiled from) U.S. Bureau of the Census. Local Government
Finances in Selected Metropolitan Areas and Large Counties:
1973-74. (Series GF-74, No. 6) Washington D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1976, Table 1.
Source:
Table III-1
Comparison of Revenue Sources and Levels of Some Cities
(Dollars per capita) FY 1973-74
Standard
Metropolitan
Statistical
Area (SMSA)
Atlanta
Boston
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Dallas
Detroit
Houston
Kansas City
Milwaukee
Newark
New Orleans
New York
Philadelphia
Pi tts burgh
St. Louis
San Francisco
Total
General
Revenues
614
670
589
635
503
718
471
557
828
754
487
1303
623
518
508
994
State
Aid
129
120
146
144
112
105
96
115
339
198
152
515
173
154
129
285
Federal
Aid
65
53
48
44
40
42
32
50
44
39
56
60
52
51
40
77
Total
Locally
Generated
419
495
394
447
351
365
343
392
418
518
279
729
398
31 2
340
632
Local
Property
Taxes
209
423
172
253
215
306
230
220
304
415
84
359
205
181
199
407
Local
General
Sales
and
Gross
Receipt
Taxes
28
7
10
23
21
8
52
62
21
34
Current
Charges
(Local)
120
53
106
75
65
79
49
63
58
48
67
120
57
51
46
110
Miscellaneous
Locally
Generated
Revenue
36
16
47
62
37
46
31
40
52
20
31
56
36
24
25
55
from) U.S. Bureau of the Census. Local Government Finances in Selected Metropolitan
Large Counties: 1973-1974. (Series GF-74, No. 6), Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1976.
Source: (Compiled
Areas and
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Table 111-2
Comparisons of Tax-Burdens in Some Cities
(State and local taxes in 1972-73 in dollars for a family
earning $10,000)
of four
City
Atlanta
Boston
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Dali as
Detroit
Houston
Kansas City
Milwaukee
New Orleans
New York
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
St. Louis
San Francisco
Total.
644
1,793
847
755
429
905
388
850
1,507
678
1,398
1,050
1,088
859
1,241
Income
83
287
225
155
297
241
392
64
292
561
440
241
64
Real Estate
294
1,341
465
443
204
369
163
380
921
324
751
334
493
357
948
Sales/Other
264
165
157
157
225
239
225
227
194
285
355
155
155
261
229
Source: (Compiled from) Department of Finance and Revenue, Washington, D.C.
Major State and Local Tax Burdens in Washington Compared with Those
in the 30 Largest Cities, as quoted in Boston Redevelopment
Authority. "Boston's Economic Program: Planning and Development
for the 1976-1985 Decade". (Draft), January 1976, Table 111-30.
Chart 111-4
Disclosure Recommendations Given for Information on Year-end Balances
Recommending
Report
1951 New York City Report
1963 IBA Format
1965 State Technical
Assistance Report
1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines
1976 Williams-Tower Bill
Fund
Balances
Yes
No
No
Ambiguous
As required
by the SEC
Types of Descriptive Information Recommended
. Trends of Audit for Bud-
Total Balances getary Accounting
No No
Yes No
Ambiguous
Ambiguous
As required
by the SEC
No
No
Aq required
by the SEC
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B. Year-end balances
The most basic comparison of "total available resources" for the year
and total revenues is controversial. The difference (as shown in Figure
111-2) reflects proceeds and redemptions of bonds and the city's cash surplus
or deficit. Although Lennox Moak claimed that a deficit is not necessarily
a bad thing and may be easier to manage than a surplus L28, p. 76_7, in-
vestors seem to feel differently. Recent public apprehension about municipal
insolvency has forcused attention on any mismatches between revenues and
expenditures, A comparison of the trends of the total revenues, the total
budget base, and the total expenditures would indicate the existence of any
problem more clearly than would the trumpeting of a single positive or neg-
ative figure at the end of the year. Yearly comparisons of the balance
could show whether a deficit was accumulated by continual overspending or
as a result of unanticipated fund needs or unpredicted lost revenues. The
trends of total revenues, budget bases, total expenditures are important
in showing whether the financial management and administration of a city
can reasonably estimate expected revenues, determine a reasonable level of
planned expenditures, and live within the budget. This sort of analysis is
part of an audit procedure for budgetary accounting. This is an area of
municipal finance in which there may be some policy trade-offs between
extensive auditing and extensive reporting.
The local or national news media usually picks up a single surplus or
deficit figure as an indication of the city's financial health. The mayor,
comptroller, or other administrative staff have interviews or send explana-
tions to the news media on the year-end figure. If they could refer to
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Figure 111-2
Equation Defining Available Resources
4-
Resources at
beginning of
year
\\ //
Revenues
received
in year
V //
+E
Proceeds of
debt issued
in year
Payment of
principal
of debt
Payment of
interest
on debt
Payment
of
expenses
Resources
at end
of year
Source: Moak, Lennox L. and Hillhouse, Albert M. Concepts and Practices
in Local Government Finance. Chicago, Illinois: MFOA, 1975,
p. 63.
%.\ //
Total
resources
available
in year
\\
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an independent auditor's summary, their explanation would have more credi-
bility. Such explanations should be included in information directed
towards bond buyers as part of a marketing strategy. If statements were
sent directly from the city financial offices to underwriters, more
detailed and technical defenses and exhibits could be used than those
presently used by elected officials and newspaper reporters.
New York City has had a law for years requiring that it finance its
expenditures from current receipts. [62, p. 188] This law was obviously
not enforced. If it had been enforced over the years, the deficit would
have never accumulated to the unmanageable figure it did. If New York City
had had regular independent audits for legal compliance, more attention
might have been directed towards this illegality. If the city had had
reporting requirements, the national investment community would have been
aware. Bond holders could have pressured the city through letters, through
their personal and political influence, and by threatening not to buy any
more New York City securities. Without pressure from bond holders, this
illegality was not resolved, although it might have been resolved earlier
if the taxpayers of New York City or the Attorney General of New York State
had sued the City in New York State court or the political situation had
been different. This kind of'intervention was unlikely because it would
have resulted in an increased tax rate.
As discussed in the second chapter, if the current legal cases relat-
ing to the SEC's right to sue a municipality and standards of fraudulent
action had been resolved years ago, the SEC might have sued New York City
in federal court for not disclosing the material fact that they were
violating their own budgetary laws. Even if the SEC had been unsuccessfuL
resulting publicity would have probably brought increased market pressure
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on New York City. Suggestions currently being considered but not yet adopted
that might have prevented the large accumulated deficited in New York City
are: a required independent auditing for legal compliance or budgetary
accounting, reporting of the audit results to the SEC or bond holders, and
legal standing for SEC involvement.
Chart 111-5
Disclosure Recommendations Given for Information on Property Tax Rates and Levies
Types of Descriptive Information
Recommending
Report
1951 New York
City Report
1963 IBA Format
1965 State Technical
Assistance Report
1976 MFOA Disclo-
sure Guidelines
Trends of
Tax.Revenues
by Type
of Tax
Yes
Ambiguous
Ambiguous
Trends of
Property
Tax Levies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Rates for
Each Type
of Tax
Property Tax
Levies and
Rates of Over-
lapping Units
No
Yes
Yes
Ambiguous
Property
Tax
Rate
Tax
Authority
Limit
Yes
Yes
Yes
Ambiguous
No
Yes
Yes
1976 Williams-
Tower Bill Yes No Yes Yes YesYes
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C. Property tax rates and levies
Property taxes are the most important locally generated revenue
source, averaging 37.2% of total revenues in 74 major metropolitan areas
(see Figure 111-1). [58, p. 7] However, this percentage varies a great
deal mainly because of state aid policies and the use of other taxes such
sales, payroll, and income for local tax revenue (see Table III-1). Prop-
erty tax revenues are dependent on the value of the total property tax
base, assessment practice, the tax rate, and the collection rate. Some
municipalities are legally limited as to the rate of taxes that they may
impose. Assessment practices and tax rates are determined through various
political procedures. Whether the effective tax rate can be reasonably
increased might affect bond security.
The property tax rate must be known to relate the size of the tax levy
and the tax rate. Many cities are now in the position of having such high
property tax rates that property owners are claiming hardship and threaten-
ing to move from the city or to abandon rental property. If analysts wish
to explore the validity of those claims and form a hypothesis about whether
the city can reasonably raise taxes if more revenues are needed to pay debt
service, they must know the effective tax rate and compare it with that of
other cities (see Table 111-3). The effective tax rate is the actual rate
times the assessment to sales ratio. Assessed value may range from 20%
to 100% of market value and may vary within a municipality by type of
neighborhood, type of property, date of last assessment, and the formula
used by the assessor. The tax burden on property also includes the prop -
erty tax rate imposed on the property by overlapping units and fees
charged for vital services to property, such as for water and sewer
connections.
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In 1975, 109 out of 169 issuers included the current property tax
rate in the official prospectus statement (Summary of Reporting Practices).
[63, p. 271] The Williams-Tower Bill would require the disclosure of "tax
rates" and of the legal limit on taxing authority. [63, p. 7] The word-
ing on both the Summary of Reporting Practices and the Williams-Tower Bill
is unclear as to whether it means the actual or the effective tax rate.
The MFOA guidelines never specifically require either the actual or the
effective property tax rate, although it does suggest including the legal
tax limit, procedures, and the unused taxing margin in the prospectus
statement. [33, p. 7]
Cities may find that it is inconvenient to have to change
their financial statements when property taxes are raised. Its
financial offices may need to have prospectus statements ready
for'the printer two months before a bond issue is sold and during that
time, the tax rate and other financial policies may be changed. If state-
ments were released that did not report the most current tax rate, the city
might be said to be misrepresenting the situation by omitting a "material"
fact. Some might argue that the possibility of increases should be dis-
closed. This could create polical difficulties if the increase is contro-
versial.
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Table 111-3
Effective Property Tax Rates in 1972-1973 in Some Cities
Effective Rate per $1000
City of Market Value ($)
Atlanta 13.93
Boston 52.20
Cincinnati 21.85
Cleveland 21.84
Dallas 10.95
Detroit 21.43
Houston 10.02
Kansas City 21.14
Milwaukee 45.37
New Orleans 10.92
New York 26.72
Philadelphia 26.09
Pittsburgh 30.84
St. Louis 19.39
San Francisco 28.39
Source: (Compiled from) Department of Finance and Revenue, Washington,
D.C., Major State and Local Tax Burdens in Washington Compared
with Those in the 30 Largest Cities, as quoted in Boston
Redevelopment Authority. "Boston's Economic Program: Planning
and Development for the 1976-85 Decade". (Draft), January 1976,
Table III.
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D. Property base
The property tax base is the total of all taxable property and
excludes tax-exempt property even though it uses city services. Taxable
property is described by an estimated market value and by an assessed
value. There are a variety of ways to determine market and assessed value
and they often yield different results. The actual market value of a
particular property is dependent on the demand for that location, which
may vary over time. The assessed value is determined by low- or medium-
ranked civil servants or by elected officials. They may use a percentage
of the last sales price of the property, a percentage of the last sales
price of similar property, a multiplier of the reported income from the
property, a percentage of the estimated replacement cost, or other methods.
There is a large, arbitrary element in assessment and in estimating market
value. Ordinarily, high property tax revenues are generated by highly
capitalized industrial and commercial uses and by the more wealthy
residential neighborhoods.
In 1975, 109 out of 169 issuers gave at least some indication of the
property tax base in the prospectus, as shown by the Summary of Reporting
Practices. [63, p. 271] All of the mentioned committees which recom-
mended municipal disclosure included the total market and assessed values
of property. The 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines were the only recommenda-
tions requesting an explanation of any changes in assessment practices, and
a breakdown of the taxable property base into its residential, commercial,
industrial, and utility components over each of the last five years.
[33, p. 8]
Like other information that may be considered for municipal
(88)
disclosure, information on the property base must be examined for its
relevance and cost. Some information on land use is available in cities
because it is used for local planning efforts and other reports to citi-
zens, although it is expensive to collect and keep up-to-date. In addition
to providing some indication concerning the ability of the locality to bear
property taxes, land-use breakdowns also provide an indication of its basic
character. Some municipal bond issuers are "bedroom communities" in which
most of the taxes are paid by individuals. Other municipal issuers have
strong industrial components, which yield property tax revenues of suffi-
cient size to reduce the tax burden on individuals and residential property.
This understanding is important in an analysis of property tax revenues and
effective rates. However, it is not at all clear that such breakdowns are
needed for every year. The trends of the land use composition can be seen
by comparing the tenth, fifth, last, and current years as suggested by the
1965 State Technical Assistance Report. [1, p. 40] Information on tax-
exempt property is not recommended by any of the commissions. Although
tax-exempt property is not significant in most municipalities, some cities
have not only religious property but also tax-exempt property housing
cultural, educational, and governmental institutions benefiting the entire
region. For these cities (such as Boston where 56% of the total assessed
valuation in 1972 was tax-exempt [38, p. 19]), the tax-exempt property
represents important lost revenues, which a legal change might bring into
the taxable property base.
Five out of the eighteen most highly rated indicators on the Indicator
Survey were characteristics of the taxable property base. Of the seventy-
four indicators on the survey form, the bond dealers rated "assessed
taxable value of commercial property" as sixth, "assessed taxable value of
(89)
residential property" as eighth, "estimated market value of commercial prop-
erty" as fourteenth, "estimated value of residential property" as fifteenth,
and "assessment practice information" as eighteenth in importance. These
results show a basic agreement with the suggestions of the 1976 MFOA Disclo-
sure Guidelines, supporting their expansion of earlier recommendations.
The bond dealers surveyed also rated "percentages of property excempt from
taxation by type of property and adjusted assessment" 27th out of 74 in
importance representing a mean importance rating of 2.0 (on a scale of 1 to
5 in which "1" = "very important" and "5" = "irrelevant"). This result is
ambiguous.
Investors must not force upon cities the expense of more frequent land
inventories than needed for local planning. The U.S. Census Bureau should
explore the possibilities of making its reporting more consistent with the
needs of the municipal bond market as shown by the results of the Indicator
Survey and further studies. If the Census does, it may reduce possible con-
flicts over data collection and reporting responsibilities between overlap-
ping units of local government and data will be more standardized and com-
parable.
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E. Tax collection rates and procedures
Property tax reveneus are dependent on the taxable property base,
assessment practices, the property tax rate, and the collection rate of taxes
due. Uncollected property taxes can range between a fraction of one percent
and over ten percent of the total annual property tax levy. Municipalities
charge interest on delinquent taxes and after a certain time have the right
to forclose on the property and sell it at public auction to pay the tax bill.
If property owners feel that their taxes are unfairly high, they may apply
for an abatement. A low rate of property tax collections is significant be-
cause it represents lost or delayed revenues and increased administration
costs. It may also represent inefficient financial management, deterioration
of urban properties, and widespread personal financial setbacks.
Property tax collections were a widely publicized problem of New York
City. Some landlords collected rents until the City foreclosed. The City's
tax collectors billed exempt properties such as schools, embassies, and public
housing projects in error and then represented them as receivable revenues,
L62, pp. 155-156_/ A 1975 audit report noted...
"Under a disciplined accounting system, all of
the accounts receivable would be collected and
converted into cash within a relatively short
period of time. Borrowing needed to finance
the accounts receivable. To the extent, how-
ever, that the accounts receivable are
inflated, then the municipality would have a
deficit which must ultimately be paid by means
of appropriations." [62, p. 189]
When one New York City note holder saw the audit report showing that real
estate receivables were overstated by $408 million and pledged against
$380 million in tax anticipation notes, he wrote to the U.S. Senate that,
"...a massive public fraud has taken place with the knowledge of elected
(92)
and appointed public officials". 7 62-p. 148_fThe tax collection rate
and the accounting of delinquent taxes are both important in financial
management. If that investor had known how New York City accounted for
delinquent taxes, he might not have bought the tax anticipation notes. If
the City had been forced to tell investors how it accounted for delinquent
taxes, it might have been pressured into more sound practice. This inci-
dent is an example of why voluntary disclosure guidelines are ineffective
in protecting investors. In fact, one of the recommendations of the 1951
New York City Report shows an anticipation of such a situation. New York
City officials ignored the recommendation that the City should include in
notices of bond sales a "Three year record of property tax collections and
delinquencies... (and a) description of tax collection machinery, especi-
ally regarding delinquencies (and) penalties". [1, p. 37]
The consensus of bond dealers surveyed, the rating agencies, and the
writers of the 1976 Williams-Tower Bill, the 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guide-
Tfihes, the 1965, State Technical Assistance.Report, the 1963 IBA Format,
and' the 1951 New York City Report is that the administration of delinquent
tax accounts and the rate of delinquency are important. About one-fifth of
the volume of the three-page format suggested by the Investment Bankers
Association for general obligation bonds is devoted to information on
delinquent taxes. It asked for three years of: "Amount of Levy by This
Issuer", "Uncollected at End of Year", "Uncollected (at) Latest Available
Date", and "Delinquent Taxes from Prior Years Collected During Year". The
format also asks for a great deal of other detail on property tax delin-
quencies including responses to these questions:
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1. Taxes for fiscal year are due
Became delinquent
2. If payable in installments, give particulars.
3. Discounts for prepayment and when applied?
4. Specific practice for delinquency?
5. Explain in detail any modifications of practice during the past
two years
6. How are uncollected taxes handled?
(a) Anticipated as revenue in next year's budget? .
If yes, what percentage?
(b) Turned over to other governing bodies?
If yes, when?
(c) Sale of tax certificates?
If yes, when?
(d) Other methods
7. Has tax sale period been extended in last two years? .
If yes, explain.
8. Accumulated total of uncollected taxes for fiscal years prior to
those reported above? $
9. Are tax title liens included in uncollected tax totals above?
How much? $
10. Total tax title liens owned by municipality. (Years 19 to
19_, inclusive) $
13. Do you levy taxes in excess of actual requirements to provide
margin against delinquencies? Yes No . If yes, what
ratio? . Current year? %. Previous year? %.
Two years ago? %. [1, p. 66]
The 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines goes into great detail about
property tax collection experiences. It suggests the following procedures:
(94)
"Include descriptions of (1) the manner in which delin-
quent taxes are collected; (11) the interest charged on delin-
quent taxes; (iii) important changes in the last five years
in tax...collection practices; and (iv) the reasons for such
changes. State the value of total tax liens owned by the
issuer as of the end of its last five fiscal years and as of
a recent date. Describe briefly the procedures followed in
foreclosure, including extension of foreclosure dates. De-
scribe the priority of tax claims of the issuer over other
indebtedness of taxpayers.
State whether real estate, sales, income, or other
taxes are levied in excess of actual requirements to provide
a margin against delinquent taxes and, if so, give the amount
of such excess taxes expressed as a percentage of total taxes
levied for the issuer's last five fiscal years and as of a
recent date and the tax delinquency rate for each of such
fiscal years and for the current fiscal year to date. De-
scribe any anticipation of collection of delinquent taxes
in-budgets for current or future years. State whether
borrowing is made against delinquent taxes ,and if so, state
the percentage of delinquent taxes so financed as of the end
of such prior fiscal years and as of a recent date. Describe
the accounting principles applied in writing-off delinquent
taxes, and state the period for which delinquent taxes are
reflected on the issuer's books before they are written-off."
L33, pp. 8-9/
The city must be careful not to appear contradictory as it tries to
make two points: (1) The city's tax claims are more important than those
of other creditors. (2) The city's notes and bonds are in no way less
secure because of tax delinquencies. The web of case and statutory law
involved with the priority of tax claims of the issuer over other indebted-
ness of taxpayers is technical and dynamic and its relation to total
revenues is obscure. It may be appropriate but politically controversial
to report on the handling of the delinquencies of very large taxpayers,
such as the bankrupt Penn Central Railroad, which owns a great deal of
property in New York City, Boston, Philadelphia, and other cities. In
addition to property for its own use, it owns property such as Carnegie
Hall, which it rents to other users. [58, pp. 164-165] Penn Central was
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excused from property tax payments when it filed bankruptcy, but if it
becomes financially solvent, it may possibly repay them.
The 1965 State Technical Assistance Report considers sharing of
delinquent tax accounts to be an example of the quality of financial
management. [1, p. 43] However, foreclosure procedures and interest
charges are matters that have local political implications and may involve
policy trade-offs between tax collection and strategies in deteriorating
urban areas. They should be resolved by the community and its administra-
tion. Investors should not dictate such policies. Much other evidence
could be provided on the quality of financial management and the adequacy
of tax revenues.
Reporting of collection of delinquent taxes is another area of
disclosure that would be very affected if independent audits became
routine. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, & Co., a leading accounting firm,
described their modern approach to government auditing as using "system
evaluation". They identified the tax assessment/billings/collection pro-
cess as a key cycle. The auditor should, they say, consider the organiza-
tional objectives, identify the internal control features, and evaluate
their effectiveness. [16, p. 16] The auditor may be able to give the city
financial management some suggestions on how to improve efficiency.
Thee auditor assumes some. responsibility for the accuracy of -the
analysis.
Why is disclosure in such detailI"of.:tax collection policies recommended? If
purchasers and bond dealers spend as little time reading prospectus state-
ments as the results to one question (on the Indicator Survey) showed,
could they learn more by looking at other data? Whether it is important or
(96)
not, however, the market seems to want it. Respondents to the Indicator
Survey gave a relative importance ranking to "Records of tax collections
compared to tax accruals", placing it fifth out of 74 indicators. Cities
should experiment with substituting an auditor's statement on the suffi-
ciency of reserves for uncollected taxes and abatements and a statement on
handling of funds from delinquent taxes paid and from foreclosures. If
legally allowed, the city might not distribute such statements unless
requested. Its prospectus and annual reports distributed to bond holders
could refer to the existence of such statements but not go into great
detail. The prospectus could include figures using standardized definitions
of trends for abatements granted and for "Amount of Levy by This Issuer",
"Uncollected at End of Year", "Uncollected (at) Latest Available Date" and
"Delinquent Taxes from Prior Years Collected During Year", as the IBA
suggested. [1', p. 66] If other cities conduct surveys like the Indicator
Survey, they can ask whether such a policy is acceptable, but if most
respondents are negative, the city should provide them with the information.
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F. Locally generated revenues other than those from property taxes
In 1973-74, nonproperty taxes, charges, and miscellaneous revenues
locally raised accounted for an average of 24% of total general revenues
for 74 major SMSA's. [55, p. 7] (See Figure III-1, p. 74) However, the
amounts of these revenues varied a great deal between metropolitan areas.
(See Table III-1, p. 75) These taxes and fees include retail sales taxes,
income taxes, payroll taxes, public utility taxes, tobacco and liquor taxes,
admissions and amusement taxes, motor fuel taxes, business license taxes,
transport revenues, sanitation revenues and hospital revenues.
Most of the sets of disclosure recommendations include nonproperty
taxes and other locally generated revenues. The 1951 New York City Report
recommended reporting of trends of revenues by class and an itemization of
local nonproperty tax revenue for three years. /1, p.37_/ The 1965
State Technical Assistance Report recommends that revenues be itemized to
reveal in particular the relative size of each nonproperty tax./ 1, p. 65_7
The 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines is more vague; it recommends reporting
of whether sales, income, or other taxes are levied at a higher rate to pro-
vide a margin against delinquencies and reporting of taxing authority,
nonproperty tax rates, or a description of taxable transactions or wealth
other than property. [33]
The emphasis by some analysts on the property base and property taxes
is misguided. Property taxes were instituted when ownership of property
represented wealth. However, not all apartment houses and other commercial
property generate high profits, while many very profitable businesses
operate out of small, rented offices. Sales and special retail taxes,
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income taxes, payroll taxes, and some other taxes are seen as a way to tax
these businesses and commuters who use city facilities. If a city does not
have the legal authority or political strength to distribute the burden of
its taxes, greater pressures will be exerted on the wealth which is repre-
sented by property.
The ability to impose a nonproperty tax depends on the form of the
charter of the municipality. Those with stronger home-rule provisions find
it easier to choose the forms which their taxation will take. Sometimes,
state legislation, a referendum, or a charter amendment is needed before a
nonproperty tax can be imposed. The taxing authority of the issuer is a
critical indicator of its ability to generate revenues, and so it should be
summarized in the prospectus statement.
How much descriptive detail is important? Some might argue that a
description of the value of what is being taxed should be given for non-
property taxes in a similar manner to the way in which the property base is
considered to be rightfully the responsibility of the city to describe to
investors. If the city has a sales tax, should it give investors an
estimation of retail sales? If the city has a tobacco sales tax, should it
tell investors how many packages of cigarettes were sold last year?
Reasonably, New Orleans, where 41% of tax revenue is from a retail sales
tax, [58, p. 105] might give more information on retail sales than another
city. Other revenue sources particular to given cities, such as a tax on
use of an airport, might also merit further attention. In such cases,
space requirements might justify correspondingly less information on its
property tax base in short statements.
Nonproperty taxes are more difficult to forecast than property taxes.
Their revenue levels change because of fluctuations of personal incomes,
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retail sales, attendance, and other sources. This makes it more difficult
to plan a budget. For these reasons, and because of the shortage of
quantitative information on their bases, it is more important to establish
a range by examining trend data than it is for property tax revenues. This
information should be easily obtainable from existing files. As suggested
for property tax collection rates, an independent auditor might be able to
reduce the city's vulnerability to political criticism or charges of
misrepresentation if a statement were prepared for the city's use on the
adequacy of its budgeting and contingency funds for nonproperty tax
revenues.
As mentioned earlier, data collection is expensive. One city used
data collected by a private retailer's trade magazine in its prospectus.
[7, p. 18] Such information lacks the authority of Census data. Its
potential usefulness to analysts has tobe weighed against the possibilities
that such information may be inaccurate or misleading.
It might be very expensive and politically difficult to develop
detailed mandatory information requirements for various activities or
wealth other than property, which might be taxed. Perhaps a review panel
could make nonmandatory suggestions on the consistency of detail appropri-
ate. Perhaps the city could develop a file of information on these
subjects, including information collected by nonofficial sources and make
it available to interested analysts. Perhaps cities should be allowed to
release certain information with a disclaimer of responsibility.
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G. State and federal aid
Inter-governmental aid is an important revenue source for most cities.
In 1973-74, aid from state governments to local governments operating in
74 major SMSA's accounted for an average of $226 per capita or 31% of general
revenues. Aid from the federal government-accounted for an average of $55
per capita or 8% of general revenues. / 58, p. 7 (See Figure III-1)
Other aid is sometimes available from county governments or surplus-produc-
ing enterprises. The amounts of aid vary greatly between cities and over
time. Because of their importance to total revenues, the situation of inter-
governmental received by each issuer should be disclosed to analysts. The
current total aid and future levels of such aid available for general use
must be considered as well as the importance of the aid to particular expend-
itures, such as those for debt service, school operations, and capital im-
provements.
The wealth of the state and the political influence of the city are
important factors in the amount of aid received. The financial reputations
of the state and of large cities are intertwined. This is not a new concern.
Could a policy of regular reporting to bond holders have changed the follow-
ing situation? In the late 1950's, the State of Michigan generously aided
local governments providing 40% of all school districts general fund revenue,
one-quarter of general revenue receipts of the twenty largest cities, and
one-third of county revenues. The State exp--iences a series of financial
crises resolved by imposition of a new tax, :dating collections of other
taxes, and a much publicized one-week delay in meeting a payroll.. Neither
the State nor the local units were late on payments due to bond or note
(103)
holders. However, because of these events, the interest costs that Michigan
municipalities were forced to pay after this were much higher -- on full-
faith-and-credit bonds rated A, Aa, and Aaa, it is estimated that interest
costs averaged 10-15% higher to maturity. /_16, p. 429_7
Just as analysts are concerned with citizens' attitudes towards pay-
ing taxes and avoiding default, they are concerned with the state govern-
ment's attitude and ability to maintain needed and accustomed aid. The
State of Michigan had previously cutback state aid sharply to balance state
finances which might have predisposed investors to their strong reaction.
Similarly, investors learned to distrust New York State through experiences
with the New York Port Authority and the Urban Development Corporation.
/15_/ For this reason, information on past actions of the state or current
considerations of aid cutbacks may be relevant. However, such a requirement
may infringe on the state political domain. If legally acceptable, a simple
and general statement about the trends of state aid, the need for periodic
legislation to continue various programs, the designated uses of program
funds, and severe problems of state finances should suffice for the purposes
of analysis.
This area of disclosure has clear possiblities for conflict of inter-
est. It would be best for the city if the state government were to provide
it with a statement on its policies towards aid and the sufficiency of state
finances. It may not be to the political advantage of the state administra-
tion to do so, particularly if the city is large with a great deal of in-
fluence and a large budget. However, consitutional limitations on federal
powers might make it difficult'to require such participation from state gov-
ernments.
(104)
Some cities have been including statements on the future of state
aid in their prospectus statements. The City of Albany, New York, for in-
stance, has this statement in a prospectus of about thirty pages:
"If during the term of the bonds a significant default
or other financial crisis should occur in the affairs
of the State of New York or any of its agencies or pol-
itical subdivisions including the City of New York,
the resulting effects may substantially impair the
ability of the City of Albany to sell other obligations
including notes or bonds to renew or fund outstanding
short-term debt. Moreover, any such default or fi-
nancial crisis may substantially impair the market-
ability of the Bonds for resale purposes. The fail-
ure by one or more major government issuers outside
New York State may also have an impact on the market-
ability of the Bonds or theabilityof the City to
sell other oblgiations." / 7, p.2 /
Is it necessary to raise the possibility of such an extreme in their official
statements? Does the language suggest to bond buyers that they should not
but this or other bonds of Albany? Is it the duty of a municipal issuer to
try to educate a bond buyer about the secondary market in municipal securi-
ties? Cities should not be forced to dwell overly long on the negative
possibilities of their associations in reputation. They should not be respon-
sible for notifying their bond holders of financial problems of other govern-
mental units that will not be reflected in aid cutbacks or direct costs. In
this case, a cautionary statement about potential cutbacks in aid from New
York State to Albany in event of more financial problems in New York City
should be more than sufficient.
Issuers should be careful in projecting future levels of state and
federal aid and analysts should be careful in accepting issuer's projections
because they are not in local control. One recent incident involved Lennox
Moak, mentioned several times as a financial expert and Director of Finance
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of Philadelphia. In late 1975, he placed an advertisement for the City's
bonds in The Wall Street Journal that referred to a surplus in Philadelphia's
budget several months earlier and proclaimed the City's financial health.
This estimatation of the City's finances included $65 million in anticipated
budget revenues dependent on the enactment of state and federal legislation.
As many analysts and market experts predicted, this aid didnot materialize.
As mentioned earlier,the SEC launched an investigation of the City because
of this incident. /_47, p. 1_/
Was it appropriate for investors to rely on projections placed in a
newspaper advertisement? If Pennnsylvania had been required to give Phila-
delphia a statement for its prospectus about the possibilities of aid, would
the City's financial officers pursued a different strategy in marketing
bonds? What sort of statement could the State have given the City in such
uncertain circumstances? If the State had given the City a statement and
the City had used it in its advertising and somehow made an inaccurate pro-
jection, would the SEC have investigated or sued the State?
Perhaps because state and federal aid were not an important source
of local government financing until the last few decades, most of the disclo-
sure recommendations given are vague on reporting of such aid. The 1963 IBA
Format asks for the trends of total state and federal aid for the last three
years but goes into almost no detail, unlike its format for reporting pro-
perty tax revenue. /1, p. 65_/ The 1951 New York City Report recommends
disclosure of revenues by source but does not -specifically discuss inter-
governmental aid. L 1, p. 37_/ The 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines do not
recommend reporting levels of inter-governmental aid although they might be
apparent from the operating statements it recommends. / 33_7 The 1976
Williams-Tower Bill would require a report fo the "nature and extent of
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federal or other assistance programs available to ths issuers", /_63, p. 8_7
but this seems impractical.
The results of the Indicator Survey are somewhat helpful in this
question. As mentioned before, bond dealers surveyed were very interested
in the sources of revenues and their trends. They also rated "total state
and federal aid and as percentages" as thirteenth in importance out of 74
indicators giving it a mean importance rating of "1.6" on a 1-5 scale.
(Indicator Survey) This shows that it is necessary to report something
about the levels of state and federal aid, although, as mentioned before,
in 1975, only 15 out of 174 issuers included a detailed statement of sources
of revenues in their offering circulars. (Summary of Reporting Practices)
63, P. 271_/
The amount of detail on use of inter-governmental aid and its con-
tinued levels that should be reported is still unclear. The possible uses of
state and federal aid are very important because not all aid may be used for
debt service. If concern is with the risk of outstanding debt, the most
useful funds are those that have no restrictions on use and those predesig-
nated for vital or debt services. Aid predesignated for nonessential ser-
vices and functions or for deferrable capital facilities is less helpful
in avoiding a potential default situation. Different ways of measuring the
relative aid for comparison purposes may result in varying answers. Per
capita figures may not reflect aid to overlapping units or for special
facilities used by the people living in a large region. An argument can
also be made that state aid to low-income and elderly people should not be
counted as aid to local governments.
The 1965 State Technical Assistance Report recommends that the pro-
spectus include revenue from state and federal governments classified by use
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for operations, capital outlays, and debt service. /P1, p. 40_7 This seems
helpful, although it may be appropriate to further differentiate between
aid used for the regular functions of that municipality, such as schools,
and that for some extraordinary purpose, such as disaster relief or pollution
control. It may be useful to draw on the reporting experience of the require-
ments attached to Federal Revenue Sharing Funds. /64_7 Identification of
the particular aid programs that account for large amounts may be useful to
analysts who have access through other sources to discussion of cutbacks and
expansions of aid programs. In fact, it may be possible that bond owners
could become effective advocates for those cities, because they are often
wealthy individuals or institutions having influence. Cities should do
further opinion surveys to determine whether they are meeting the informa-
tion needs of market participants who handle their securities and if they
can increase interest in aid discussions.
(108)
H. Summary and Conclusions
Revenue analysis is concerned with the sufficiency of revenues and the
ability of the city to estimate them. The city must show analysts and in-
vestors the revenue aspect of its financial structure and prove that rev-
enues will continue to be sufficient and competently managed.
Politically, the city's greaters risks are that investors might
disapprove of tax rate increases, tax collection policies, and sources of
tax income. Conflicts with the state government might increase because of
the pressure on both to tell the investment community about future state aid.
With disclosure and independent analysis, as with analysis by the
rating agencies, there is the possibility that communities with high tax rates
and low levels of taxable property will be labelled "poor quality investments"
and be forced to pay higher interest rates. With disclosure, however, such
communities may be able to demonstrate an attitude that will reassure bond
investors.
The disclosure recommendations reviewed generally do not show enough
concern about revenue sources. Their attention is overly focused on property
taxes, which now account for a much smaller share of local revenue sources
than they did twenty years ago. It is more important for the investor to
understand the circumstances affecting state and federal aid than it is to
understand some of the detail on property taxes recommended. Investors must
learn to understand what is involved with new tax sources such as commuter
taxes. Operating statements are not very useful for analysis and are too
long to conveniently distribute, The Census Bureau could be helpful by
collecting standardized information on taxable assets and transactions.
Accounting techniques used in revenue management are very important
-- they should probably be standardized and should be definitely reported and
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audited. An independent audit may help to provide credibility, while redu-
cing the need for disclosure of details tat are politically sensitive or
hard to pinpoint. An auditor's report may be helpful, in particular, to
establish the adequacy of budgetary accounting, contingency funds, and tax
collection procedures.
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IV. Disclosure of Debt Information
The debt structure is the most important aspect of city finances in
municipal credit analysis. According to one text:
"Debt implies the use of revenues from outside the
current tax structure, the annual payment of principal
and interest, the encumbering of credit and anticipated
revenues, and the assumption of long-term liabilities.
in return for long-term benefits. Analysis of debt
is frequently avoided because of its complexity, its
dynamic nature, and the long-term economic effects
which make forecasting difficult and evaluation be-
yond currently available data, dangerous" / 34, p. 38 /
Possibilities in analysis of a particular debt structure must be understood
before one can design a presentation of the facts that will facilitate
analysis and perhaps even suggest conclusions. It is even more difficult
(and requires greater understanding) to specify details of disclosure re-
quirements (for the debt structure of various categories of municipal struc-
tures) in such a manner that interpretations are not unwisely pre-biased.
when the specifications are used for a particular municipality.
As with all parts of a bond analysis, the city debt structure may
be examined with the goal of establishing a "quality opinion" applicable
to all of its outstanding debt, or it may be examined with a particular
interest in a long-term or a short-term issue. An analysis of short-term
debt is more directed towards immediate cash-flow than is an analysis of
long-term debt. The latter is concerned with a city's ability to meet
payments on bonds that may mature in as many as forty years (although most
-mature sooner), and it should include an examination of how the issuer's
policies and reliance on short-term debt affect this. A general analysis
is concerned with these subjects and with the city's patterns of borrow-
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ing as they reflect a debt management policy. Although it is unknown exactly
how investors and the rating agencies analyze or should analyze bonds, it is
clear that the most rigorous analysis is directed towards the debt structure.
Not only does the analysis affect the interest rates, but the interest rates
affect the analysis. The debt structure of various cities vary in many ways
-- Table VI-l compares short-term interest rates, long-term interest rates,
and ratings of some cities. (see page 121)
The following charts present applicable data from the Indicator Survey
showing how important various debt information is to bond dealers and data
on existing reporting practices. Other charts, preceding chapter sections,
compare the recommendations given for disclosure of debt information by the
1951 New York City Report, the 1963 IBA Format, the 1965 State Technical
Assistance Report, the 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines, and the 1976
Williams-Tower Bill. This chapter has eight sections: (A) Short-term debt
structures, (B) Past and current levels of long-term debt, (C) Overlap-
ping debt structures, (D) Authorized debt and the possibilities of increas-
ing outstanding debt, (E) The uses of outstanding debt, (F) Debt retire-
ment schedules, (G) Legal debt limits and debt-weighting ratios, and
(I) Summary and conclusions.
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Chart IV-1
Frequency of Reporting Debt Information in 1975
Section of
Chapter IV
in which
Discussed
Not
Reporting ReportingIndicator
Direct debt statement, 1975
Statement of direct debt outstanding
within 120 days of sale
Statement of direct debt for prior
five year period
165
149
167
(Excerpted from exhibit submitted by Professor Ronald Forbes,
New York University) U.S. Congress Senate. Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Securities on S. 2969 to Amend the Securites
Exchange Act of 1934 to Require the Preparation of Annual Re-
ports and Distribution Statements by Issuers of Municipal
Securities, and for Other Purposes, S. 2574 to Amend The
Securities Act of 1933 to Provide for Registration of Secur-
ities Issued by State and Local Governments, February 24,
25, and 26, 1976. 94th Congress, Second Session, Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 271.
Source:
Chart IV-2
Results of Questions of the Indicator Survey Concerning Debt Information
Section of
Chapter IV
in which
Discussed
B
H
H
F
H
D
C
Relative
Importance
Ranking
:Indicator as listed on survey form (out of 74)
Total debt outstanding 1
Debt per capita ratio 2
Funded debt outside of legal debt limit 3
Net indebtedness 4
Debt retirement schedule 9
Combined debt as a percentage of market value 17
Projected capital expenditures for public facilities 20
Number of overlapping jurisdictions with debt
issuing capacity 23
Statement of assets and liabilities over five years 24
Mean
Importance
Rating
(on 1-5 scale)
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.3
1.9
1.7
1.7
1.8
1.9
Proportion
Desiring
Comparative
Data (%)
67
80
56
68
44
64
38
32
36
Chart IV-3
Disclosure Recommendations on Short-term Debt Structure Information
Types of Descriptive Information
Recommending
Report
Amount of
Short-term Debt
Trends, Uses,
Categories, or
Other detail
Amount of
Short-term debt of
Overlapping units
1951 New York City Report
1963 IBA Format
1965 State Technical
Assistance Report
1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines
1976 Williams-Tower Bill
Ambiguous
Yes
Ambiguous
Categories
of security
Ambiguous
Yes
Yes.
If used for
Operating expenses
If required
by the SEC
Ambiguous
Ambiguous
Yes
If required
by the SEC
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A. Short-term debt structures
There are three commonly used classifications of short-term debt
contracts that are sold to underwriters and, through them, to other insti-
tutions and private citizens. These are Bond Anticipation Notes (BAN's),
Tax Anticipation Notes (TAN's), and Revenue Anticipation Notes (RAN's).
They are issued to cover cash needs until the particular funds pledged are
received from bond sales, tax collections, or other revenues. The security
of the short-term note depends on the likelihood that the particular funds
against which they have been issued will appear, and on the actions planned
if there should be a fund shortage. Legally, in event of default, bond
holders have priority over note holders. Theoretically, this means that if
an issuer does not have sufficient cash on hand to pay both bonds and notes
coming due in a given month, the bond holders will be paid first and the
note holders will have to wait until sufficient revenue is received. The
lien situation is complicated because of other encumbrances on revenues
and the general legal inexperience with municipal default.
Capital market interest rates for short-term securities are differ-
ent at any given time than those for long-term securities. The typical
buyer of a note has different needs and circumstances from those of the
buyer of a bond.
A municipality may be able to borrow from local banks or from the
state government. These loan contracts have different terms than the
notes nationally marketed. The municipality may also be able to borrow
interest-free from unwilling creditors by delaying payments owed.
Information on short-term debt intended for investors in long-term
securities should be handled differently from that intended for investors
in short-term securities. In the short-term, cash-flow is important, and
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the passage of a few months might significantly alter the financial picture.
Moody's has recognized this and has instituted Municipal Investment Grade
(MIG) Ratings for short-term securities. The rating agency monitors a
city's monthly cash receipts and verifies the complete repayment of TAN's
with tax receipts of that fiscal year. / 23_7 Other short-term notes
should also be paid by the source of funds predesignated for repayment at
the time of issue. New debt should not be incurred to finance their redemp-
tion.
Most municipalities have not recognized that the information relevant
to short-term debt is different from that which is relevant to long-term
debt. The municipalities often use the same basic prospectus for note buy-
ers and bond buyers. Most of that information shows the long-term financial
picture but is too dated to be useful in evaluation the risk of notes.
Independent analysis of short-term securities, like that of long-
term securities, gives investors an opportunity to make their own judgments
about the risk of purchase. Mikesell and Hay suggest that for such purposes,
a city should release interim statements detailing the total amount of funds
available for the year, the amount of expenditures and encumbrances to date,
and the balance available for the remainder of the year. /26, p. 117_7
More detailed short-term information is currently being released by the
City of Philadelphia under a policy developed by Lennox Moak. It includes:
monthly cash receipts; statements for each operating fund, each capital pro-
jects fund, and each consolidated cash account; quarterly financial state-
ments; and reporting of significant financial developments that may influ-
ence projected fund conditions. /37 7
Short-term debt policies and debt levels also affect the long-term
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financial management of a city. In 1973-74, short-term debt accounted for
an average of 11.5% of the total debt outstanding in imetropolitan areas as
reported by the U.S. Census Bureau. /58, p. 7_/ An increase in the amount
of short-term debt and regular tapping of contingency funds may indicate an
increasing delay between receipt of revenues and disbursements. Such situ-
ations are difficult to detect. An increase in the amount of outstanding
BAN's, however, may be a positive sign because it could be an indication of
public-works activity.
Some cities do not have the legal authority to incur short-term debt.
However, for those that do, short-term debt can be used to increase the
flexibility of city financial management. RAN's and TAN's are used because
tax collections and intragovernmental transfer payments are seldom received
during the month in which they are most needed to pay bills. If the city
maintained a large balance, it would not need to issue TAN's. Unless such
balances are mandatory, however, political pressure to postpone tax increases
lead to their depletion.
BAN's may be issued to finance the beginning of a project until nec-
essary approvals are given or administrative delays are resolved. Notes
may be issued to postpone entrance to the long-term market until the going
interest rates become lower. The federal government is encouraging cities
to use BAN's for preliminary construction financing of federally subsidized
projects until a final cost estimate is determined. /23_/ Because the
amount of BAN's outstanding is usually higher before a city embarks on a
major construction project, trend figures of total short-term debt may be
misleading.
The 1976 Williams-Tower Bill would require disclosure of the esti-
mated amount of short-term debt outstanding. The 1976 MFOA Disclosure
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Guidelines suggest that debt-service schedules should include short-term
debt. /33, p. 6_7 The 1963 IBA Format suggests that the amounts and mat-
urity dates of unfunded short-term debt be reported and classified as
TAN's, BAN's, bank loans, warrants, judgments, unpaid bills sixty days past
due, and miscellaneous items. /1, p. 63_7 The total is to be com-
pared to those of a year and two years ago. This format seems reasonable,
although RAN's should be another category and the trends of BAN's should
be shown separately.
This thesis recommends that cities make available to note holders
statements similar to those released by the City of Philadelphia or sug-
gested by Mikesell and Hay. Such detailed statements with trend data,
published annually or more often, should be sent to note holders if they
request it. Because of the typical timetable within which most notes are
issued, distributed, held, and redeemed, it may not be appropriate to dis-
tribute statements of short-term cash-flow information in the same manner
in which detailed prospectus statements are distributed to bond buyers.
Most notes mature in less than one year, and many in a few months. Most
note buyers will probably be unlikely to respond with any sort of comments
or questions to annual reports, long prospectus statements (such as currently
distributed), or cash-flow statements.
If cash statements are circulating in the marketplace, investors may
examine them before they buy the city's notes. If they are released, the
existence of the statements may give the city a cooperative image, and the
information included may allay some fears about the possibilities of default
by certain cities that might be, according to rumor, in financial trouble.
The time necessary to conduct an audit means that such figures will probably
have to be released without one, although an independent auditor could
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moniter the city's record-keeping and reporting, While a city would probably
want to attempt to disclaim liability for the accuracy of the figures, the
potential harm to the city's reputation for reliability in reporting if
inaccuracies are exposed would deter deliberate misrepresentation, If cities
adopt policies of releasing special statements on short-term concerns, as
this thesis suggests, they should avoid the administrative difficulties of
assembling names and addresses of note holders and the legal responsibility
for statement distribution, if possible, by supporting the assignment of
this responsibility upon bond dealers.
Many or most note holders may be uninterested in actually reading
cash-flow statements unless default seems imminent. Distribution of the
statements to financial journals, such as The Bond Buyer and The Wall Street
Journal, and to major underwriters may sufficiently bolster the city's rep-
utation and would enable analysis by those with special interest. If mun-
icipalities distributed less information to note holders than to bond holders,
however, the SEC might consider them to be withholding material information
from note holders.
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City
Memphis
Long Beach
Oakland
Chicago
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Nashville
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Los Angeles
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Long-term
Interest
Rate
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Table IV-1 (cont.)
Date of Short-term
Long-term Interest
Bond Issue Rate
-- 5.48
8/73 3.74
5/74 7.00
7/76 3.98
6/76 3.37
5/76 --
6/74 --
5/76 4.75
9/76 4.50
4/76 3.50
1/76 6.52
5/76 4.25
9/76 4.50
9/76 8.07
6/76 7.00
6/76 7.00
Date of
Short-term
Note Issue
4/74
9/76
1/76
6/76
6/76
8/76
4/76
2/76
2/74
7/76
7/76
7/76
7/76
Moody's
Rating -
Aug. 1976
Aa
Aa
Aa
Aa
Aa
A-1
A-1
Aa
Aa
A
Aaa
A-1
Baa
Baa
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Table IV-1 (cont.)
Long-term interest rates, dates of long-term bond issues, short-term interest rates, and
dates of short-term note issues are taken-from results of The Survey of Financial Officers
Moody's ratings are taken from Moody's Updated Rating List.
Source:
Chart IV-4
Disclosure Recommendations for Information on Past and Current Levels of Long-Term Debt
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B. Past and current levels of long-term debt
Disclosure of outstanding long-term general obligation debt is not
controversial. The level of outstanding debt is generally considered to be
a "material" and relevant fact which is often disclosed and always recom-
mended for disclosure. In 1975, 165 out of 174 issuers included a fairly
recent statement of direct debt, and 149 included an update to within 120
days of the current bond offering. (Summary of Reporting Practices) /63,
p. 271_7 The results of the Indicator Survey support a policy of disclosure
of this information. The bond dealers surveyed rated "total debt outstand-
ing" as the most important indicator of all seventy-four included on the
survey form. Such information is available to city officials without re-
search or audits.
The more complicated questions in analysis of the debt structure are
the following: How should limited obligation or self-supporting debt be
treated? How should the debt of other municipal corporations that have an
overlapping geographical area and taxing powers be treated? How important
is the possibility or probability that bonds that have been authorized will
be issued in the next year? in the next two years? How important is the
possibility of new bond issues shown in capital improvements plans but not
yet authorized? Should the current and past use of the proceeds of out-
standing long-term general obligation debt and other debt be detailed to
bond holders or new bond buyers?
Long-term debt offerings can be classified into two types by security
-- general obligation and limited obligation. Analysis in this thesis is
primarily directed at general obligation bonds.
General obligation bonds are secured by the issuer's or by another
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governmental unit's giving of its full-faith-and-credit-pledge of its taxing
power and other general revenue producing power. To be a general obligation
bond, a security may be issued with the assumption that repayment will come
from special revenues, but if there is a full-faith-and-credit pledge and
the special revenues are insufficient, the general governing body will very
seldom renege on its responsibility for the debt. In practice, an example
was given by one midwestern city where auditors examining special assessment
funds discovered that a large number of installments collected for one fund
had been diverted to pay bonds issued from another fund, that had failed to
make adequate collections. Although bonds of the fund from which the diver-
sion was made were of the special assessment type, they were ultimately paid
by the general funds from a tax levy on all local property. /_26, p. 119_7
Experience has shown that if a municipality does not support its
limited obligation debt and avert default, its financial reputation and
ability to market general obligation securities will be strongly damaged.
If the municipality has a limited right to levy taxes, it cannot issue gen-
eral obligation debt. Although many tax increases are passed by referendum,
taxpayers cannot legally refuse to pay taxes necessary to redeem outstanding
general obligation debt unless the municipality is in bankruptcy receiver-
ship.
Some very good but detailed approaches to disclosure of limited
obligation debt have been suggested. The 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines
include a suggestion that:
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"If any outstanding revenue, special assessment, or
limited obligation bonds have not been fully supported by
earnings of the relevant facilities or by other relevant
receipts at any time in the last ten years, state for each
year in which additional general receipts of the issuer
were used or required to be used for payments on such sec-
urities, the amount due on such securities and the amount
of such additional funds. Describe any contract or arrange-
ment, such as a lease, services contract, or deficiency
subsidy aggreement, requiring application of general tax or
other receipts of the issuer for-the benefit of other gov-
ernmental entities. / 33, p. 8_/
The description of those contracts or arrangements, however, might be so
technical that that it might have to be drafted by a bond counsel, auditor,
or other expert -- further removing document preparation from the control
of city officers. For many or most investors, though, such wording would
be most useful if it was not in legal language.
There are many possible oontingencies affecting revenue facilities.
If these contingencies are determined to be "material information", then the
potential liabilitiy of the city may be greatly increased and the prospectus
statements have to be much longer.
The 1965 State Technical Assistance Report gave useful suggestions
on presenting limited obligation debt. It recommended that separate forms
be developed for these types of bonds: (1) nonproperty-tax-supported bonds
(payable from gross receipts and other nonproperty taxes), (2) bonds payable
from property taxes that are subject to limits, (3) special assessment
bonds, (4) housing authority bonds, and (5) bonds secured by pledges of
two or more revenue sources. It also recommended a "bridge" between disclo-
sure of revenue bonds information and general obligation bond information by
including:
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"(a) in the general obligation form a trend
report of enterprise debt, income, expense,
debt service, and surplus or deficit, and
(b) in the revenue bond form a summary of
general debt and related information that
reflects upon the entire credit standing of
the community. / 1, p. 39 _
This recommendation is broader than that of the MFOA which would apply only
to enterprises that had a deficit or had required a subsidy. Both have
similar problems in that prospectus statments designed along such lines
might be very bulky, extend the conceptual boundaries of the information
that must be included, and increase liability. For instance, it is possible
that a city could be held responsible for misestimating the size of a def-
icit of a metropolitan transit system.
Ideally, arrangements should be made for exchanges of such informa-
tion statements between the financial management of a city and any special
enterprises under separate financial management. They could be compiled in
detailed information reports available to investors on their request and
released to financial journals. If this sort of distribution scheme is
made possible, the generally distributed prospectus could include only
the names of the enterprises and the amounts of outstanding limited obliga-
tion debt. More detail could be provided if the city had ever actually
contributed from its general funds for t.e redemption of limited obligation
debt or if it had guaranteed the debts.
For general distribution, the fc wing excerpt from the 1963 IBA
Format has the advantage of brevity:
Amount
Outstanding
A. General obligations
(not listed below)
Special assessments secured
also by general tax
Utility and public enterprise
debt secured also by general tax:
(a) water
(b) sewer
(c) light and power
(d) other (specify)
Total general obligation bonds
B. Special assessments only
Utility and public enterprise
revenue only:
(a) water
(b) sewer
(c) light and power
(d) other (specify)
Total other than general
obligation bonds:
To keep the
ents to the
version of
$$$$
$
$$$$
$
prospectus statements short and readable, as desi
Indicator Survey, this thesis recommends the use
this part of their format additionally including:
$
$
$$$$
$
$
$$$
L 1, p. 63_/
red by respond-
of an expanded
The amounts
and trends of the payments from the general funds for redemption of special
assessment bonds and repayment of utility and public enterprise debt, the
dates and amounts of subsidies for debt described as "self-supporting" with
an explanation of those circumstances, the amounts and names of funds with
outstanding limited obligation debt, and the amounts and identification of
lease contracts, service contracts, and deficiency subsidy contracts. The
contract information recommended by the 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines
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Sinking
Funds
Balance
(130)
should not be included in the prospectus because it is not that important
and would add unnecessary detail and bulk, but is should be available upon
request for those that feel strongly enough.
The trends of long-term debt help to put the issuer's current financial
condition in perspective. It is reasonable for an analyst or investor to
know whether the city has borrowed heavily for years, whether capital needs
have been postponed, and how the debt burden has changed relative to the
total budget. Current debt-service requirements would also be more clear if
they were related to their original issues. It would be interesting to
analysts if a city had changed the composition of its debt structure (by
type of security) and they might question its reasons (to avoid legal debt
limits?) Reporting on the trends of long-term debt is not unlikely to uncover
potential problems or to increase costs of data gathering and verifying. It
may not be important enough, however, to be included in a short statement,
The trends of interest costs are something that the city might wish to
downplay.
The Summary of Reporting Practices found that only seven out of 174
issuers included a "statement of direct debt for prior five-year period"
L63, p. 271j7 as recommended by the 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines.
33, p. 7_/ The 1965 State Technical Assistance Report recommends a compar-
ison of outstanding debt, characterized by type of security, for ten years
ago, five years ago, and the last two years. / 1, p. 40_/ The 1976 Williams-
Tower Bill would not require disclosure of long-term debt trends, and there
was no space for it on the 1963 IBA Format.
If the extra detail on trends of long-term debt is given, trends over
ten years (or some of them) would be more representative than the five sug-
gested by the MFOA because capital construction programs of cities have
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varied greatly (due to funding of urban renewal programs and other circum-
stances). Bar or line graphs, such as those used in most annual reports
prepared by corporations for stockholders, would be very adequate and would
not drown the analyst in detail. The trends of interest rates may be down-
played by including them in debt service trends (or highlighted if the city
is now paying more favorable rates).
Annual debt service requirements over the last ten years could be
effectively compared with total revenues. Because a large amount of annual
debt service expenditures in previous years is from debt issued more than
ten years ago, records of annual debt service show a different picture than
total debt outstanding. Trend data could be accompanied by a short descrip-
tion of reasons for major increases or decreases of debt (such as central
business district renovation or transfer of school building functions to a
special district).
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C. Overlapping debt structures
Cities have several types of long-term liabilities from overlapping
jurisdictions (such as school districts, utility districts, housing author-
ities, transit authorities, and counties). These include jurisdictions that
have a funding agreement with the city, a legal or political claim on city
revenues if they should default, service city people or property, and/or
tax city people or property, Where the overlapping units are separate cor-
porate forms and the legal cooperation of the city is not needed for auth-
orization of the issue, their debt cannot be considered to be the debt of
the city government. Debt of this types is called "overlapping debt" and
is either general or limited obligation debt of the overlapping entity,
which may be overlying, underlying, or coterminous.
The idea that overlapping debt should be somehow reported and used in
analysis is fairly well established. In 1975, 138 out of 158 prospectus
statements included it. (Summary of Reporting Practices) L63, p. 271_/
However, the bond dealers surveyed rated it aa 23rd in importance out of 74
indicators placing it as having less importance than most indicators of
internal finances. (Indicator Survey)
The 1976 MFOA Disclsoure Guidelines and the 1963 IBA Format suggest
a table with the name of every overlapping entity, its amount of authorized
debt as of a given date, and the percent of its outstanding debt chargeable
to persons or property within the issuer's boundries. / 34, p.9; 1, p. 64_
The 1976 Williams-Tower Bill does not require any disclosure of overlapping
debt. The 1965 State Technical Assistance Report suggests including sum-
maries of classified revenues and expenditures of overlapping units. L1,
p. 64_7 An exhibit developed by the Firch Investors Service mentions the
"multiplicity of overlapping governmental units", but it is not explicit as
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how much detail of the finances of those units the agency considers. / 60,
p. 76 _j
What could be disclosed about the finances of overlapping units?
Possibilities for each unit include; (1) total debt outstanding, (2) a
breakdown of total debt outstanding by type of security, (3) sinking fund
detail, (4) an aggregated schedule of debt service requirements, (5) de-
tail for each outstanding issue, (6) the amounts of authorized debt,
(7) legal debt limits and procedures in issuing debt, (8) a general des-
cription of the administration, finances, and characteristics of enterprises
or area, (9) a summary of services provided and other expenditures, (10)
a summary of revenue sources, (11) the type of taxes and the tax rate
imposed upon people and property of the municipality of concern by the over-
lapping unit, (12) the trends of each of these, and (13) tax collection
procedures.
Obviously, if a city tried to report all of this detail on each over-
lapping unit (there may be many), the city's statement would be unwieldly
and more important information would be obscured. What is the most impor-
tant information about the finances of an overlapping unit to an investor
in securities of the general governing body? Logically, the most important
questions about an overlapping units seem to be: (1) Is the unit in imme-
diate financial danger? (2) If the unit defaults in what ways might the
city be held responsible? (3) Are the people of the city dependent on the
overlapping government for vital services? and (4) What kind of taxes
(and in what amounts) are imposed by the overlapping unit on people or prop-
erty within the city?
Moak suggests that comprehensive financial reports be prepared show-
ing the aggregated effect of the finances of all municipal units in each
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locality. Such a policy would be a significant advance that would open new
possibilities for reseach in municipal finance. He does not, however, sug-
gest that such a policy be instituted with the purpose of informing the
municipal securities market. L 28, pp. 430-432_/
Reporting of the finances of overlapping units might require more
political cooperation than is sometimes existing. If the officers of the
overlapping unit can anticipate a danger of default of that unit, their stra-
tegic maneuvering might be hampered by an obligation to frequently and offi-
cially inform other local governments. A lesser responsibility, however,
may suffice and lead to greater communication than currently exists. The
more detail on overlapping units required, the more opportunity will exist
for policy conflicts and liability disputes between overlapping units. This
thesis therefore recommends that limited and defined categories of informa-
tion on overlapping units be reported in prosepctus statements and annual
reports.
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D. Authorized debt and the possibilities of increasing outstanding debt
It is reasonable to consider new debt when evaluating the burden of
outstanding debt. For any city, an exploration of the finances and other
circumstances may lead to various perceptions of risk. Examples of such
are:
(1) A city has recently completed a major capital imporvements
program for which debt service requirements are high. How-
ever, because no more long-term borrowing is planned or
needed for several years, outstanding bonds and new issues
of TAN's and RAN's are an acceptable risk.
(2) The debt service requirements of a city are high and it is
planning more capital outlays, however, the risk of its
securities is an acceptable one, because its revenue base
is adequate and growing.
(3) Although debt service requirements are currently reason-
able, the expense of capital facilities needed and planned
(to be paid by new debt issues) is so large that the sec-
urity of its current long-term issues will be undermined
by the extra debt service needed for as yet unissued debt
before current issues mature.
It is difficult to define how much and what kind of information on
the possibilities of increasing outstanding debt are needed to allow -
investors to form this sort of general risk perception without reducing the
flexibility of the city in its future financing. How far in the future
should the analyst think and what certainty is -needed? The 1965 State Tech-
nical Report recommended that the prospectus "summarize all capital improve-
ments and bond issues that are likely during the next six years". /1,
p. 41_1 Although it is generally recommended that cities plan compre-
hensive capital improvement programs, there is a large element of uncertainty
in these plans as financial priorities, administrations, and building costs
change. Someone, such as a financial consultant, who has personal commun-
ication with investors may be able to give them the most favorable or the
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most probable of possible interpretations.
The 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines suggest disclosure of debt
including the "Amount Authorized", which it defines as follows:
"Debt should be regarded as 'authorized' when all
material legal steps have been taken by the issuer
for its authorization for issuance, such as required
approval of the city council or the voters. Actions
tending to be of a ministerial or judicial nature,
such as validation in some jurisdictions, should not
be regarded as discretionary for this purpose. / 33, p.7 7
The 1963 IBA Format provides a half-inch blank each for the purpose and
the amount of authorized debt. / 1, p. 64_7 The rating agencies, how-
ever, claim to review much more than currently authorized debt. Standard
& Poor's Corporation claims that it considers the future borrowing plans
of the unit and all overlapping units and that it reviews plans for capital
improvement programs for the next five years. /60, p. 37_7
It is obviously reasonable to disclose authorization on the basis of
which the city is really planning to issue more bonds within the year. In
reality, however, things are more complicated. Some cities have very large
amounts of authorized but unissued debt on their books with which they have
little intention of proceeding. Others may have ongoing and immediate plans
to issue debt that has not yet been authorized. Of course, what is really
important in analysis is the probability of increasing outstanding debt,
not the dormat authorizations of bonds so long delayed that the use for
which they were intended has been forgotten.
The Indicator Survey results provide evidence that bond dealers are
interested in the possibility of increasing outstanding debt. Their im-
portance ratings showed they think that "projected capital expenditures
for public facilities" is more important information than "number of assets
7and liabilities over five years", "number of overlapping jurisdictions with
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debt issuing capacity, "changes in welfare expenditures in last five years",
and "employment by the city and other governmental units over the last five
years".
How may the distinction between legal authorization and the likeli-
hood of issuing be made? A city could describe part of its authorized debt
as being out-of-consideration and part of its authorized debt as being
really anticipated. If it does, what happens if it is politically strategic
to use an old authorization? If it begins to call certain debt anticipated,
will it be considered to be willfully misrepresenting the facts if it issues
debt within the next six months, year, or two years, that it did not describe
on the last official financial statement as anticipated? Also, is not a
capital improvement program something a city develops as an internal planning
mechanism -- why should it be exposed to the investment community? Could
the city be held responsible for carrying out the plans announced in offi-
cial statements even if the wishes of the administration and the population
change?
This is an area in which there is potential for real conflict of
interest, between the investors who wish to be informed and the city which
wants to manage itself. Extensive disclosure requirements and court find-
ings holding the city strictly liable for the accuracy of this information
could force the city to change its financial management policies. Although
the Moreland Commission (convened to evaluate the financial crisis and
temporary default of the New York State Urban Development Corporation)
argued that disclosure will, in general, instigate investor feed-back lead-
ing to more sound management policies, that feedback could also lead to in-
creased difficulty in city management. For this reason, this thesis recom-
mends that investors find out about projected capital expenditures through
informal channels.
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E. The uses of outstanding debt
Long-term debt is generally used instead of cash savings to pay for
capital facilities because:
(1) The use of long-term bonded debt helps to smooth fluctuations
in expenditures over time so that the same tax rate can be
maintained.
(2) The use of long-term debt allows current needs for capital
facilities to be met in growing communities.
(3) The use of long-term debt allows capital facilities to be
built much sooner after their need is perceived.
(4) The use of long-term debt allows the administration that
plans the project to get fairly immediate political credit.
(5) The use of long-term debt allows more equitable payment by
users of facilities serving transient communities over a
period of time.
(6) The interest rates that municipalities generally pay on
outstanding debt is less than the inflationary increase in
construction costs so it is less expensive to borrow-build-
repay than to save-repay-build.
The 1965 State Technical Assistance Report recommends that the pro-
spectus itemizations of outstanding debt issues include their uses.
It notes that the debt detail of a large metropolitan center should be
reserved for the annual report. 11, p. 40_/ Although none of the other
disclosure guidelines cited recommend reporting df the use of proceeds of
all outstanding issues, several prospectus statements examined did include
this information. St. Paul, Minnesota, for example, gave a list of all the
project names and amounts of issues of thirty-five outstanding bond issues
(such as health center, street lighting, flood control, and library improve-
memts). /-9, p. 26_7 Boston, which has more outstanding debt, classified
it into nine general categories of use (such as general purposes, public
buildings, and public works). /8, p. 13_/ Depending on the judgment of
the investor, a list of purposes may show that a city's management has been
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wise or foolish to borrow for these reasons. A list, such as either one
described, takes one page or less in a prospectus statements, is easy to
compile from city records, and should not increase the city's potential
liability.
What is more important to the security analyst, however, is uses of
bond proceeds that may indicate potential financial trouble. Because they
are looking for problems, analysts are interested in any irregular uses of
debt proceeds at any time in the past and currently. This section discusses
irregular uses which are of interest because they may (or may not) indicate
bad financial management or financial difficulties: (1) debt-financing of
capital equipment, (2) debt-financing of operating expenses, (3) deficit-
funding, and (4) refunding and rollovers.
(1) Debt-financing of capital equipment: Capital equipment (such
as buses, fire engines, and heating systems) is often financed by long-term
bond proceeds; this is often wise and canbe justified because they have
high initial costs, are used for along time, and are often apart of the
plans of buildings. However, large communities generally pay for capital
equipment out of operating funds so that they do not need voter authoriza-
tion, avoid complicating the capial programming process, and do not increase
the outstanding debt counted against the legal-debt limit. A policy change
from excluding capital equipment to including it in uses of the proceeds of
long-term bonds may indicate a shortage of current revenues. A short expla-
nation of how this has been handled should help analysts to understand the
long-term debt structure, however, the city should not commit itself to
maintaining either policy because its financial flexibility would be reduced.
(2) Debt-financing of operating expenses: Use of long-term bond
proceeds for operating expenses is only justifiable by a real emergency
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such as a natural catastrophe. The 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines specif-
ically recommend reporting of the use of long-term bond proceeds for oper-
ating expenses / 33, p. 8_/ An honest description of past reveneus and
expenditures would show such use. A poor example was set by New York City,
which included in one capital budget items such as textbooks, manpower
training, and even some salaries. /15, p. 94_/
(3) Deficit funding: When operating deficits have accumulated to
an unmanageable level, bonds may be issued to cover them. This is called
"deficit funding". It is more honest to issue bonds specifically for such
purposes than to pad the s.ize of bond issues designated for capital improve-
ments with needs for operating funds. However, deficit funding is not
generally justifiable and except in times of "deep and protracted business
depression", it usually indicates financial mismanagement. 7~28, p. 260_7
The financial policies responsible for deficits may not be in the
control of the issuer. City financial statements discussing deficit funding
should make this clear, and investors and bond analysts should try to under-
stand the whole situation. Albany, for instance, was limited by New York
State from increasing its maximum property tax rate. Although its long-
term debt records show that for a number of years it issued very few bonds,
it built up a deficit of $22 million. When the City became legally eligible
for a different state classification by passing a population size criteria,
it used its new enabling powers to double its tax rate and divest its school
district. /7, p. 10_/ The financial mismanagement was in the slowness
of the City and State political processes in finding a solution, not in the
issuing of the deficit funding. Investors who are prejudiced against new
securities of the City of Albany because the City has had a deficit and
funded it with long-term securities are doing the City an injustice.
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(4) Refunding and rollovers: Refunding is a procedure by which call-
able bonds are redeemed with with cash or with newly-issued bonds. It is
legitimate and may indicate sophisticated debt management. Its normal uses
are to achieve interest savings, eliminate restrictive bond covenants, and
reorganize maturitj patterns, or to consolidate debt. /27, p. 279_/ Fre-
quently, the law prohibits the issuance of refunding bonds in greater ,
amounts than the value of the principal of the refunded-issue although maturity
may be delayed. Refunding may be more of a political question than a fin-
ancial one. The city must justify extension of the payment period and the
new burden of fees and taxes on users and citizens for facilities built
years earlier.
One kind of refunding does have cause for concern. That is a "roll-
over", which the 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines define as:
"refunding securities (which) have been issued by the
issuer within the last 25 years for the purpose of
preventing a default in principal or interest payments
on securities then outstanding. / 33, p. 7_/
The MFOA suggests disclosure of the circumstances and amounts involved.
However, it may be that a city that had refunded securities in the manner
described by the MFOA may not have otherwise defaulted. It may not have
had sufficient general funds or sinking funds available to redeem the bond,
and refunding may have been a more convenient or politically expedient
alternative than raising taxes or cutting services. Whether the city would
have in fact defaulted (if it had not refunded the bonds) seems difficult
to prove.
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F. Debt retirement schedules
The debt retirement schedule is a very important piece of information
in security analysis. It is simply a presentation of the amount that is
due every year for redemption and interest payments on outstamding serial
bonds and maturing term bonds. The disclosure recommendations cited show
a consensus on the importance of reporting debt retirement schedules, yet
in 1975 the Summary of Reporting Practices found that only 66 out of 174
issuers surveyed included a statement of annual debt service requirements
and only 36 included the interest payments. /63, p. 271_7 This clearly
shows mow unresponsive municipal issuers have been to investor's information
desires. In fact, respondents to the Indicator Survey thought that debt
retirement schedules were the ninth most important indicator out of 74
indicators.
The schedule of debt retirement is necessary to make a comparison with
projected revenues and other projected expenditures in a detailed analysis
to see if there might be shortages of funds needed to avoid default. Most
cities have so many outstanding issues and their maturities are arranged
in such a way that a slightly smaller amount of existing debt should be
due each succeeding year.
If there are years in which an especially large amount of debt matures,
savings for that year's bond repayment should be distributed over other
years. If there are years in which relatively little debt matures, those
extra funds should be used to defray the debt repayment requirements of
other years. Funds normally dedicated to debt service should not be used
for unnecessary expenditures in the occasional year in which debt service
is especially light, because that might contribute to extravagent, unplanned
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expenditures. If bond redemption requirements were the same every year
there would be no need to save for them because annual appropriations could
be marked for maturing debt.
In addition to looking for fluctuations in debt service requirements
and the city's handling of them, an analyst is interested in how fast the
outstanding debt will be repaid. The more quickly it is repaid the fewer
encumbrances there will be on future revenues, so that more debt may be
safely issued to pay for other capital needs. One way to evaluate this is
to future the "average life of tax-supported debt outstanding", which may
be expressed in years or as the percentage that annual retirement and/or
amortization represents of the total debt outstanding (e.g. 7.14% or 14
years). Moak advised that use of this ratio increase with a safe range
being 10 to 15 years. /28, p. 376_/
The rating agencies have said that they consider the shape of the debt
service curve to be very important. They calculate the "debt payout ratio"
by summing the scheduled bond redemptions for a certain number of years and
dividing by net outstanding direct debt. The rating agencies consider a
25% redemption in five years and a 50% redemption in ten years to be a good
rate. /47, p. 140_/
Other analysts use another calculation to evaluate whether the burden
of debt is being extended over too many years. They add five percent of
all general bonded debt outstanding to current annual interest requirements.
This gives the burden of annual debt service that would be due if all of the
bonds were retired evenly over the next twenty years. /28, p. 375_7
These several simple techniques are related to a fairly important
aspect of the debt structure and could be computed by an unsophisticated
investor using the debt service schedule. This is a good example of how
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disclosure policies might promote wider analyses by more people.
Because debt service requirements fluctuate, many cities pay into a
sinking fund" to save for bond redemption -- which is then invested in
approved investments (such as U.S. government securities), Sometimes a city
may, for various reasons, pay into a sinking fund all of the money needed
for redemption of a particular issue years before the bonds mature. Bond
owners prefer the security of having appropriations made into a sinking fund
or a reserve fund somewhat ahead of the schedule at which repayment of bond
principal and interest has been contracted. Bonds so secured may sell for
lower interest rates than bonds of the same issuer without them, on the
theory that if the issuer has a temporary cash shortage, immediate debt ser-
vice requirements will still be safe. If bond owners are very concerned
about the security of the bonds, they can check to see that appropriations
are made to the sinking or reserve funds as scheduled. There may be pre-
scribed legal procedures if they are not.
Should principal and interest due be lumped together when reported or
shown separately? Both the 1963 IBA Format and the 1976 MFOA Disclosure
Guidelines aggregate them. In fact, the MFOA suggests that assumptions about
future interest costs be made so that the principal and interest costs for the
new issue and for authorized but unissued debt "where appropriate" can be
included with outstanding debt in the annual debt service schedules. /33,
p. 7_/ There is a danger in these assumptions because of the difficulties
in estimating future interest costs and deciding when authorized debt is
"appropriate". An alternative, more appropriate treatment of this subject
might be to require analysis of the assumptions about the interest costs of
new and future debt issues.
The 1965 State Technical Assistance Report suggested that a debt ser-
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vice schedules for only the next ten years would be sufficient for analysis.
because after that the situation is likely to change. / 1, p. 41_7 The
1963 IBA Format suggests reporting this for only five years, / 1, p. 65_/
while the 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines suggest until maturity. / 33, p.7_
This format decision is relatively unimportant. An annual showing of debt-
service requirements for the next ten years followed by a lumping of debt
service already contracted for years 10-15, 15-20, etc., should be sufficient
and space-saving.
The 1963 IBA Format includes the yearly amounts due to sinking fund
installments, but it lumps them with the requirements for principal and
interest that are paid directly from general funds. /_1, p. 65_7 Both it
and the 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines suggest that the current balances of
sinking funds be given (also for overlapping units), If a city follows these
suggestions, the unfunded amount of outstanding debt and future encumbrances
on revenues would be clear, but the bond owners would still not be able to
tell if proper payments were being made into trust to redeem their bonds.
However, because some cities may have more than a hundred outstanding
issues, reporting the status of each payment separately is impractical.
Other possibilities exist to moniter payments such as appointing trust
officers for each issue who could notify security owners if problems arose.
The prospectus statements could then be reserved for information of more
general concern.
The 1976 Williams-Tower Bill does not specify the format of the debt
information it would require -- it throws out terms including the "character
of amortization provisions of funded debt", "sinking fund requirements", and
"debt service requirements". /.63, p. 7_7 However, some of these format
decisions in reporting debt retirement schdudules have policy implications.
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Although an aggregated format would be sufficient to check the debt-
payout ratio and pattern of debt service requirements, most disclosure guide-
lines suggest that the debt retirement schedule be disaggregated. The 1963
IBA Format suggests that it be broken down by authorized source of repayment,
such as general taxation, special assessments and general taxation, utility
revenues and general taxation, special assessments only, and utility revenues
only. / 1, p. 64_/ The 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines suggest that it be
broken down into general obligation, special assessment, utility revenue,
and other indebtedness. /_33, p. 7_/ It is unclear how much understanding
may be gained by the analyst from disaggregated displays of debt service
requirements. However, it will be more difficult to compare two issuers if
one uses the IBA suggestions and the other the MFOA suggestions.
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G. Legal debt limits and debt-weighting ratios
What is a "safe" amount of debt for a city to have outstanding? Tax-
payers have long been interested because of their concern about tax levels
and the future capacity of their city to build schools, roads, and other cap-
ital facilities as they are needed. Bond owners are concerned about the
ability of future revenues to repay outstanding debt. Although the level
of debt that would threaten the issuer's ability to embark upon new capital
projects, or to maintain a low tax level is much lower than that which would
threaten its ability to repay already issued debt, both are estimated in
similar manners.
Debt-weighting ratios are commonly used although they are not pre-
scribed by formal theories of practice of municipal finance. They include:
debt levels relative to property values, debt levels relative to the total
budget, debt per capita, and debt per capita relative to per capita income.
The rating agencies have been in a position to compile this information for
many issues and use some ratios in assigning ratings. Analysts may use
these formulas to compare the issuers of bonds they are considering buying
and save enough time by doing so to examine a few 'issuers in more detail. If
enough buying decisions are made on the basis of debt ratios, the interest
rates the issuer is forced to pay will be affected. -Thus a city that has
a financial structure different from the norm may seem more or less attrac-
tive to investors because of the use of very simple formulas for evaluating
the debt burden.
The traditional legalistic approach to debt limitation is character-
ized by two common constitutional and statutory restrictions: (a) a limit on
indebtedness expressed as a percentage of the local governmental tax base
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and (b) a requirement of a local referendum to authorize the issuance of
bonds often calling for some sort of special voter majority. The debt to
property ratio in debt limiting legislation was originally developed as a
way to allow more flexibility than a flat ceiling. This approach has been
criticized by the Federal Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
as follows:
"(1) It pertains to present or past conditions, rather than
those of the future when long-term debt will be subject to
servicing, and thus takes no account of divergent trends for
various governments and communities.
(2) It deals with separate layers of local governments rather
than the aggregate of local government for a particular area.
(3) It purports to measure economic capacity by reference
to only one revenue source, the property tax, which provides
less than half the revenue of most local governments in most
states.
(4) This type of limit is, in most states, imprecise and
potentially discriminatory because of the nature of the prop-
erty tax base to which it refers. The real level of limita-
tion is determined by local assessment practices rather than
being closely governed by the legal provisions.
(5) Being commonly applicable only to full-faith-and-credit
debt, this type of limitation offers not assurance that ag-
gregated local debt will be kept within prudent bounds.
(6) Debt restrictions have probably restrained the total
volume of local government borrowing to some extent, but the
extent to which this is true cannot be definitely measured.
(7) The restrictions have probably restrained the total vol-
ume of local government borrowing to some extent, but the
extent to which this is true cannot be definitely measured.
(8) Debt restrictions have tended to impair the public
accountability and responsiveness of local governments in
various ways, including the promotion of special districts
and various kinds of financing authorities, and the compli-
cation and obfuscation of financial arrangements.
(9) The restrictions have affected governmental relations
in various ways. They may artificially increase the needs
and demand for federal and state grants to local governments.
In some states, they have contributed to urban-rural and
local-state frictions." /L1, p. 20_/
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Most limitations of tax-supported direct debt are still expressed in
terms of a debt-to-property value ratio. The property value used may be the
assessed value of taxable local property, the market value, or the state
equalized valuation. There is no uniformity of the allowed percentile of
debt-to-assessed-property values used -- Washington uses a 1.5% basis and
Virginia uses an 18% basis, but 5% is the most common. /39, p. 727_/
Some attempts have been made to legally limit outstanding debt while
responding to the criticism of debt to property ratios as a basis for a
limit. The Pennsylvania 1972 Local Government Unit Debt Act, for instance,
uses as a basis the arithmetic average of the last three years' total revenues
adjusted to exclude certain precommitted revenues. That legislation allows
most governmental units, including all cities except Philadelphia, a maximum
of 250% of the average adjusted total revenue as outstanding unfunded debt
without electoral approval. Limitations on legal taxation rates and assign-
ment of specific tax revenues to debt service can also operate as a legal
debt limit. f 45_1
The outcome of the controversy on disclosure has the potential to
affect the use of legal debt limits and of informal debt-weighting ratios.
Although the authors of the 1965 State Technical Assistance Report gave nine
strong arguments against the use of legal debt limits, they still recommend
including in a prospectus statement "for general obligations, a summary of
debt incurring power (which) could be confined to a comparison of the amount
permissible under the debt limit with the gross debt, allowable deductions,
and net limited debt." /1, p. 40_/ It is a state and local decision if
formal debt limits should be used, If a prospectus format is federally man-
dated or standardized through customary use, it may be more difficult for a
municipality to abolish or change its legal debt limit. If debt-weighting
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ratios are displayed in financial information, their use may also be institu-
tionalized.
It can be difficult to interpret information about the legal debt lim-
its. Some financial statements present "debt within the legal debt limit"
and "debt outside of the legal debt limit" without further explanation of the
source of the limit or which debt applys. These assume that the reader is
knowledgeable in municipal finance even though disclosure is supposedly
needed for the unsophisticated investor. For them, legal debt limits should
be explained without using difficult legal terminology.
The 1976 Williams-Tower Bill is vague in defining what sort of inform-
ation it would require as an explanation of the "legal limitations on indebt-
edness". /63, p. 6_/ The 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines are more complete
and suggest reporting the legal debt limit of the issuer, the debt chargeable
to that limit, the unused margin, and the legal requirements in debt issu-
ance. 1 33, p. 7_7 The municipality runs a risk that investors will ques-
tion its motives and say that they should have been previously warned if it
changes the formula or level of its legal debt limit. It is necessary to
resolve these questions because such information is important to investors.
Respondents to the Indicator Survey rated "funded debt outside of legal debt
limit" as the third most important indicator out of the 74 indicators in-
cluded on the survey form, and 56% felt that it would have "significantly
more meaning if compared to other cities".
This thesis recommends that the scope of audits be expanded to include
an evaluation of the legal debt margin. The auditor and bond counsel could
provide the city with a statement for the prospectus concerning how bonds
issued within the next few years might be affected by the legal debt margin.
There are significant interpretational questions about debt-weighting
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ratios that municipal financial experience has not yet been able to resolve.
Reliance on only the ratios seems overly limited, but they may be a very good
point to begin to understand a city's debt structure. Standardized defini-
tions of ratios would make comparisons easier. It should be clear whether
short-term debt, funded debt, and overlapping debt are included and to what
date. Their use may encourage limited analysis by some investors who might
otherwise rely on the ratings. Reporting of debt-weighting ratios implies
assumptions about those towards whom the report is directed. The collections
and display costs are minimal but they may make the city look worse finan-
cially.
Debt per capita is a very popular debt ratio. U.S. Census data on
total debt and various revenues and expenditures are published in per capita
figures,making comparisons easy. Most prospectus reports include figures on
direct debt outstanding and on population and some also calculate and display
the ratio in a statistical section. Of the total respondents to the Indica-
tor Survey, 80% wanted comparisons of debt per capita with other cities, and
it was ranked second only to "total debt outstanding" in importance. How-
ever, the 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines were the only one of the disclo-
sure recommendations cited to specifically recommend reporting debt per
capita. ~33, p. 9_7
Gross comparisons of debt per capita can be illustrative. For instance,
in fiscal year 1974 the average full-faith-and-credit debt was $351 per cap-
ita in fourteen large cities that have been losing population, $221 per cap-
ita in thirteen large cities that have been gaining population, and $1,031
in New York City. L-32, p. 61_/ Yet in more specific comparisons, debt
per capita figures may be very distortive because they may not reflect the
total debt burden or the real ability-to-pay of citizens or of the issuer.
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In New York City, the figure used for "per capita" would not include the
many commuters who contribute to city revenues through income tax, sales tax,
and other fees, yet the debt figure would include debt undertaken for trans-
portation facilities and other facilities in the central business district
undertaken to serve and attract commuters. If the tax base also supports
debt of overlapping units, that debt should be included in calculations of
debt per capita.
Somewhat more sophisticated than debt -per capita is a ratio computed
by dividing debt per capita by income per capita. Standard & Poor's Corp-
oration has assembled an unpublished index of this ratio for its private
use. /49, p. 140_/ The 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines suggest reporting
"debt-per capita as a percentage of estimated per capita income of individual
resident taxpayers". /3 , p. 9 7 The use of this ratio as an indicator
of ability-to-pay can be further improved by incorporating data on the cost
of living. Even so, it is misleading if revenue sources other than taxes
paid by residents are not considered.
Debt to property ratios are the most commonly used weighting methods,
because they are the basis for most legal limitations on debt and reflect
the historical importance of property tax revenues. The rating agencies
consider a ratio of 10% to be high and one of 3-5% to be low. /47, p. 139_
Most legal debt limits, as mentioned before, are based on a ratio of allowed
debt of 5% of total assessed property values. /39, p. 727_7 (Other debt
is issued outside of the legal debt limit.)
Evaluation of the debt burden by using debt to property ratios has
some of the same problems of interpretation other debt-weighting ratios
have. It may not reflect either the tax burden of debt service required
for overlapping debt or the value of nonproperty tax revenues. And, as
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mentioned in discussions of the property tax, determination of property
values involves many judgments.
The 1976 Williams-Tower Bill would not require computation and display
of debt to property ratios, although it does, of course, require debt levels
and property values. The 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines recommend computa-
tion and display of debt to assessed value and of debt to estimated true
value of property. / 33, p. 9 7 The respondents to the Indicator Survey
were asked to rate "combined debt as a percentage of market value" and found
it to be fairly important or 17th out of the 74 indicators. Because it is
not an expensive piece of information, this thesis recommends that it be
included in propsectus reporting.
Another ratio sometimes used (although not required or recommended by
and of the disclosure guidelines cited) is debt service to total revenues
or debt service to total budget. This has the potential to be misleading
because a rich community may need few municipal services and have a small
government budget. In an interview with Fortune Magazine, the rating agen-
cies siad that they use this ratio, considering 10% to be a comfortable level
and the.high teens to be a dangerous level. 149, p. 139_/ Lennox Moak,
suggested using this same ratio, but-he claims that the standard is 25%.
He advises that debt service to toal revenues is a more useful ratio than
debt service to total budget because the budget is inflated by bond proceeds.
/f28, p. 375_7
The 1965 State Technical Assistance Report and other sources cautioned
against over-reliance on any one weighting ratio. It suggested that an
analyst use a variety of debt ratios and consider some other factors. The
ratios it suggested were: "debt service as a percentage of revenue", "net
general obligation debt as a percentage of total and overlapping tax levies",
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and "general debt service as a percentage of total and overlapping tax lev-
ies". / 1, p. 49_/
The results of the Indicator Survey show that investors are interested
in both debt per capita ratios and debt to property value ratios. Further
research will probably show that they are also interested in other debt-
weighting ratios or would be if they became familiar with their use. This
thesis recommends that debt ratios be displayed in a grid format with direct
debt, overlapping debt, and debt-service indicators across one dimension
and total revenues, total tax levies, total property values, total popula-
tion, and population adjusted for income across the other dimension, This
format would be inexpensive, consise, and facilitate independent analysis.
The debt of some cities has been compared in Table IV-2 (see page 161)
using two different debt per capita ratios and one debt to total revenues
ratio. This table illustrates some of the advantages in using a number of
debt ratios to compare cities or other similar municipal governments. The
first column is a ratio of long-term general debt of the city govern-
ment to the general revenues of the city government. A comparison of these
percentages shows that certain cities seem to have relatively more debt
although they may have great potential for increasing their revenues. The
second column is a ratio of the long-term general debt of the city to its
population. Part of the variations in these figures arises because some cities
have much more utility debt and some have separate school districts. If the
school district is operated by the city government, its debt is included
in the figures; if it is operated separately, its debt is not included.
Utility revenues and independent school district revenues were not included
in the ratios in the first column.
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The third set of ratios included in Table IV-2 is the ratios of total
long-term debt (general and utility) for the entire metropolitan area (SMSA)
divided by the population of the entire metropolitan area. When these
figures are compared, the relative debt burden of the cities look much dif-
ferent than it does using the other ratios. However, an individual govern-
ment within the metropolitan area may have much larger and more stable rev-
enue to support its direct outstanding debt than other local governments
do and its securities may therefore be considered to be of higher quality.
This type of insights would not be possible without comparison of similar
municipalities using a number of different indicators and debt-weighting
ratios.
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Table IV-2
Comparisons Using Debt-Weighting Ratios
of the Debt Burdens of Some Cities
Ratio of Long- Long-term Total Long-term
term City Debt to City Debt Metropolitan Debt
City/SMSA General Revenues (%) Per Capita ($) Per Capita ($
New York City 67 919 1281
Chicago 94 296 574
Los Angeles 71 218 627
Philadelphia 119 542 775
Detroit 74 348 779
Houston 193 358 659
Baltimore 50 413 543
Dallas 232 597 1157
Cleveland 71 259 476
Indianapolis 123 385 471
Milwaukee 79 256 493
San Francisco 18 158 779
San Diego 82 171 475
San Antonio 91 126 577
Boston 64 566 567
Memphis 153 505 830
St. Louis 60 252 775
New Orleans 132 442 709
Phoenix .7 18 941
Sources: Long-term city debt figures, city general revenue figures, and
total long-term metropolitan debt figures were compiled from
U.S. Bureau of the Census. Local Government Finances in Se-
lected Metropolitan Areas and Large Counties: 1973-74.
(Series GF-74, No. 6), Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1976, Tables 2 and 3.
Population figures used in computing debt per capita are U.S.
Census data as quoted in City of Boston, Massachusetts. "Pre-
liminary Official Statement Dated September 17, 1976", p.32.
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H Summary and Conclusions
Information describing the debt structure is more important to munic-
ipal securities investors than other financial information and nonfinancial
information. Note holders are most concerned about cash flow. Bond holders
are most concerned about the schedule of bond repayment, possible increases
in outstanding debt levels, and the burden of debt service including that of
overlapping debt. To understand the current financial picture, an analyst
should have trend data on the levels of outstanding debt, the levels of debt
service, and reliance on short-term and limited obligation debt. Certain
uses of bend proceeds that may indicate financial problems are also of
interest. Debt-weighting ratios can facilitate analysis particularly if
several types of ratios are used. The legal debt limit can be confusing to
unsophisticated investors.
- Cities should be very cooperative in releasing debt information, al-
though too much detail may hinder analysis. Certain debt-reporting policies
may influence investor judgment. Investors may disapprove of certain uses
of debt proceeds. Overlapping jurisdictions and revenue facilities with debt
issuing capacity should cooperate by exchanging statements for reporting
use. Cities should try to maintain internal control of legal debt limits
and bond authorization procedures.
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V. Disclosure of Expenditure Information
The primary purpose of local government entities is to provide services
to people and property in the area. Most of the attention directed at local
government by citizens concerns local taxes and service delivery, while that
of the municipal securities market concerns bonded indebtedness and the suf-
ficiency of total revenues. Debt service is only a small part of total expen-
ditures and long-term debt is only used for capital improvements which ac-
cording to Census data account for an average of only 15% of direct general
expenditures. / 58, p. 7_/ Of the reiaining 85% used for operating expenses,
about 70% is used for wages, salaries, and benefits of the staff needed to
provide local services. / 32, p. 53_7 Operating expenses also include
school supplies, food, and other supplies needed for service delivery,
maintenance of public facilities, and general costs of administration.
This chapter concerns disclosure of operating expenses. It is divided
into four sections: (A), Disclosure of service expenditures with welfare
as an example, (B) Disclosure of municipal employment information,
(C) Disclosure of employee pension cost information, and (D) Summary and
recommendations. This chapter is organized in a similar manner to Chapters
III and IV. The charts immediately following present information on
reporting practices in 1975 and relevant data from .the Indicator Survey.
Charts coordinated with the sections compare recommendations given by the
1951 New York City Report, the 1963 IBA Format, the 1965 State Technical
Assistance Report, the MFOA Disclosure Guidelines, and the 1976 Williams-
Tower Bill.
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Chart V-1
Frequency of Reporting Expenditure Information in 1975
Section of
Chapter V
in which
discussed Indicator Reporting
Operating Statements of Revenues and
Expenditures for the most Recently
Completed Year:
Detailed Statement or Explanation
of Sources of Revenues and
Expenditures:
Not
Reporting
130
149
(Excerpted from exhibit submitted by Professor Ronald Forbes,
New York University) U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Securities on S. 2969 to Amend the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to Require the Preparation of Annual Re-
ports and Distribution Statements by Issuers of Municipal
Securities, and for Other Purposes, S. 2574 to Amend The
Securities Act of 1933 to Provide for Registration of Secur-
ities Issued by State and Local Governments, February 24,
25, and 26, 1976. 94th Congress, Second Session, Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 271.
Source:
Chart V-.2
Results of Questions on the Indicator Survey Concerning Expenditure Information
Section of
Chapter V
in which
Discussed Indicator as listed on survey form
Relative
Importance
Ranking
(out of 74)
Mean
Importance
Rating
(on 1-5 scale)
Proportion
Desiring
Comparisons (%)
Total welfare
Changes in welfare expenditures in the last
five years
Employment by the city and other governmental
units over the last five years
Pension liabilities and funding provisions
Excesses in operating expenditures over
originally approved budgets
Statement of assets and liabilities over
five years
2.0
2.0
2.1
1.7
1.4
1.9 36
Chart V-3
Disclosure Recommendations For Information on Services
Types of Descriptive Information Recommended
Recommended
Report
1951 New York
City Report
1963 IBA Format
1965 State Technical
Assistance Report
1976 MFOA Disclo-
sure Guidelines
1976 Williams-
Tower Bill
:Amounts of
Expenditures
by Class, Categ-
ory, of Fund
Yes
Yes
Yes
Ambiguous
If Required
by the SEC
Trends or
Comparison
with Previous
Responsibility
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Description of
Principal
Services
Provided
No
No
Implied
Yes
Physical
Vol ume
of
Services
Services
Provided by
Overlapping
Governments
No
No
Yes
School
Enrollment Yes
YesYes Yes No
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(A) Disclosure of service expenditures with welfare as an example
U.S. Census data show that in 1973-74 total expenditures by local
governments for personal services in the average SMSA accounted for about
55% of direct general expenditures. From 1971-72, it increased by 23.4%;
and, between 1969 and 1972, it increased by 59%. /32, p. 81_T In 1973-
1974, public welfare accounted for 9.6% of direct general expenditures,
health and hospitals accounted for 7.0%, police protection accounted for
2.7%, and sanitation other than sewerage for 1.7%. /58, p. 7_/
The range of services offered by local governments has been expanded
in the last century. Previously, essential services were considered to be
those of sanitation, public primary and secondary school education, and
police and fire protection. Since then, the concept of "nonessential -
services" has evolved and the goals of some cities have become very ambi-
tious. The War on Poverty and other federal programs created expectations
that forced cities to create self-help programs. For instance, Mayor Wagner
of New York City explained a tax-increase in 1965 by saying:
"I intend that we shall press ahead with
the war on crime, the war on narcotics addic-
tion, the war on slums, the war on disease,
and the war on civic ugliness." 15, p. 33_/
Even when there seemed to be more of a concensus about the definition
of vital services, the proper interest of investors and creditors in the
level and expense of municipal services was unclear. Dimock, for instance,
wrote in 1935 that:
"The simple fact is that we are unwill-
ing in this country to permit the creditors
to determine what shall be spent for those
municipal services and what shall be applied
upon their debt." / 13, p. 51_7
In recent years it has become much more difficult to estimate what municipal
services will cost. The need for and use of services may fluctuate. Wage
and benefit settlements are difficult to predict and may be retroactive,
For a typical city, revenue from its own sources is sufficient to pay
for all local services other than education, hospitals, housing, and welfare.
/~32, p. 26_/ As may be seen in Table V-1 (see page 169), local -expenditures
on services vary considerable because of the level of services offered,
local need or use for those service<, local government efficiency in service
provision, and the proportion of costs paid by the state government. The
fragmentation of local government has created separate municipal entities
to provide a variety of services in the same locality. As discussed in
Chapter IV (Disclosure of Debt Information), more than one municipal torpor-
ation may have debt-issuing authority and levy taxes on the same people and
property. This has increased the difficulty of estimating the burden 6f
service costs to taxpayers and of comparing the provision, utilization, and
costs of service with those of other cities.
To understand the debt structure, it is essential to know what
services the issuer provides. Beyond identification, the appropriate level
of detail on services that should be disclosed and considered by the secu-
rities analysts is controversial. An "Overview of Factors Considered in
Municipal Credit Analysis" submitted to the Senate Hearings on the 1976
Williams-Tower Bill noted:
"The level of services provided by a municipality, and
the extent to which they are utilized, is a critical input to
financial stability. It is unusual to see services withdrawn;
consequently, during economic downturns, the municipality may
face unusual difficulties in meeting operating budgets. Increas-
ing demand for services, as indicated by trends, must be consid-
ered with a perspective on corresponding changes in revenue gen-
erating capacity." /763, p. 285 _
(+W, 1 4 la,
Table7V-1
Comparison of Expenditure Purposes and Levels of Some Cities(Dollars per capita) FY 1973-74
Standard
Metropolitan
Statistical
Area SMSA)
Atlanta
Boston
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Dallas
Detroit
Houston
Kansas City
Milwaukee
Newark
New Orleans
New York City
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
St. Louis
San Francisco
Education
241
274
289
263
229
296
224
251
300
324
174
344
273
266
254
337
Public
Welfare
8
.7
20
31
1
19
2
1
101
86
4
286
28
10
5
113
Health Police
and and
Hospitals Fire
Interest
on
General
Debt
80
79
51
48
53
51
41
24
45
27
28
150
27
19
30
85
Capital
Outlays
111
70
91
87
147
94
94
83
96
52
71
194
83
87
58
92
Total
Direct
General
Expenditures
562
595
588
605
563
688
466
524
751
734
451
1307
607
510
485
879
Source: (Compiled from) U.S. Bureau of the Census. Local Government
Areas and Large Counties: 1973-1974. (Series GF-74, No. 6),
Printing Office, 1976, Table 3.
Finances in Selected Metropolitan
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
(168)
In harmony with this advice, the 1976 Williams-Tower Bill suggests required
disclosure of:
"A description of the principal govern-
mental and other services provided or per-
formed by the issuer, the extent to which
similar or differing services are performed
by other governmental entities which serve
the same geographical area and any major
changes in such services in the last ten
years. / 63, p. 7_/
The 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines recommend the same description of
services except they recommend description of changes in the last five years
only. / 33, p. 11_/ Neither explicitly recommends disclosure of the total
costs, cost per participant or service unit, and costs and participants or
service units provided by overlapping local government entities or private
philanthropic organizations. The 1965 State Technical Assistance Report,
however, suggests that all expenditures be shown by category such as opera-
tions, capital outlays, and debt service. It suggests that an evaluation
of an issuer should include an examination of the "percentage distribution
of expenditure, by fund, to show relative functional claims on revenue and
bond proceeds. / 1, pp. 40-42_/ Such information has not been generally
available to credit analysts as shown by the Summary of Reporting Practices
finding that in 1975 only 44 out of 174 issuers included operating state-
ments of revenues and expenditures for the most recently completed year.
/63, p. 271_/
A comparison of fund expenditures could show, for instance, how ex-
penditures on police protection compare with those for education. The his-
tory of their relative functional claims could be seen from a trend com-
parison of those fund expenditures -- if an analyst had access to operating
statements for a number of years. It might be difficult to tell, however,
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how much of the change in expenditures for each program was due to change in
the level of services offered, changes in utilization of services or program
enrollment, increased wages and benefits for program employees, funding of
accrued pension liabilities, and/or general inflation of costs or changes
in efficiency. Another reporting recommendation sometimes considered for
locally distributed annual report involves relating the costs of services
to some measure of efficiency by comparing, for example, the response time
of firetrucks with department budgets.
The 1965 State Technical Assistance Report also recommends disclo-
sure of the physical volume of services to prospective bond buyers. It
suggests that standard forms be developed to fit types of governments,
liability, and selected functions. It suggests as an example that school
districts should report the numbers of existing school houses, existing un-
satisfactory school houses, school houses under construction, and detail
such as the number of buildings, number of classrooms, capacity of buildings,
and estimated costs of projects for which financing is being sought. / 1,
pp. 41-42_7 This and other examples given, such as reporting of street
mileage .by type of construction, show a greater interest in the possibility
of further capital outlays than in the current costs and levels of services.
Service disclosure standards and policies, then, necessitate assump-
tions about how municipal credit analysis should be done, whether such dis-
closure well cause investor pressure to reduce or otherwise change the ser-
vices offered, and if investor influence is desirable or undesirable. Wel-
fare will be considered as an example.
One difference between the private and public sectors is that mun-
icipal expenditures do not usually generate revenues and people do not pay
taxes in proportion to services received. Welfare recipients do not usually
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pay much in local taxes or have much political power because they are poor
and a numerical minority. Unlike police, fire, sewerage, and education,
public welfare programs provide little that is of identifiable value to the
persons and property whose taxes yield most of the locally generated reve-
nues. Non-welfare-recipients may feel that welfare should therefore have
lower priority.
As may be seen in Table V-1, local government welfare expenditures
vary greatly. As mentioned before, local governments in the average metro-
politan area spend 9.6% of their total direct general expenditures on wel-
fare. / 58, p. 7_7 Per capita expenditures for welfare may vary by as
much as one-fifth of total per capita expenditures.
Welfare costs fall under the "uncontrollable" category because fed-
eral law requires that the state determine elgibility requirements and ben-
efit levels. The federal government pays between 50-80% of the federal
welfare program costs depending on state need formulas. The state legisla-
ture has some control over local welfare expenditures insofar as that body
determines the degree of local participation. Localities in New York State
must pay 25% of total welfare costs, while those in California pay 16% and
other localities pay very little. Only eleven states require local partic-
ipation in Aid to Dependent Children. /35, p. 5_/
As mentioned earlier, the 1976 Williams-Tower Bill and the 1976 MFOA
Disclosure Guidelines suggest disclosure of "a description" of the services
provided or performed by the issuer. What will this description consist of?
One description of welfare services could detail exactly what benefits are
offered, who is elgible, how many people receive welfare or send their chil-
dren to day-care centers funded by the city, and the costs per participant
for each welfare program. Another description could only describe facil-
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ities used by the programs and speculate on whether the city will issue
more debt to expand those facilities. A different type of description could
provide information on welfare financing -- how funds are budgeted and ad-
ministered.
The results of the Indicator Survey showed that bond dealers were
fairly interested in welfare expenditures. They rated "total welfare"
25th and "changes in welfare expenditures in last five years" 26th in import-
ance relative to the other seventy-two indicators. The welfare indicators
were rated as the least important of the eighteen financial indicators but
were rated as more important than employment by the city and many other
economic, property, and social indicators.
It is obviously reasonable to disclose local responsibility for wel-
fare funding. However, if that is all that is disclosed, an analyst would
not be able to make assumptions about how much utilization and total program
costs will increase if there is a downturn in the local economy. If a city
reports to the investment community how many families are on welfare, what
the level of benefits is, and about supplementary programs, the investors
may disapprove enough not to buy the city's bonds even though the investors
may not have cared enough about welfare costs to investigate them indepen-
dently.
A letter to the U.S. Senate claimed that day-care programs in New
York City were costing $6,000 per child enrolled. If the City had reported
to investors total costs of the day-care program and number of participants,
the underwriters might have raised this and similar questions about effi-
ciency when the City tried to negotiate a bond sale. If it had reported
the same information to a "watch-dog" committee of taxpayers, they might
have raised the same questions. The investors, however, might have inter-
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preted this information as an example of inept management and based their
purchase decision on that as opposed to their concern over actual costs. In
fact, city officials probably were not aware of the per participant cost.
This shows a need for a better review of management and internal accounting,
but those results should probably be kept private.
Chart V-4
Disclosure Recommendations on Employment Information
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(B) Disclosure of municipal employment information
Disclosure of the level of municipal employment was not suggested by
the 1951 New York City Report, the 1963 IBA Format, the 1965 State Technical
Assistance Report, the 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines, or the 1976 Williams.
Tower Bill. The National Committee on Governmental Accounting and Lennox
Moak did, however, recommend that the number and distribution of employees
be included in the comprehensive financial report. £ 28, p. 445_] As part
of the Indicator Survey, "Employment by the city and other financial units
over the last five years" received an importance ranking by bond dealers
that placed it only 30th out of 74 indicators.
How important is the wage and salary component of city expenditures?
While wages are a large proportion of total operating expenses, should it
matter to investors whether the money goes for police officers or police
cars, for heating or teachers? Would review of city employment by securi-
ties investors and credit analysts help improve efficiency or undermine
citizen influence? Is city employment really a factor that might affect
bond security?
In a composite employment picture, 1.6% of the total population of
American cities are employed by the city or other municipal entities. Of
them, 19% are employed in public education, 16% in police protection, and
9% in fire protection. /~20, p.111_/ Muller found a large difference in
municipal employment in large cities with increasing populations and large
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cities with decreasing population, In fiscal year 1973, the thirteen cities
that had over 500,000 population and an increase since 1960 employed 13.1
people per 1,000 residents for municipal service delivery other than educa-
tion. The fourteen cities that had over 500,000 people but a decrease
since 1960 employed 18.7 people per 1,000 residents. New York City employed
31.7 people per 1,000 residents for municipal service delivery other than
education. The difference in employment levels for these cities closely
paralleled the difference in their per capita operating outlays. /32,
pp. 50-51_/
Besides the difference in level of employment, there are differences
in average wages, benefits, and duty hours, all of which affect total expen-
ditures. Gross wages for municipal employees cost $141 per capita in the
thirteen cities that increased in population, $240 per capita in the four-
teen cities that decreased in population, and $637 per capita in New York
City. Whether because of starting salaries, seniority, or overtime, in
1974, New Orleans paid its sanitation workers an average of $4,170, while
New York City paid its $15,924; Baltimore paid its police and fire officers
$10,098 and $10,980, respectively, while Los Angeles paid its $15,833 and
$21,280; Denver paid school teachers $13,505, while Detroit paid $22,603.
/6, Table 11-15_7 In the thirteen cities with increasing population, fire
department members were on duty an average of 54.9 hours per week; in the
fourteen cities with decreasing population size, they were on duty 49.9
hours per week, and, in New York City, only 40 hours per week. /32, p.41_/
Low-income families and high-density areas need more labor-intensive
services than suburban areas. Municipal employee associations in cities
with increasing populations appear more able to press for favorable contract
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terms involving wages, hours, and fringe benefits than those in growing
cities, f32, p. 44_/ High-density areas are more vulnerable to strikes
by public employees. The growth of collective bargaining helps to account
for expansion in short-term floating debt to finance current operations --
especially when the final contracts are not set prior to the establishment
of the tax levy for the next year. /27, p. 376_/ As explained in the
next section of this chapter, collective bargaining has probably led to in-
creased pension liabilities, which are not always sufficiently funded and
present a real threat to bond security.
Many cities have reduced the level of services offered, capital improve-
ment programs, and administrative and service staffs as part of economy
moves. A trend comparison of fund accounts might show that education had
been cut back proportionately more or less than police protection. Unless
considerable detail about particular expenses were shown, however, it would
be impossible to tell whether educational program cutbacks involved closing
the schools after hours, increasing the teacher-pupil ratio, declaring a
moratorium on new construction of school facilities, or whether the cut-
backs were a simple response to a decline in school enrollment. Detail on
employment trends by department may be more illustrative. New York City
had large numbers of positions that were approved in the budget but not
actually filled and positions that had been described to investors and cred-
itors as eliminated but that were actually filled. An independent auditor
might be able to help with these problems of employment reporting accuracy
and be able to provide the city with a succinct statement for prospectus
reporting.
Reporting by the city staff or auditor on program employment and pay-
roll trends would not solve the problems of comparability of municipal
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employment data. Figures (such as those given earlier for number of employ-
ees per 1,000 residents, municipal employee wages per capita, and average
salaries) are regularly gathered and published by the U.S. Department of
Labor and the Bureau of the Census. Comparisons for the purpose of bond
analysis are difficult, because the data are usually aggregated for all
local governments. Employment figures may also be misleading because of
the commonpractice of contracting with private employers for the provision
of certain services, such as garbage collection or special education.
Unionization of municipal employees may lead to higher wages and ben-
efits, shorter hours, and fewer layoffs. Strikes may be very disruptive.
For these reasons, analysts may want to consider how many city employees are
union affiliated, how active those unions have been and whether they have
ever called a general strike, whether the city has a binding arbitration
agreement, and how large contract settlements have been. Some cities have
discussed employee unions in their prospectus statements, Boston, for ex-
.ample, gives the dates at which various contracts will expire and need to
be renegotiated. /8, p. 10_/ Unionization of municipal employees is a
controversial subject. Disclosure policies might interfere with off-the-
record resolutions and other management strategies. The experience of pri-
vate companies that file with the SEC and must disclose labor disputes to
stockholders and other creditors may be helpful.
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C. Disclosure of employee pension funding information
"In many of our governmental units, there are
today significant hidden future costs that have not
yet been identified either to investors or taxpayers,
One of the most significant of these is unrecognized
pension costs but they must also include other amounts
for services rendered that have not been recognized
and recorded," f 63, p. 43_]
Although recently the adequacy of pension funding has become of great con-
cern to taxpayers and to the municipal securities market, formerly it was
almost ignored. A 1972 list of "information required for a rating" pub-
lished by Standard & Poor's (one of the two most influential rating agencies),
does not mention pension funding. Until recently, the recommendations given
for municipal disclosure -- the 1951 New York City Report, the 1973 IBA
Format, and the 1965 State Technical Assistance Report -- do not discuss
pension funding either.
The size of municipal expenditures on employee pensions is determined
by:
(1) Numbers of municipal employees
(2) Contract specifications for pension formulas
(3) How the actual rate is determined -- one base year or an average
of base years, counting of overtime pay
(4) Cost of living clauses
(5) Benefits extended to spouse and children
(6) How long employees live
(7) Contributions from the state, social security, and employees into
the fund
The adequacy of funds to pay for municipal employee pension benefits is
determined by:
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(1) Sufficiency of general municipal revenues
(2) Whether the municipality has previously established a retirement
trust fund
(3) Actuarial assumptions used in computing fund requirements
(4) Provisions if the municipality cannot meet its pension obligations
If there were no inflation and cost-of-living pension increases, if the
numbers of municipal employees were constant, and if they all retired at the
same age and lived to the same age and were paid the same wage-and-benefit
packages, then the annual cost of pension benefits to the municipality would
be constant. There would be no point to having a pension fund. However,
none of these conditions hold. Employment by municipalities increased con-
siderably in the last forty years -- particularly in the sixties. Unions
of municipal employees have become strong. When a union strikes, or threat-
ens to strike, it is easier for the administration to agree to increase
basic pension benefits, extend benefits to those who retire early and their
families, agree to cost-of-living indicators, or agree to allow base pay
scales to be computed from the last year or two before retirement than to
pay cash for increased wages. Employee benefits average about 35% of base
wages. Between 1967 and 1972, membership in municipal retirement systems
increased by 28% and local government contributions to those funds increased
more rapidly than wages. So an action that was "easier" in the short run
created problems in the long run.
Many cities have had no savings plan to pay for their accumulated pen-
sion obligations. In many of the older cities, the average age of municipal
employees is higher so that the number retiring will continue to increase.
/32, pp. 46-47_7 In June 1976, the. City of Oakland discovered that its
unfunded pension liabilities were more than five times its annual budget.
Oakland, San Francisco, and other cities are now saving for previously un-
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funded pension liabilities not yet due in addition to paying the pensions
of those already retired. For every dollar it pays in salaries, San
Francisco pays seventy-four cents into its police retirement fund. /52 7
Various estimates have been given for unfunded pension liabilitiies -- in
Los Angeles, $1 billion; in New York City $3-6 billion; in Massachusetts,
$7-8 billion. /52 and 47, p, 33_/
Bond dealers surveyed rated "pension liabilities and funding provisions"
as having a mean importance rating of 1.7 on a 1 to 5 scale or 21st out of
74 indicators (Indicator Survey). Although that is still in the range of
"very important", it is surprising that the bond dealers did not rate pension
funding information as being more important because some cities have much
greater unfunded pension liabilities than they have bonded debt outstanding
-- presenting a real threat to bond security.
The 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines give a good description of how
pension liabilities should be described to bond investors;
"Describe briefly the issuer's or the enterprise's pension
and other employee retirement plans and the methods by and basis
(e.g. actuarial or "pay-as-you-go") on which the plans are
funded. State the issuer's or the enterprise's contributions
to the plans for, and the unfunded accrued liabilities as of the
end of, each of the last five years. State the annual benefit
payments, net of employee contributions and interest earnings
of the plans, for each of the last five fiscal years, unless
the plans are fully funded. State the date of the most recent
actuarial study, if any, and describe briefly the assumptions
upon which the study was based. If contributions are made on
an actuarial basis, state the year in which such basis was
first used to determine contributions and the extent to which
any deficiencies in contributions prior to such time have been
eliminated." / 33, p. 8_/
Describing current pension liabilities to the bond market may become
even more complicated than a statement of funding provisions and actuarial
bases would be. In 1976, the City of Englewood, Colorado sued the State of
Colorado in an effort to invalidate sections of the State pension law that
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municipal officials believed could bankrupt the City's pension plan fund.
Under the Colorado Police Pension Statute of 1935, the State sets up the
level of benefits and the levels of contributions from the State, the City,
and the officers' pay. When the suit was filed, the contributions from these
sources were inadequate to pay for accrued benefits, The City attorney
charged that the police and fire pension funds had been creating a con-
dition of debt which will have to be paid by City tax revenue and that this
had been unconsitutional. L3, p. 57
This is not the first time cities have become involved with suits that
could significantly alter their financial condition. Traditionally, the bond
counsel explained to the purchasers of their securities the financial poten-
tial of such cases. An increase in the number of cases makes it more diffi-
cult for securities dealers and investors to keep up-to-date. Because the
outcome of some cases might affect other cities that are not parties to them,
the goals of disclosing all "material" facts and of considering everything
relevant in a thorough analysis become even more difficult to reach.
Cash and security holdings of all state and local retirement systems
increased by 40% in three years --from $62 billion in 1970-71 to $87 billion
in 1973-74. /_32, p. 46_7 The trustees responsible for investment decisions
will probably have increasing economic and policial power. The employee pen-
sion funds were very important in New York City's cash shortage -- first,
pension managers said that the City's bonds were too risky for them to buy;
but under threat of increased layoffs of union employees, the pension funds
finally bought large amounts of notes and bonds that the City had been unable
to sell elsewhere and agreed to defer repayment on some securities. /15_7
Because of such situations, the management.and investment policies of munic-
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ipal pension funds may become a factor to be scrutinized by analysts and by
the rating agencies.
These examples show that disclosure of pension funding may be techni-
cally difficult. In order to comply with the 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines,
many municipalities may need to commission special studies they might have
otherwise forgone. The detail and legal language necessary to describe pen-
sion funding may be of little interest to the unsophisticated investor, The
range of contingencies that might be considered relevant is large, It may
be difficult to keep disclosure statements up-to date on the progress of
litigation aggecting pension liabilities.
Disclosure of pension funding also raises broader questions, Many
cities would be in a better financial position now if the extent of their
increasing pension liabilities had been realized earlier. If these cities
had been well managed, the sums would have been discovered and steps taken
to set up a viable funding plan. Ten years ago, the rating agencies could
have threatened to downgrade cities without reasonable pension funding plans
and the securities market press could have drawn attention to this need.
The chances of pension-funding problems being discovered would have been
greater if there had been more independent analysis. However, if disclosure
guidelines had been mandated ten years ago following the suggestions given
by the various committees of experts, disclosure of pension funding provi-
sions would not have been required. Disregarding reporting costs, disclosure
for the purpose of providing more opportunity for an analytic check cannot
reach its full potential of usefulness unless some analysts have access to
a very wide range of information. This range may be much wider than the
average bond dealer or bond investor is interested in. This suggests a dual
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structure of information release.
The size of unfunded pension laibilities is in some ways surprising
because pension benefits are a liability that the cities have directly
contracted and that some people have a direct interest in. Hidden future
costs have been historically more associated with contingent liabilities.
In the 1930's, for instance, many municipalities found that canals and other
water transport facilities that had been profitable were no longer in demand.
If the municipality had partially funded their construction through bonded
debt, it was forced to either subsidize the canal out of general funds or
default. /_27, p. 167_/ What might other future hidden costs for munici-
palities be? If, for instance, large metropolitan airports become less in
demand because there is more traffic to small airports scattered about the
region, then cities may be called upon to subsidize them. Does this very
questionable possibility mean that cities should try to disclose airport use
and finances now so that the market can react by estimating the risk? Dis-
closure of all contingent liabilities is a difficult proposition.
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D. Summary and Conclusions
Operating expenses account for 85% of average total expenditures and
are difficult to reduce. Their size and the importance of municipal ser-
vices to the functioning of the locality make operating expenses a threat
to bond security. Operating cost overruns are as important as under-estim-
ation of expected revenues in causing year-end deficits. The bond dealers
surveyed by the author ranked "Excesses in operating expenditures over orig-
inally approved budgets" as tenth in importance out of 74 indicators --
higher than other important indicators. (Indicator Survey)
City services affect citizens more than they do investors. Taxpayer
pressure is a strong force to limit expenditures. Checks on the legality
of expenditures are routine.
Direct general expenditures vary a great deal. Reasons include the
level of services offered and utilized, the number of city employees, how
much they are paid, what benefits and pensions they received and how those
are funded, and how payment for certain services are share with the state.
Services and service program payrolls account for the largest share of
expenditures, Unfunded pension liabilities are often larger than total out-
standing bonded debt,
The local political forces affecting service levels make service dis-
closure controversial. An article on municipal credit analysis explained
that the provision and demand of services is a "critical input to financial
stability". L 63, p. 285_7 The 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines and the
1976 Williams-Tower Bill recommend disclosure of a "description" of ser-
vice provided. That could consist of a simple definition of government pur-
pose, detail on service finances, or discussion of particular service pro-
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grams -- their finances, facilities, and use. Welfare is an ex-ample of how
disclosure may facilitate investor involvement, which may lessen the influ-
ence of local groups. This shows that service disclosure necessitates policy
decisions.
City employment is an important and varying factor in total expenditures
and in cost reduction strategies. Bond dealers surveyed were not as inter-
ested in city employment information as they were in many other factors,
The National Committee on Governmental Accounting is the only source of those
mentioned in this paper that suggested reporting of city employment informa-
tion. A breakdown of employment for each service, administration, and other
programs could help illustrate priorities and strategies in economy moves and
make it easier to understand pension liabilities. An independent auditor
may be needed to ascertain accuracy of employment information. The status
of unionization of city employees may be very important to its finances but
a reporting policy may be politically difficult,
The recent exposure of the size of unfunded pension liabilities in many
cities is a strong argument for mandatory disclosure as another check on
local government finances. However, even sophisticated analysts did not
anticipate its emergence as a factor, While the technicalities of pension
disclosure will probably be adequately resolved, the broader question is
whether the range of information relevant to local finances can be limited
so that it may be effectively disclosed.
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VI. Investor Perceptions of Local Economic Factors and the Character
of Local Communities -- Disclosure of Information on Economic and
Social Factors
It is people and their property who need services, and people and
businesses who pay taxes. Bonded debt is assumed to pay for facilities
used directly by people and for improvements to the physical assets of the
area. Decisions on operating expenditures, capital improvements, tax rates,
bond issues, and default are made by the management of the local government
with input from citizens, business leaders, and the state government.
Therefore, the economy of the issuer, the economy of the region, social
factors of the community, and the management of the local and state govern-
ment are among the factors affecting bond security. They are less immedi-
ately causal, however, than financial factors.
Investor opinions of the City of Boston, apparent from the results
of the Perceptions Survey, are an example of how people operating in the
municipal securities market may perceive the local economy and character of
a well-known city. (See Appendix II for the survey format used and infor-
mation about its distribution.) These results are compared with information
that is theoretically important and with categories of such information
whose importance has been rated by respondents to the Indicator Survey.
This chapter has five sections: (A) The theoretical importance of non-
financial factors, (B) Investor opinions of the City of Boston -- results
of the Perceptions Survey, (C) How investors might have formed their im-
pressions of Boston, (D) Disclosure of nonfinancial information, (E)
Summary and conclusions. The following charts display relevant data from
the Indicator Survey and the Summary of Financial Officers; a chart pre-
ceding Section D compares the disclosure recommendations cited.
(188)
Chart VI-1
Frequency of Reporting Nonfinancial Information in 1975
Not
Indicator Reporting Reorting
o C
0
'P .* 1975 population 110 64
.r- ci rci
L -P 1970 population 114 60
0) 4- 0 i
M 0 C.
4-
o Median family income -- own unit 20 154
U
0 to
+>Median family income- SMSA 3 168
r--1 0
to U Total personal income of residents 14 160
.c- Cr- t
S- o C
U U W List of major industrial firms located
W QE
>, in area (with employment figures) 50 119
0
0 o E Data on number of employed persons in
'P major employment categories 10 164
0' Data on level or rate of unemployment 4 170
Source: (Excerpted from exhibit submitted by Professor Ronald Forbes,
New York University) U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Securities on S. 2969 to Amend the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to Require the Preparation of Annual Re-
ports and Distribution Statements by Issuers of Municipal
Securities, and for other Purposes, S. 2574 to Amend The
Securities Act of 1933 to Provide for Registration of Secur-
ities Issued by State and Local Governments, February 24,
25, and 26, 1976. 94th Congress, Second Session, Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 271.
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Chart VI-2
Results of Questions on the Indicator Survey
Concerning Nonfinancial Information
Relative Mean Proportion
Importance Importance Desiring
Ranking Rating Comparisons
Indicator (out of 74) (on 1-5 scale) (%)
Total population 22 1.7 54
Racial distributions 35 2.1 48
Educational level and skill-
training of workforce 39 2.6 51
Migratory trends by economic
class 41 2.6 46
Educational level of population 43 2.7 54
Percentage of city workforce
* living inside the city limits 49 2.8 25
Population density 52 2.8 48
Crime rates 55 2.9 56
Population by age group 60 3.1 51
Percentage of census tracts
with median incomes above
* city median 61 3.1 15
0CA
r_ E
.0 Median household income 14 1.6 80
Percentage change in median
*,. household income in last
4 five years 29 2.1 37
C o
Ten largest industries in
.the ci-ty 11 1.5 34
Unemployment rate 19 1.7 70
Number of industries by type
and dollar value that opened
or entered in last five years 28 2.1 45
Number of industries by type
and dollar value that left
or closed in last five years 31 2.1 44
Financial insitutions with home
o offices in the city, by rank,
0 r type, size 38 2.5 27
0U Energy costs 41 2.6 54
Number of strikes in city in
last five years affecting
_ 0major institutions 46 2.7 41
~_ (cont.)
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Chart .VI-2 (cont.)
Relative Mean Proportion
Importance Importance Desiring
Ranking Rating Comparisons
Indicator (out of 74) (on 1-5 scale) (
o c--
_j WI~
Labor participation rate 48 2.8 44
Percentage of workforce
that-is union affiliated 53 2.8 42
Number of Furtune 500 firms
0 r with repesentative offices
in the city 57 3.0 28
Sector analysis of production 62 3.3 29
Commuting trends 63 3.3 22
4-W 0
Trends in vacancy rates for
commercial property 32 2.2 54
Average value of building
permi ts by type and vol ume
in last five years 33 2.2 49
Trends in vacancy rates for
residential property 34 2.3 50
Cost of living indicators 36 2.5 65
Value of commercial bank
deposits 37 2.5 43
Trends in retail trade 45 2.7 43
Average annual absorption
rate of commercial
office space 50 2.8 33
Trends in wholesale trade 45 2.7 43
Volume of luxury and pres-
tige housing 56 3.0 27
Average investment in rec-
.- 0ently rehabilitated
0 0) office space 64 3.4 29
Shipping tonnage and traffic 65 - 3.4 30
Average investment in recently
rehabilitated dwelling units 66 3.4 29
o o Rail tonnage and traffic 67 3.4 30
Truck tonnage and traffic 67 3.4 28
Airflight tonnage and traffic 70 3.4 31
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A. The theoretical importance of nonfinancial factors
Lennox Moak* describes many financial and nonfinancial factors theor-
etically affecting these decisions:
"(1) The decision of the rating agencies concerning the quality
of the credit of the issuer,
(2) The decision of the investment banker to purchase or not
to purchase the credit instruments - and the rates of-
interest to be charged.
(3) The decision of the investor to purchase the credit instru-
ment at the yields offered,_or to put his money in some
alternative investment." L 27, pp. 169-170_J
He asserts that using a measure of local fiscal capacity requires consider-
ation of the economic framework of the community as well as the narrow def-
inition of the tax and revenue bases.. He suggests that these economic
criteria are used by investors and rating agencies:
(1) Geographical area of the municipality(2) Trend in numbers of residents(3) Location of area(4) Sources of economic activity
(5) Volumes of economic activity(6) Maintenance of the economic plant
- (7) The identity of the primary employers and their position
in the regional and national community
(8) The kinds of manufacturing, wholesale trade, and retail
trade conducted in the area and their relation to
the national community
. (9) Diversification of employment
(10) How far the residents have to commute to work
(11) Dependence on regional agricultural output. L 27, pp. 160-161_
Moak claims that investors are concerned with the distribution of
income among population segments, as well as with the primary measures of
the current economy which are primarily the per capita income and the income
of local businesses. /_25, p. 160_7 He claims that the best index of the
economic base is "total tangible property values per capita" whether the
* Moak is cited quite often in this chapter so that his assertions can be
compared with the survey data.
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property is real or personal, taxable or nontaxable. In addition to taxable
property values, he suggests that investors should consider the value of
tax-exempt property and estimate the value of residents' personal property.
Investors may evaluate the general and fiscal management of local
governments when buying local government securities as they evaluate corp-
orate management in other investment decisions. Moak advised:
"A well-administered government which keeps people
informed of this fact, especially those persons who
help to form opinion in circles which help to in-
fluence investors, will ordinarily reap dividends
of substantial dimension." / 27, p. 165_/
Forbes also emphasized the willingness of the local government to attempt
to influence and control external factors. /63, pp. 285-286_/
Moak lists "educational opportunities, cultural opportunities,
recreational facilities, the community record of handling problems of
social unrest, the housing stock, and characteristics of the population"
as being the most important social factors. He discusses how institutions
of higher education, cultural opportunities, and recreational facilities
can enrich a community and attract industries. Furthermore, "Investors
have begun to show a marked reluctance to extend credit on equal terms to
cities with great unresolved social problems as contrasted with areas not
so confronted". /27, pp. 163-164_
Moak suggests that the following statistical measures of economic
activity are sometimes useful as indirect measures of wealth and income:
Water-borne cargo tonnage Military expenditures
Freight carloadings Value of construction
Trucking tonnage Building permits
Motor vehicle registrations Retail sales
Gasoline consumption Department store sales
Number of tourists Postal receipts
Kilowatt hours produced Bank deposits
Average daily water consumption Newspaper circulation
Value added by manufacturing Enrollment in local
Industrial payrolls universities L28, p. 394]
(193)
In fact, one author of prospectus statements, said that some investors
ask for such information. /21_7
Moak claims that analysts learn through experience to scan such
information and make quick decisions although they must "caution themselves
to avoid emotional reactions to current personalities or to events of
transitory or superficial importance." In summary, he writes:
"The factors discussed in the preceding pages help
to determine the degree of risk that is likely to be involved
in agiven bond issue with a given pladeged security. In a
number of respects, the discussion is admittedly theoretical,
but, if it is good theory, it is likely to be good practice
as well. This is not to suggest that a poor rating in a num-
ber of these factors will make the debt unmarketable. It is
to say, and to say emphatically, that they influence the
price at which the debt may be sold in any given general
municipal bond market." / 27, p. 170 7
The rating agencies consider at least some nonfinancial information
when they assign credit ratings to municipal issuers. Figure VI-1 shows
information considered by Standard & Poor's Corporation and by the Fitch
Investors Service. (see page 194)
Very little research has been conducted on how such factors actually
affect thequality of local government finances. It is not clear that inves-
tors actually consider all of the information that Moak says they do or
that the rating agencies claim they do. One statistical study that has
been completed shows significant financial differences between cities that-
havenlincreasing population levels and those that have decreasing population
levels. ~32_7 Another statistical study has contradictory findings:
"Population has minimal effects when other variables are in-
cluded in the analysis. The percentage of Irish residents is
distinctly associated with higher spending...Cities tend to
suffer greater fiscal strain if they have powerful mayors,
weak businessmen, union contracts for municipal employees,
"overstaffing of municipal employees, and low rates of tax
collection. These five leadership characteristics tend to
go together, be associated with numerousIrish residents, and
in turn to increase capital outlays." / 10, p. iii 7
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Figure VI-1
Nonfinancial Criteria Used by the Rating Agencies
by Standard & Poor's Corporation:
(1) Recent population estimate.
(2) List of the ten leading taxpayers with their assessed
valuations, including the number of employees for
large taxpayers.
(3) Brief description of the economy of the area, including
the character of development, the level of housing ac-
tivity, and the value of homes (for residential areas).(4) School enrollment for the past ten years (where applicable).
by Fitch Investors Service:
(1) Ability to pay:
(a) Location and transportation trends.
(b) Population trends -- quanitative.
(c) Population characteristics -- qualitative
Wealth as measured by home ownership, per capita
assessed valuation, family income, education.
(d) Character of the local economy -- industrial, res-
idential, trading and commerce, agricultural, min-
ing, suburban, resort, and diversification of
sources of employment.
(e) Presence of stabilizing institutions -- colleges,
government establishments.
(f) General economic indicators -- employment, building
permits, bank deposits, etc.
(2) The type of government and political situation may be a
factor in willingness to pay.
(3) Economic factors which may indicate potential trouble:
(a) Declining population.
(b) Extraordinary rapid population growth.(c) Shift of racial or economic character of population.(d) Declining general economy -- loss of industrial plants,
change of fashions, change in modes of transportation,
obsolescence or depletion in major industry.
Source: Excerpted from statements submitted to Congress by the rating
agencies and printed in: U.S. Congress, House. Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance of the Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreigh Commerce, House of Representa-
tives on H.R. 675, A Bill to Amend the Investment Advisors Act
of 1970 to Provide for Regulation of Persons Rating Municipal
Bonds. 94th Congress, Second Session, Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, pp. 37, 76, and 77.
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B. Investor opinions of the City of Boston -- Results of the Perceptions
Survey
A survey asking opinion questions about Boston was mailed to a group
of bond buyers which was almost identical to those receiving the Indicator
Survey. In total, 172 responses were received in June and July of 1976 to
the Perceptions Survey. Both surveys, as mentioned earlier, were mailed in
cooperation with the City of Boston, using the city's letterhead and mailing
list and signed by the Treasurer of the City of Boston. The purpose of the
Perceptions Survey was diagnostic. Copies of the survey forms, tabulated
reaults, and a more detailed description of its distribution are included in
Appendix II. In the following discussion, results to the questions are
grouped by subject area instead of by question format or order in which they
appeared on the survey form.
1. ' Perceptions of the local economy
The survey included a number of questions on major and minor aspects
of the city's economy. When respondents were asked to rate the current sit-
uation of "business activities" in the City of Boston on a 1-5 scale (with
"1"="very good", "2"="good", "3"="average", "4"="poor", and "5"="very poor");
the average was 2.70 (falling between "good" and "average"). They were
asked whether they "perceive" "decline in manufacturing" as among "signifi-
cant problems which the City of Boston must resolve to maintain economic
prosperity"; and 50% of respondents did consider it to be a problem, 12.5%
did not, and 37.5% did not know. In another question, respondents were
asked to make projections for the City of Boston in the next five years of
certain factors by checking possible responses. Their answers were evaluated
by assigning numerical values ("4"="much greater", "3"="greater", "2"=
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"current", and "1"="less than") and computing the mean. The future of "econ-
omic well-being of manufacturing industries" was rated to be 1.62 (between
"current" and "less than" -- a fairly negative response). The future of
"economic well-being of major retail business" was rated to be 1.87 (between
"current" and "less than", also). The future of "economic well-being of fin-
ancial institutions" was rated to be 2.23 (between "current" and "greater").
Other survey questions dealt with more minor aspects of Boston's
economy. When asked to make projections (over the next five years), the
bond dealers rated the future of economic well-being of high technology,
R & D industries, and specialized consulting firms" at 2.34 (between "current"
and "greater"). They rated the future of Boston's "popularity as a conven-
tion center" at 1.84 (between "current" and "less than") and the future of
its "popularity as a home office" at 1.60 (between "current" and "less than"
-- the poorest projection of this set of questions). A few other questions
using different formats also asked respondents to rate minor aspects of the
city's economy: "Cutbacks in military facilities" was considered to be
among "significant problems that Boston must resolve in order to maintain
economic propsperity" by 31%, however, 21% did not consider it to be a pro-
blem and 48% did not know; the current situation of "transportation and
road systems" was rated at 2.63 (between "good" and "average"); and the
current situation of "medical care facilities" was rated at 1.83 (between
"good" and "very good").
These results include evaluations of many aspects of the economy that
Moak considers to be factors important to investors and rating agencies in
determining preference. Manufacturing industries, important both as employ-
ers and as taxpayers, were seen to have current and worsening problems. The
opinion of the dealers that the transportation and road systems were above
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average suggests that shipping problems are not a reason for the decline of
manufacturing. Retail business (a source of state sales tax, a potential
tax source for the City of Boston, and an indicator of the "spending money"
of the population) was also seen as declining. The city's general attrac-
tiveness to business people as a home office and convention center was
seen as falling. However, high technology and medicine in the area seem to
have better reputations -- although their potential as a source of tax rev-
enue, primary employment, or attraction to other business is unclear. In
general, then, investors' opinions of Boston's economy are somewhat negative
with some areas of hope.
Forbes had emphasized the "controllability" of economic factors and
the willingness of local government to do so. It is, however, unclear how
much industry can be attracted and nourished by favorable local tax struc-
tures or aid in site location and preparation when these costs are a small
part of total costs to business (compared with other factors, such as labor
and energy, most of which local government cannor influence), when relocation
is inhibited by moving costs, and when other local governments are competing
to attract industries.
2. Perceptions of the quality of city government
Ten questions were asked relating to the reputation of the quality of
the city's government, which Moak, Forbes, and Fitch Investors Service had
emphasized. A very general question asked respondents to rate the current
situation of "effectiveness of city government" on a scale from 1-5 ("1"=
"very godd", "2"="good", "3"="average", "4"="poor", and " 5"=Ivery poor").
The mean of the responses to this question is 3.35 (falling between "average"
and "poor"). Respondents were also asked to "rate the City of Boston's
policy making and administration" in the following areas with possible
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responses of "good", "adequate", "poor", and "don't know". The mean ratings
were computed (using "3"="good", "2"="adequate", and "1"="poor"); only one
mean rating fell in the range of "adequate".
Criteria
(1) Optimization of economic impacts of
health care industry:
(2) Provision of police and fire protection
services:
(3) Input into decisons of the Massachusetts
Port Authority regarding its financing
and operating of facilities such as
Logan and the Harbor:
(4) Input into decisons of the Metropolitan
-Boston Transit Authority regarding its
financing, service levels, and capital
improvements:
(5) Maintenance and imporvement of roads,
sewers, and parks:
(6) Negotiating in securing federal funds:
(7) Negotiating tax abatements at reasonable
levels for city interests:
(8) Planning for educational programs and
facilities and implementation of the
desegregation order:
(9) Negotiating arrangiments with municipal
Adjusted
Mean
Rating
2.08&
1.97
1.85
1.82
1.72
1.66
1.60
1.53
"adequate"
"poor"
unions and public employees: 1.35
These results imply an overall lack of faith in the managerial ability
of Boston's city government. The low ratings on the questions concerning
its influence with the Massachusetts Port Authority, the Metropolitan Boston
Transit Authority, and the federal government (criteria numbers 4,5, and 6)
show an uncertainty regarding its ability to deal with intergovernmental
politics. The results concerning its policy making and administration in
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negotiating tax abatements and in public education (criteria numbers 7 and 8)
cast doubt on the City's ability to deal with local taxpayers and citizens,
although the administration is rated more highly on its ability to deal
with hospitals (criteria number 1). The evaluations of "provision of police
and fire protection services" and "maintenance and improvement of roads,
sewers, and parks" (criteria numbers 2 and 5) could imply criticism of the
adequacy of its expenditures and of its internal administration; the latter
hypothesis is also supported by the lowest mean rating in the section --
"negotiating arrangements with municipal unions and public employees" (crit-
eria number 9).
This discussion is not meant to imply that the government of the City
of Boston is actually inadequate or mismanaged or that the general securities
market holds this opinion. However, as Mr. Moak warns: "Although reputa-
tions, both good and poor, are sometimes not warranted, the reality is that
much opinion formation rests on the views of others". /27, p. 165_/ Many
people have not formed an opinion -- good or bad -- on the quality of Boston's
government -- the "don't know" response on the questions rating the city's
administration was an average of 61% -- much higher than that on any other
question.
3. Perceptions of Social Factors
Social factors may benefit or hurt a community by attracting popula-
tion and business, enriching life or by increasing the need for certain ser-
vice expenditures and undermining the commitment of citizens -to the city.
One. purpose of the Perceptions Survey was to determine whether investors
view certain intangible and certain natural assets as being present in Boston.
Respondents were asked to rate the current situation of "recreation,
cultural facilities, and art" in the City on a 1-5 scale ("1"="very good",
(200)
"2"="good", "3"="average", "4"="poor", "5"="very poor"). They rated the sit-
uation as being between "very good" and "good" (1.81), placing it higher than
any other indicator on that question. When asked if its cultural facilities
are an economic asset, 69% said "yes", 12% said "no", and 19% said "don't
know".. Of the total responses to that question, 38% cited examples, fre-
quently mentioning the Boston Pops and prestigious universities in the area.
When asked if its envi onmental qualities are an economic asset, only 29%
said "yes" (26% said "no" and. 45% said "don't know"). Of the total responses
to that question, 17% gave examples frequently citing the Commons and Public
Gardens, the architecture, and the proximity to the ocean. None of the
responses to either of these questions gave examples of improvements that
were new in the last twenty years.
Another question asked respondents to rate the current situation of
"quality of life/environment" on a 1-5 scale ("'1"="very good, "2"="good",
"3" ="average", "4"="poor", and "5"="very poor"). Boston received a mean
rating of 3.32 or slightly below average. That may have something to do
with the rating of "maintenance and improvement of roads, sewers, and parks"
as below adequate (as mentionpd earlier).
Population trends can be considered to be both an economic factor and
a social factor. People may come to or leave an area for economic and for
social reasons; once there they affect the economy, the social fabric of the
community, -and the finances of local government; their leaving in large num-
bers also affects the community. Certain population trendse were mentioned
in the exhibit prepared by Fitch Investors Service as "factors which may
indicate potential trouble". (See page 194 ) In answer to a question on
the Perceptions Survey of "How do you perceive population trends in Boston",
5% checked "significant out-migration to suburbs of Boston" and 25% checked
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"significant out-migration to other areas than Boston area". Only 1% of
respondents thought that there has been "significant in-migration", while
18% thought there are "stable population levels, but significantly changing
population composition". Another question asked respondents to project
"overall population levels" in the City of Boston in the next five years.
Of the total responses to that question, only 10% checked "greater" or
"much greater", 35% checked "current", 45% checked "less than", and 10%
checked "don't know".
4. Perceptions- of school desegregation problems
Like many other American cities, Boston has been under federal court
order to desegregate its public schools in a manner that involved reassigning
many students and busing them away from their immediate neighborhoods. As
has been highly publicized, Boston has had difficulty in implementing this
requirement. There has been some violence in the schools and neighborhoods
regarding the desegregation order, and eventually certain schools were put
under federal court receivership. In response to one survey question, 97%
thought that "school administration and desegregation" are among "signifi-
cant problems that the city must resolve to maintain economic prosperity".
The problems in Boston related to implementation of the desegrega-
tion order can be reviewed for direct costs of administration and indirect
costs of education quality. The problems can also be considered as to what
they show about the quality of community and government leadership and other
social factors. Some think that forced busing it causal of "white flight"
and other economic changes. In an effort to see if the busing problems
havenaffected financing costs and investment decisions, the Perceptions
Survey included the following question;
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How do you think that news coverage of the City of
Boston's school desegregation order and related
events have affected the City's financial reputa-
tion with potential investors?
Frequency
Possible responses of response (%)
The financial reputation that Boston has
with potential investors has been improved: 1
The financial reputation that Boston has with
potential investors has not been significantly
affected: 4
The financial reputation that Boston has with
potential investors has been somewhat damaged: 48
The financial reputation that Boston has with
potential investors has been greatly damaged: 46
Don't know: 1
As mentioned earlier, "financial reputation" is said to be very impor-
tant to the securities market. How much importance the market actually
attaches to school desegregation problems is still unclear, however, as is
how indicative of broad comunity problems they are. It is notable that on
the last two questions discussed, both of which related to school desegrega-
tion, the'"don't know" responses were only "3%" and "1%" respectively.
Three other survey questions are somewhat related to school desegreg-
ation. On a 1-5 scale, respondents rated the current situation of "educa-
tional levels" between "good" and "average" with a rating of 2.86 (with "1"=
"very good", "2"="good", "3"= "average", "4"="poor", and "5"="very poor").
On the same scale, the current situation of "public safety" was rated at
3.32 (between "average" and "poor"). These questions had "don't know" re-
sponses accounting for 16% and 20% of the total. However, on another ques-
tion that asked respondents to rate the City of Boston's policy making and
administration on "planning for educational programs and facilities and im-
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plementation of the desegregation order"; 7% checked "good", 10% checked
"adequate", 27% checked "poor", and a full 57% checked "don't know". These
results suggest that the impact of the school desegregation situation is
still fluid. It is possible that investors may still be reassured about
the various aspects of the problem - public violence, undermining of the
teaching of basic skills, and the propriety of the city government's handling
of the problem. Much depends on the future.
5 Perceptions of Boston when compared to other cities
Fout questions asked respondents to compare the City of Boston to
other cities. When asked to compare residential property values in Boston
to those in other cities, 9% thought they were rising faster than those in
other cities, 42% thought they were changing evenly with other cities, and
49% thought they are lagging behind other cities. This may show that invest-
ors think the property tax base is expanding or that the standard of living
is lower.
"Investments in real property" include those in business and land
and are important in maintaining and expanding the economid base. Only 3%
thought investments in real property in the City of Boston are more attrac-
tive than other cities, 31% thought such investments are on par with those
in other cities, and 66% thought that such investments are less secure. If
the bond dealers who answered this question -- because of their contact with
investment bankers, financial institutions, and wealthy individuals -- are
either influential or representative, then Boston's economic base may have
future problems (even if there is insufficient evidence to prove that other
investments are better than those in Boston).
Because the rating agencies and purchasers. evaluate municipalities
on a comparative basis, the survey included two questions explicitly compar-
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ing Boston with fourteen other cities. Respondents were asked to compare
Boston with each of the other cities in terms of "general economic chacterer-
istics" and "general quality of life" by checking columns labelled Boston
is "better", "worse", or "similar" than the other city, or that the respond-
ent does not feel qualified to give an opinion, The results were ranked by
computing a mean using a value of "1" if Boston was considered "better",
a value of "0" if the two cities were considered "similar", and a value of
"-1" if Boston was considered worse. The adjusted means were then inverted
so that the city with the highest rating heads the list.
General General
Economic Quality-of-life
Comparison Comparison
tied for Dallas (1) Atlanta
(1) and (2) Houston (2) San Francisco
(3) Atlanta (3) Dallas
(4) San Francisco (4) Houston
(5) Kansas City (5) New Orleans
(6) Milwaukee (6) Cincinnati
(7) New Orleans (7) Kansas City
(8) Cincinnati (8) Milwaukee
9) Pittsburgh (9) Boston
(10) St. Louis (10) St. Louis
(11) Boston (11) Pittsburgh
(12) Cleveland (12) Philadelphia
(13) Philadelphia (13) Cleveland
(14) Detroit (14) Detroit
(15) Newark (15) Newark
Analysis of the survey results is somewhat limited because there does
not exist similar data on investor opinions of other cities. The preced4ng
ing questions help somehow-to show that investors'-overall negative opinions
of Boston do not extend to all cities. However, more research is needed on
comparing perceptions. For instance, if the above cities mailed question-
aires to bond dealers receiving their prospectus statements with a similar
question to that prece ding,- would the same ranking appear in their results?
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6. Perceptions of Boston's securities
Most of the questions on the Perceptions Survey addressed opinions on
the economy, the government, and social factors. The minds of respondents
might have been preoccupied with the subjects stressed in the survey form
(instead of with fiscal cash-flows and debt schedules). A few questions
specifically concerned securities of the City of Boston; their answers could
reflect various experiences.
A somewhat ambiguous question asked "How would you rate the security
of Boston's bonds compared to...?" The following chart shows frequency of
response and an adjusted mean rating (computed by assigning values of "1"=
"more secure", "2"="as secure" and "3"="less secure" and omitting "don't
know" responses):
Frequency of Response (%)
More As Less Don't Mean
Comparison Secure Secure Secure Know Rating
Compared to state
and suburban issues
not in Massachusetts: 2 11 73 14 2.83
Compared to other
cities: 1 22 68 8 2.73
Compared to other
Massacusetts
municipalities: 1 30 53 15 2.62
Although the range of results in the preceding question is not very wide,
they give some support to a hypothesis that, in addition to the quality of
a particular municipality, there are other perceived risks associated with
cities, with suburbs, and with state location. Of course, interest rates.
are also determined by external market factors.
As mentioned earlier, the Perceptions Survey was sent to a mailing
list of bond dealers provided and used by the Treasurer-Collector's Office
of the City of Boston, with a cover letter signed by the Treasurer. Those
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who responded to the survey (about 13%) may have had some special interest
in Boston. It is impossible, however, to be certain what biases were intro-
duced because of the low response rate. The most important question on the
survey asked: "Would you consider buying a new issue of Boston's bonds if
you were in the market for municipal bonds"? In response, only 18% said
they would consider the bonds, while 22% were uncertain, and 60% said they
would not even consider bonds of Boston. These results have implications
for Boston's marketing strategy.
C. How investors might have formed their impressions of Boston
This section discusses the information that investors might have used
in forming their impressions of Boston. It does not concern the state of
Boston's economy and quality-of-life or the actual risk of its securities.
Five pages in one of Boston's recent prospectus statements are de-
voted to explaining the community. This explanation does not include all
of the subjects mentioned in questions in the Perceptions Survey. The
city's financial offices have on file all of the audit statements, prospectus
statements, and other information on city finances which it has released
over the years. Other sources, however, publish and release information
about the city's economy and social factors. These sources include the U.S.
Census Bureau, the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Department of Labor,
various agencies of the State of Massachusetts, the Boston Redevelopment
Authority, the Mayor and his office, the School Board and Department of
Education, various local and national news media, and many of the private in-
dustries', commercial establishments, financial institutions, and nonprofit
organizations located in the city. There is no way to keep track of every-
thing published. Part of this information is analyzed for various purposes
by trade organizations, planning agencies, privately owned consulting firms,
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and universities. Representatives of the rating agencies also occasionally
refer to Boston in newspaper interviews (for instance, as an example of a
city with large, unfunded pension liabilities).
Full-time analysts who are self-employed, employed by financial in-
stitutions, or employed by a rating agency and every trader, underwriter,
and investor who is a part-time analyst are exposed to some of this informa-
tion. They may form an opinion of a small town at the time when they con-
sider the quality of its security, but they already have some sort of opin-
ion on every major city.
Part of their opinion may be from personal experience. Twenty-two
percent of those who responded to the Perceptions Survey had lived in Boston
or the Boston area. Another thirteen percent had visited it many times.
Only twenty-one percent of the respondents had never been to Boston. Some
included little notes about how they had loved the city when they lived
in Boston until they retired and moved to Florida or how they had attended
Harvard thirty years earlier. Because municipal bonds are bought by wealthy
individuals and institutions, the same people who work and invest in the
securities market are likely to have other investment experience. They may
personally know people who are important in Boston's economy.
The results of this survey, and other diagnostic tools, may help show
whether investors are getting the correct information and on what subjects
they have not formed opinions.
One way in which Boston is different than other cities is the strength
and size of its financial institutions. As the prospectus stated:
"Boston's financial institutions manage about $80 billion
in assets including more than a third of the nation's
mutual fund industry assets. The city is the home of
sixty major insurance companies, thirty national banks,
and thirty savings institutions, and over a hundred
co-operative banks." 78, p. 35_/
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The bond dealers surveyed seemed to be aware of this situation -- they gave
an average future projection to "economic well-being of financial institu-
tions" between "greater" and "current". They might have formed this impres-
sion from statements released by the city, from financial publications and
business magazines, or through an acquaintance working in a financial in-
stitution. Another city, that did not have a thriving financial center,
would probably have not mentioned it in its prospectus statement just as
Boston did not discuss the status of its manufacturing industry (in its pro-
spectus statement).
The status of "public safety" has a questionable relationship to bond
security (although it might reflect attitude's of the community and be a
factor in people's decision to move). This section discusses perception
of crime rates, as data, because they were not included in the city's pro-
spectus statement yet survey respondents had an opinion. Only 33 respondents
(of the 146 who answered this question) did not "feel qualified to give an
opinion". Of those who gave an opinion, 10%' thought that the current situa-
tion of public safety in Boston is "good", 50% thought it is "average", and
30% thought it is "poor". Their perceptions are compatible with those of
MassachUsetts tesidents, as shown by the' published results of a telephone
survey. Of 1,000 people interviewed by telephone, 78% of those living in
Boston who were called said that "crime and violence in the streets" is
"a very serious problem". L~4, p. 38_7 In fact, Boston has a reported
victimization rate for all personal crimes of violence that is twice that
of Washington, D.C. although other types of crime have relatively lower
statistical incidences. /65 7 It is doubtful whether either the bond
dealers or the citizehs surveyed have ever seen crime statistics comparing
incidence in Boston to that in other cities. Their perceptions must have
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been formed by a combination of personal experience, second-hand experience,
and news coverage.
In at least one area, respondents to the Perceptions Survey were mis-
informed. As mentioned earlier, 9% thought that residential property values
in Boston are rising faster than those in other cities, 42% thought that they
are changing evenly with other cities, and 49% thought they are lagging be-
hind other cities. In fact, U.S. Census Data shows that the median value of
owner-occupied dwelling units in Boston rose in the period 1960-1970, bring-
ing Boston's rank in this measure from tenth to fifth among the twenty larg-
est cities (after San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, and New Orleans)
/57, Table 17_ Boston's prospectus pointed out the increase. /8, p. 35_
This fact appears more remarkable when viewed in light of Muller's finding,
using Census data, that the average value of a single-family home increased
by 48% between 1966 and 1971 in thirteen cities with increasing population
and by only 27% in fourteen cities with decreasing population -- including
Boston in the latter average. / 32, p. 70_7 Information for investors,
written in a more aggressive style, might have pointed out this paradox and
attempted to explain it.
A planning document, of limited distribution, had this to say in
1975 about retail trade in Boston:
"Retail trade has lagged behind the overall revival and
growth in the city's economy over the past decade. While re-
tail sales in the Boston metropolitan area have been expanding
continuously since World War II, sales in the City of Boston
have barely held their early postwar level, reaching a low point
in the early 1960's and recovering only modestly since then.
Retail sales in downtown Boston faired even poorer, but appear
to have stabilized while gains in the neighborhoods have been
modest. These trends reflect the shift in population to the
suburbs and the development of shopping centers in the 1950's
and 1960's. In recent years, growth in Downtown employment and
residential population has counterbalanced the losses to the
suburban market and resulted in a stabilization of sales in
Downtown." /~6, pp. 15 and 16 7
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This situation shows in a variety of statistics related to retail trade in
Boston, such as trends of volumes of sales and retail employment or a list
published by the Census of Retail Trade ranking 250 cities. /59, Table 7_7
Boston does not report in its prospectus to the securities market the sit-
uation of retail trade. Because the City does not have a retail sales tax,
it is not and probably will not be obligated to report the volume of retail
trade to bond buyers. This is another example of an indicator of the local
economy that a city may report when it is to its advantage to do so. Albany,
for instance, included in its prospectus survey data from Sales Management
Magazine showing a striking increase in sales in the City in recent years.
/ 7, p. 18_/ As mentioned earlier, the average survey projections over five
years of the "economic well-being of major retail business" in the City-of
Boston fell between "current" and "less than". (Perceptions Survey) If
City statisticians and economists felt they could build a reasonable case
that the future of retail sales in Boston will improve, then ways to change
and improve these investor perceptions could be explored.
As mentioned earlier, 55% of bond dealers responding to the Percep-
tions Survey thought the "population trends in Boston" are one of "signif-
icant out-migration to suburbs of Boston" and 22% thought that the population
trends are one of "significant out-migration to other areas than the Boston
area" (The respondent could have checked both answers). In fact, between
1950 and 1970 the population of Boston decreased by 21%. However, Massachu-
setts State Census data is contradictory showing a population increase of
21% in the period 1970-1975. ~8, p. 32_7 Survey respondents might have
formed their impressions on the basis of trends until 1970, from the most
recent U.S. Census data, or from news coverage of some sort. Only 9% of the
respondents to that question thought that there are stable population levels
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and only 1% thought that there is significant in-migration. Were these re-
spondents aware of the contradictory data (which were included in the pro-
spectus statements)?
The discrepancy in these data may possibly make a difference to an
investor who knows of and takes the Muller findings very seriously. Muller's
handling of the data is very convincing as he uses it to support his hypothe-
sis that a decrease in population is causal, syptomatic, or in other ways
correlated with a variety of economic and fiscal problems. After reading
his paper, if someone has to decide between five or ten bond issues, it may
seem very reasonable to eliminate those cities with decreasing population
trends from further consideration.
In response to the question on the-Perceptions Survey about popula-
tion trends that was most recently mentioned, 18% checked that their percep-
tions are of "stable population levels, but significantly changing population
composition" in Boston. In fact, the population composition has changed.
Police department data indicated that between 1970 and 1972, there was a
large increase in people between ages 25 and 34 and a decrease in people
between ages 35 and 64. /6, Table II-1i U.S. Census data for Boston
show that from 1950 to 1970 the population or unrelated individuals increased
by about 8% while that of families decreased by the same. These results can
also be considered in light of changes in the City's residential neighbor-
hoods and schools.
Other population composition data may be considered relevant in light
of results of some cities. Muller, for instance, also found that in the
thirteen large cities showing population increases, 19%.of the population
is black; while in the fourteen large cities showing population decreases,
more than 30% of the population is black. /32, p. 36_7 As mentioned
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earlier, one statistical study found that the most important characteristic
of fiscal strain is the percentage of the population that is of Irish des-
cent. 10, p. iiij Boston, and most other municipalities reviewed by
this author, did not report any data on racial or ethnic composition. Such
a reporting policy might draw criticism for a number of reasons.
Population composition and other social factors may or may not be
important to a bond's security or intrinsic quality. However, the possibil-
ity of various American cities deteriorating is very unappealing. As men-
tioned earlier, the Perceptions Survey also asked the bond dealers how they
would project the future in five years of "overall population levels" in the
City of Boston, and the average of their responses was below "current" levels.
A few months after those surveys were distributed, a Boston paper carried
on the front page the results of a survey in Massachusetts about trends of
Boston's population. Five hundred people were asked:
"Some people say that during the next five to
ten years most of the middle income families will
move out of Boston, leaving the City with a mainly
low-income population and even more serious problems
in schools, housing, and lack of tax revenues. In
your opinion, do you think this will definitely
happen, probably happen, probably not happen, or
definitely not happen?" /_ 5, p. 1_/
Of those questioned in Boston, 69% said that they thought that scenario
definitely or probably will happen. Citizens and bond dealers, after all,
are people who act of the basis of their opinions -- which may be well-
considered or without factual basis.
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D. Disclosure of nonfinancial information
Although the Indicator Survey and the Perceptions Survey were answered
by different people, the responding pools were almost identical having been
chosen alternately from the same mailing list. Respondents to the Indicator
Survey generally did not consider the types of information included in the
Perceptions Survey to be important -- at least not in comparison with finan-
cial information. Respondents to the Indicator Survey were asked to rank
the following items in importance in evaluating a city's credit worthiness:
Count of Count of
Markings as Markinqs as
Most Second in
Type of Information: Important Importance
Analysis of debt and
revenue structures: 144 14
Analysis of expenditures: 36 81
Analysis of economic trends: 27 51
Analysis of demographic trends: 10 20
Statement of bond counsel: 8 7
About half of the 74 indicators that respondents to the Indicator
Survey were asked to rate in importance and in the usefulness of comparative
data were related to the local economy and social factors. These were gen-
erally rated much lower than financial factors. The most important nonfin-
ancial factors not including those describing the property tax base were
"median household income" (14th out of 74), "unemployment rate" (19th out of
74) and "total population" (22nd out of 74). Some of the factors that Moak
said are important were not ranked highly in this survey by the bond dealers.
These include: "commuting trends" (63rd out of 74), "commercial bank deposits"
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(37th out of 74), "educational level of population" (43rd out of 74), "pop-
ulation by age group" (60th out of 74), "average value of building permits"
(33rd out of 74), and "trends in retail trade" (45th out of 74). Despite
the fact that they say that nonfinancial information is not very important,
it could be that such data predetermines their opinions and allows them to
make only a superficial attempt to understand the financial factors.
A city's economy is much larger and more dynamic than the finances of
its government. The interaction of the economy, social factors, and politi-
cal factors with the finances of local government (as facilities and services
are needed and revenues are generated), and with each other, is much more
complicated than the details of debt, revenues, and expenditures discussed.
Rabinowitz wrote that "a thorough job of credit analysis will cover the same
topics that should be considered by local officials in determining debt
policy for their governmental unit" /48, p. 137_7, but analysis such as
Moak discussed would go far beyond the capabilities of most analysts and
local officials.
The amount of information needed to describe the local economy and
social factors is much larger than that needed to descrbie local government
finances. Roderick M. Hills, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission,
said that without mandatory disclosure requirements...
"there will be a certain competition for disclosure,
that around the country various underwriters, various
rating services will seek to promote more and more
kinds of disclosure, a kind of competition that will
not necessarily aid the issuers, a kind of competition
that is not necessary for the protection of investors."
/63, p. 197
The average length of prospectus statements of thirty large cities is 44
pages -- that of Philadelphia is 165 pages. (Survey of Financial Officers,
See Appendix III) However, a detailed explanation of the local
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economy and social factors could easily run hundreds of pages for that alone.
The best information with which to analyze many factors of the local
economy and social characteristics is currently unavailable. Substitute
data, such as statistics collected for a metropolitan region by the U.S.
Census or indicators that are substituted for intangible characteristics
may be used. Some information is collected by some city and state agencies,
but their technique and timing differences make it difficult to use their
data for comparisons between cities. If much broader and standardized data
collection were begun immediately, it would be years before the data could
be meaningfully evaluated as to trends and its collections and anlysis would
be expensive. Political conflicts would inevitably arise.
Although the disclosure guidelines cited throughout this thesis were
generally specific as to which financial information should be reported,
they are-very general about reporting of nonfinancial information. All of
the guidelines suggest that a general description of the community be given
with the precise information involved to be judged by the issuer. The 1965
State Technical Assistance Report lists of great deal of information that is
sometimes (or could be) reported but stops short of making decisive recom-
mendations. (See Appendix IV)
Is it reasonable for the city administration to decide to put the
city's economy in the most favorable light? For instance, in 1975 only
four but of 174 issuers included data on the level or rate of unemployment.
(Summary of Reporting Practices) F63, p. 271_7 Those municipalities
probably had very low rates of unemployment. If a city has an unemployment
rate that is several percentage points above the national average, will
this affect the risk of its securities? Do the potential bond buyers have
a right to this information? Does the city have the obligation to inform
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them?
The 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines suggest, under "description of
issuer"
"Investors should be informed of factors which
indicate the ability of the issuer to impose
and collect, and the ability of the citizens'
to pay, taxes and other receipts which can be
used to discharge the issuer's obligations.
Certain trends provide useful indications in
these regards. Factors which may have a sig-
nificant, though, indirect effect on these
trends, such as types and levels of services
provided by the issuer and demand for services,
may also be helpful." f33, pp. 10 and 11_~7
Who is going to decide if such a condition has been adequately met? If dis-
closure continues to be pressured onto cities, but nominally voluntary,
for the purpose of limiting the liability of participants in the securities
offerings, then it may seem safer to underwriters to report on all poor
points of the city's economy. If disclosure requirements are mandated by
federal legislation and set by Congress or by an appointed board, what
standards will they use to define what types of background information should
be disclosed?
In 1968, Rabinowitz noted that:
"The more one considers the rating problems,
the more one realizes how intimately connected it
is with our inability to date as a nation to come
to grips with the 'urban problem' or to define
adequately a 'good city'." / 48, p. 89
Whether information is given directly to the market or filtered through rat-
ing services, there is no reason to believe that a panel of experts appointed
in 1977 could better define what areas of the local economy and population
characteristics relate most to bond quality any better than experts who
considered this problem in the past. Supposing the most important factor is
the percentage of the population which is of Irish descent.. .Will this im-
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portant fact never become clear because the idea of reporting this statistic
seems ridiculousto a panel of experts in 1977? Will local governments
take a special poll to find out what their ethnic-Irish population is? Will
the few financially secure communities that have large Irish populations be
unfairly forced to bear high inerest costs for capital improvements that are
debt-financed?
E. Summary and Conclusions
Investors have mixed opinions of Boston, and probably of many other
ities, that are not as good as the cities would like. Many of the respond-
ents to the Perceptions Survey are misinformed or uninformed. What can
Boston, or other such cities, do to improve their reputations? The dis-
closure recommendations cited provide little help in this respect. The
results of the Indicator Survey and the advice of Lennox Moak contradict in
the areas of reporting on subjects such as included in the Perceptions
Survey.
There is also a dilemna in development of general disclosure policies
for nonfinancial information. Research on how local economic and social
factors affect local government finance is just beginning. As it stands,
the research can shed little light on which economic and social factors
should be considered in municipal credit analysis although it is clear that
not everything can be considered because of research and reporting time and
costs. Also, over-use of preliminary research may result in inequities for
some local communities.
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VII. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
The history of the marketing of municipal securities, as described in
Chapter II, shows how the market became reliant on the rating agencies to
differentiate categories of securities in a way that is much more rigid than
the competing analyses common in the marketing of corporate securities. Mun-
icipalities have supported this dependency by resisting federal regulation
of municipal securities and by, until recently, maintaining policies of non-
disclosure. A number of reasons had been advanced in favor of municipal
disclosure policies including: to improve particular cities' reputations,
to lessen market dependence on the ratings, to provide opportunity for com-
petition in analysis and rating services, to be a safety check on municipal
expenditures and borrowing through investors' reactions, and to provide
opportunities for new inputs into municipal finance. However, the potential
costs combined with lack of pressure from market participants and lack of
initiative to inhibit development of disclosure policies.
Some of those recommending municipal disclosure developed guidelines
and specific recommendations. Those cited in this thesis -- the 1951 New
York City Report, the 1963 IBA Format, the 1965 State Technical Assistance
Report, the 1976 MFOA Disclosure Guidelines, and the 1976 Williams-Tower Bill
emphasized reporting information about debt structures and property tax
revenues. The results of the Indicator Survey supported the validity of
many of their recommendations but also showed that they are incomplete and
inconsistent in many ways with investors needs for information.
In several situations arising in the 1970's (the discovery of large
unfunded pension liabilities, the UDC default, the NYC default, and other
municipal financial problems), it seemed that investors had been uninformed
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or misinformed and it became apparent that the rating agencies could not
satisfactorily pre-identify high risk bonds. A series of federal suits
involving principles of securities fraud had an adverse affect on the
securities market. As an informal condition of purchase, long prospectus
statements were demanded from most municipal issuers. Although they were
hastily prepared and of inconsistent quality, they appeared to help to
limit the liability of other market participants. Mandatory disclosure
standards, primarily the 1976 Williams-Tower Bill before the U.S. Senate,
were advanced as a way to facilitate national marketing of municipal secur-
ities and to limit competition between municipalities for greater disclosure.
None of the disclosure guidelines before or during the 1970's dealt
specifically with the questions of costs to the municipality. These poten-
tiil costs are the costs of compliance, economic costs, and political costs.
The costs of compliance are those of gathering information, those of auditing
beyond "normal" requirements, those of writing of the statement and contrib-
uting reports, and those of distribution. The economic costs.include any
damages awarded because of inaccuracies in the disclosure material, inci-
dental suits that use the disclosure material as evidence, and possibly,
increased interest costs for some cities because their relative positions in
the quality spectrum may drop and the range of the spectrum expressed in
interest rates may increase. Resulting political changes may be advantageous
or detrimental and may include increased external pressures changing and
standardizing reliance on tax sources, relations with state governments,
collection of delinquent taxes, accounting practices, and contracts given
to city employees,and pressures limiting services and new capital construc-
tion.
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Whether disclosure is voluntary or mandatory, which information is
suggested or required, and the extent of municipal liability are policies
that will be formed in the money markets, Congress, and the courts through
the interactions of many interest groups. Each city must make policy
choices. On the one hand, it could disclose only the minimum necessary
by law or to gain acceptance by the market. On the other hand, it could
disclose more -- assuming that this will cause enough improvement in its
relative market position to more than pay for the costs of the added report-
ing. Each city must weigh the costs against the benefits of disclosure.
The federal government should weigh the disclosure costs of cities against
the benefits to investors and securities professionals.
How and where may the costs to municipalities of disclosure policies be
limited? If their liability is limited, savings may be considerable. Other
was, beside damage awards, may be found that ight help to resolve situa-
tions in which the information in the prospectus turned out to be inaccurate
or incomplete. If the error does not result in losses to investors and
there is not evidence of "scienter", for instance, a requirement that the
city publicize the correction would emphasize to all the importance of extreme
care in statement preparation. If there is evidence of "scienter" or neg-
ligence in statement preparation and investors suffer losses, there should
be someway to compensate them. Unfortunately, this would punish another
group of innocents -- the taxpayers, who are often less able to bear the
burden of higher taxes than securities holders can bear market losses.
Obviously, the best approach is a preventative one in which the figures and
wording would be carefully reviewed by independent professionals. However,
policies should be developed so that this concern does not eliminate possib-
ilities of aggresive marketing or provide a -disincentive to broad disclosure
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(by increasing the expenses of reporting unrequired information).
In addition to damage costs, other compliance costs may be limited.
The easiest ways to do so would be to charge for reports and to not'include
details that require special surveys or special auditing. Another way to
limit compliance costs seems to be more compatible with other findings of
the surveys. This is to use a tier system of reporting in which large
mailing lists might receive very short statements noting that more detail
is available on various subjects by request or theough investor news services.
It is not clear how disclosure policies will affect the interest
spread correlated with the quality spectrum of municipal securities. Often,
comparisons of financial data of two cities show striking differences and
this perception might increase the difference of the interest rates at
which they are able to successfully market their securities. On the other
hand, if disclosure policies encourage a greater variety of analysis tech-
niques resulting in different perceptions of preference and quality, then
many cities paying relatively high interest rates may find themselves in a
more competitive position.
The political costs of disclosure may be the most difficult to pre-
dict. It is understandable that municipalities would resist any reporting
policies that might undermine the powers of local political structures to
determine internal policies. Certain information, such as procedures in
collecting delinquent taxes or unfinalized plans for as yet unauthorized
bond issuesis more politically sensitive. This should be considered when
disclosure policies are developed.
How much more information do independent and institutinally-employed
municiapl securities analysts want? How would detailed, standardized, de"
livered or detailed, unstandardized information affect their work? In 1968,
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Rabinowitz, a bond analyst, wrote:
"In some cases the sheer mass of relevant data avail-
able, especially for major states and cities and their
related governmental entities, requires a greater ex-
penditure of research talent than the analyst's em-
ployer has made available to him." / 48, p. 138_/
He further speculated about how the state-of-the-art of municipal credit
analysis might change:
"The municipal credit analysts who work for the major
underwriters and investing institutions... are faced
with a number of operational problems for which there
seeems to be no solutions at the present time, given
the lack of substantive research about the nature of
local development.
Over the coming years the art of credit analysis is
surely going to be improved by the application of a
more scientific approach to the subject, most likely
within the university research community using data
collected by the states.
We can predict that the bond analyst of the future will
find himself immersed in the writing of these urban
economists and regional scientists, for they are build-
ing new foundations for municipal fiscal policy.
We may expect the conservative investor to put aside
some of his rules of thumb and to grapple with the more
sophisticated intuitions that his credit analysts will
provide.
Although the municipal bond analysts are generally
concerned with the aggregate local public economy of
"the problem of the cities," they are much more con-
cerned with the qualitative measurement of individual
governmental units, with the precepts under which they
are governed, with the interactions, and with the re-
sponse of the capital markets to-their invitations for
bids on issues of long-term bonds." / 48, pp. 138-145_/
Research into municipal finance would be facilitated by the existence
of greater collection and standardization of information. However, although
many experts have recommended development of a data bank, it has seemed to
be too expensive. Rabinowitz suggests that research will be done in univer-
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sities because:
"There seems to be less likelihood that sustained
research can be expected within the investment community
with its divisions among types of competing institutions
or within any of the levels of government (partly because
of the concept of federalism that gives fiscal independence
to local government) or among the many professional and
industry-wide associations that serve these various
interests". L48, p. 140_
The expense of such research is still a deterent. Recent experiences involv-
ing municipal financial crises have increased interest in fiscal strain
within the universities, industry, and government so some research may be
financed, but it seems doubtful that this research would be extensive enough
to substantially affect either municipal financial management or municipal
securities analysis unless it is accompanied by other forces such as manda-
tory municipal disclosure.
Clearly, events have changed the procedures of marketing municipal
securities so much that it is vital to develop disclosure policies, now,
without waiting for more extensive university studies. As mentioned earlier,
73% of the respondents- to the Indicator Survey thought that the municipality
with the inferior prospectus sill be forced to pay somewhat or signficantly
higher interest rates. In fact, 74% of respondents claimed that the poor
quality of information in a prospectus of a municipality has, independent of
other inputs, detered them from purchasing a security.
Moak recommends that:
"From the standpoint of the local government
S. that has bonds in the market, the problem is to
provide information on a timely and accurate basis
which will enable the analyst and investor to main-
tain his data bank on the basis of facts and not
semi-facts reaching him from secondary sources,"
f27, p. 271J
It is not at all clear, however, that most bond dealers, investors, and other
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market participants want the burden of reading, discussing, and responding
to all the information that could be reported about cities' financial struc-
tures if disclosure costs were not a limiting factor. As mentioned before,
in response to a question on the Indicator Survey, 62% of bond dealers
claimed they usually spend less than one hour reviewing prospectus statements.
They would like even shorter statements -- 86% checked "yes" when asked
"Would a short document with notice of a bond sale and key information be
useful to you if you also had access to a detailed prospectus?"
The results of the Indicator Survey show that although it is currently
impossible to specify how a city or other municipal issuer should be analyzed
and graded, types of information of interest to market participants can be
defined and ranked by importance. The inability of the rating agencies and
writers of pre-1970 disclosure recommendations to recognize the potential
problems of pension liabilities shows a need for greater research in munici-
pal finance. The results of the Perceptions Survey show that purchase dec-
isions are sometimes made on the basis of incomplete and inaccurate infor-
mation.
The President of Standard & Poor's Corporation said:
"Disclosure must be a living thing and not an annual
report that lies in some repository such as a town hall.
The disclosure information must flow smoothly into the
market place where it can. be synthesized and distilled in
a variety of ways that will make it palatable for a poten-
tial investor to digest. The needs of full disclosure will
not be satisfied by producing bigger and bigger official
statements and annual reports. The challenge is to de-
v.elop a procedure through which full disclosure may be
accomodated and at the same time sustain and improve
market performance." / 63, p. 111_1
In keeping with the reasonableness of this advice, it may be appro-
priate to have one set of reports for bond dealers, investors, and the
general market, another for analysts, and a third to facilitate research.
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A policy limiting the material distributed to the general market is supported
by the finding of the Indicator Survey that 56% of respondents will "obtain
more information" instead of simply "not buy the bonds" if the sources of
information which they usually rely upon still leave them uncertain as to
whether to buy a specific issue. Most respondents would go to the underwriter
or to the municipality that is issuing the bonds for more information. Sev-
eral situations have been suggested in preceding chapters in which the city
could distribute highly summarized informition while making detailed informa-
tion available to researchers, financial journals, independent rating services,
and other interested partices upon request.
This thesis recommends a multi-tier reporting policy. The first tier'
of information should be widely distributed in official prospectus statements
and annual reports. This basic information should consist of a simple descrip-
tion of sources of revenues, costs of services provided, the debt service
schedule, a variety of debt-weighting ratios, and unfunded pension liabilities.
This information should be based on independent auditor's reports. Because
it is so important to compare financial information, serious consideration
should be given to standardization of municipal accounting practices. A
requirement that statements be prepared using certain accounting techniques
might be enough pressure to accomplish this, especially if the federal gov-
ernment provided accounting consultants. Standardized reporting of basic
information should help investors to become less dependent on the existing
rating agencies.
This thesis recommends that a modified version of the Williams-Tower
Bill be passed so that all cities must participate in at least the first
of these reporting policies. Some participation from all cities is needed
to modify existing procedures and regulation will help to clear up current
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confusion. As described in previous chapters, some of the requirements for
information to be reported that are listed in the 1976 version of the Bill
should be changed. Vesting the powers to modify disclosure requirements in
a representative board would be preferable to their current definition in
Congress. This board should have representatives of cities and other mun-
icipalities, market participants, and researchers in municipal finance. This
thesis does not recommend that the SEC receive such powers because of the
antagonism that has developed between its board and city advocates. It
would be more appropriate to expand the administration of the MSRB to include
more representatives and vest such powers in it, while developing compatible
policies between it and the SEC.
The information that would be given to bond buyers in accordance with
a modified version of the Williams-Tower Bill will not be understood by many
of them. One article about New York City, for instance, states:
"The city budget is more than $12 billion.
The total assessed valuation of the whole town is
only $80 billion. That's like if you were spending
$8,000 a year to keep up a $40,000 house -- and
one that was antiquated and crowded and kept getting
more decrepit the more work you did on it. You'd
have to be crazy. With $12 billion per year, in
five years you could build a new city_for eight
million people anywhere you want." / 22, p. 198_/
This shows misunderstandings of the definition of "assessed valuation",
what city funds are spent on, and the costs of new construction. Such
misunderstandings should be countered public relations campaigns and by
trained investment counselors.
More detailed information should be made available to those with
the experience and inclination to further analyze it. Moak suggests that
individuals are capable and do consider such information when up-to-date
data helps by bringing:
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"into focus once- again the greatest of all
data system coordinators -- the alert, comp-
etent, trained, and disciplined human mind."
/ 27, p. 170 7
A representative from a prominent accounting firm says there exists...
"a buildup of analysis capability within the
private sector and in various banks, in var-
ious other institutions, who are going to try
to pull together all the data." / 63, p. 107_/
If such new capabilities really exist, other use of information could
be made by new rating services. Small independent consulting firms could
register as investment counselors and develop opinion reports on certain
issuers. These firms would be aided by broader, multi-tier disclosure pol-
icies. They would not have to rate all issuers.. They could help investors
compensate for their lack of understanding of municipal finances and for
their time constraints. The operation-of a number of such firms would
lessen the dominance of Standard & Poor's Corporation and Moody's Investment
Counsellors.
The most intense uses of data might be made by universities that are
equiped to do large statistical studies, computer simulations, and in depth
case studies. They would not have a vested interest in their conclusions
and should nave fewer biases. In particular, studies on a generic "finan-
cial framework" and on indicators of financial stress would be helpful.
Ideally, there would be an interplay between university research centers,
independent and institutional analysts, and a federal municipal securities
disclosure regulation board. In this way, the diversity of ideas of the
analysts could be investigated by the research organiizations and, as
municipal finance becomes more understood, the market can modify its crit-
eria in assigning preferences or other ways can be developed to deal with
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an equitable acceptance of risk and determination of interest rates.
Cities could pursue active marketing policies that would try to reach
investors through improving their perceptions instead of immersing them in
financial details. They should try to diagnose their reputations with
opinion surveys such as that about Boston. They should try to reach small
buyers by mass mailings, luncheon discussions, and paid advertising. They
should try to directly solicit suggestions and improve communication
with investors by newsletters with question-iand-answer columns. To be con-
vincing, the tone- of such material will have to be that of one backed up
by facts and avoiding language associated with the hard-sell. The cities
should coordinate releases from the financial offices with those from the
mayor's office. In fact, it may be appropriate to have a small staff de-
voted to compiling and preparing these and other prospectus and detailed
reports. Another effective marketing strategy might be to appoint an
advisory board (before a financial crisis) of people who are influential
in the securities market and to convince them of the city's financial sta-
bility and good management.
A multi-tiered reporting policy, such as this thesis recommends,
will require that the cities not have full financial liability for all
the information they release. They should be held responsible for-the
first tier of required information and they should not be allowed to use
advertising that is clearly fraudulent. However, they should not be held
responsible for the accuracy of all the information they give to researchers.
They should be allowed to develop circulars for mass mailing, newspaper
advertising, and other releases and print them with a statement cautioning
investors that they are based on estimations or unaudited figures and that
the city cannot be sued for damages if these statements turn out to be
(230)
inaccurate.
If all of the cities and other municipal units in the nation made
available more information for use as described, the security of all munici-
pal bonds could be improved. If only very limited disclosure becomes the
norm, investors may not receive information that is any more useful than
what they have had in the past. Very defined standards would not uncover
many potential problems or provide a basis for correcting misperceptions.
If disclosure is extensive and the liability of cities is not limited and if
the market reacts to the increased information by labelling the securities
of many cities as speculative, then borrowing costs for cities may be-
increased to an unacceptable point. It is imperative, then, that some mid-
dle ground be found to balance between the two extremes so as to provide
adequate information but at costs that are not excessive.
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Appendix I
Survey Form and Tabulated Results of
The Indicator Survey
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CITY, OF BOSTON
OFFICE OF THE TREASURER
CITY HALL, BOSTON
JAMES V. YOUNG June 23, 1976
TREASURER
Dear Municipal Bond Investor:
Earlier this year we asked you to complete a questionnaire
identical to the one attached, to help us discover what informa-
tion investors would like to get from municipal bond disclosure
documents. As we noted then, the Treasury Department of the
City of Boston is fortunate to have the assistance of a graduate
student team from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in
carrying out this survey and analyzing the results. While we
are heartened by the substantial response to our first mailing,
we nevertheless would like to enlarge our data base and once
again ask for your cooperation and encourage you to complete
the questionnaire, not only because we would like to improve
Boston's own disclosure information, but also because there is
a growing movement toward requiring more extensive disclosure
in the municipal bond area and the results of this survey may
provide invaluable insight into what disclosure requirements
should be.
We would prefer to receive your answers as soon as
possible. Thank you for your cooperation.
S' cerely,
j mes V. un
ollector- surer
ity of Boston
KentColton
Assistant Professor of
Urban Studies and Planning
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
JVY/ja
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INYESTOR NEEDS FOR INFORMATION IN MUNICIPAL PROSPECTUS STATEMENTS
Liated below are a number of items of information which a city might include in a prospectus statement.
They are grouped into four categories: population and other indicators, financial statistics, economic
statistics, and property indicators. Please mark each item with a value from "I" to "5" depending on
the importance you feel it has, with "1" being very important and "5" being irrelevent. Check the "don't
know".-column if you do not feel qualified to give an opinion on the importance of that particular item.
-If you think that such items of information have significantly more meaning if they are compared to
other cities, check "yes" in the column "would like a comparison with other cities". Since we would
also like to obcain an idea as to which of these indicators you feel are most important, after each of
the four area groupings. is a question asking you to indicate which three you feel are most important.
RANKING OF IMPORTANCE,
DON'T KNOW
I POPULATION AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS
1.) Total population:
2.) Population by age group:
3.) Migratory trends by economic class:
4.) Population density:
5.) Ecucational level of population:
6.) Educational level and skill-training
of workforce:
7.) -Percentage of city work force living
inside the city limits:
8.) Average commute by city workforce
(by time, distance):
9.) Median household income:
10.) Percentage change in median household
income in last five years:
- 11.) Percentage of censua tracts with
utedian iucomea above city median:
12.) Crime rates:
13.) nir-quality readings:
14.) Racial distributions:
15.) Employment by the city and other
governmental units over the last 5 years:
Of the fifteen population characteristics listed
think are the most important:
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2. 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4. 5
1 2 3 4. 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 .2 3 4 5
above, please list the numbers of
WOULD.YOU LIKE
A COMPARISON
WITH OTHER CITIES?
YES
the three which you
A.) B.) C.)
(cont.)
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As before, circle "1" to "5" representing importance, with "1" representing very important and "5"
representing irrelevent. Also.check "yes" if you would like the data to be compared with other cities.
RANKING OF 1MPORTANCE
DON'T KNOW
11.) FINANCIAL STATISTICS
1.) Total debt outstanding:
2.) Debt per capita ratio:
3.) Funded debt outside of legal debt limit:
4.) Combined debt as a percentage 'of market
value:
5.) Projected capital expenditures for
public facilities:
6.) Average age of public facilities:
7.) Total welfare:
8.) Changes in welfare expenditures in
last 5 years:
9.) Pension liabilities and funding
provisions-
10.) Net indebtedness:
11.) Total state and federal aid to city
and as percentages:
12.) Summary of revenue sources for 5 years:
13.) Statement of assets and liabilities
over 5 years:
14.) Growth of revenues by source over 5 years:
15.) Debt retirement schedule:
16.) Excesses in operating expenditures over
originally approved budgets:
17.) Number of overlapping jurisdictions with
debt issuing capacity:
18.) Records of tax collections compared to
tax acc uals:
Of the eighteen financial characteristics listed
think are most important:
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
12 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
45
1 2 3 4 5
above, please list the numbers of
A.) B.) C.)
t
WOULD YOU LIKE
A COMPARISON
WITH OTHER. CITIES?
YES NO
the three which you
(cont.)
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As before circle "1" to "5" representing inoortance, with "1" reoresentine "very lmoortant" 1 '"5
representing irrelevent. Also check "yes" ir you would like the Uaca to oe compared with other cities.
RANKING 'OF IMPORTANCE - WOULD YOU LIKE
A COIMPARISON
WITH OTHER CITIES?
DON'T KNOW YES NO
11I.) ECONOMIC STATISTICS
1.) Number of industries by type and
dollar value which entered or opened
in last 5 years:
2.) Number of industries by type and dollar
value-which left or closed in last
5 years:
3.) Ten largest industries in the city:
4.) Number of "For'tune 500" firms with
representative offices in the city:
5.) Financial institutions with home offices
in the city, by rank, type, size:
6.) Value of commercial bank deposits:
7.) Cost of living indicators:
8.) Number of strikes in city in last.
5 years affecting major industries:
9.) Percentage of work force which is
union affiliated:
10.) Worker productivity:
11.) Trends in wholesale trade:
12.) Trends in retail trade:
13.) Energy costs:
14.) Commuting trends:
15.) Air-flight tonnage and traffic:
16.) Rail tonnage and traffic:
17.) Shipping tonnage and traffic:
18' Truck tonnage and traffic:
19.) Sector analysis of production:
20.) Unemployment rate:
21.) Labor participation rate:
1 2 3 45
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 .4 5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
4
4
3 4 5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
1 2 3 - 4 5
Of the twenty-one economic characteristics listed above, please
think are the most important:
A.) B.) C.)
list the numbers of the three which you
(cont.)
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As before, citcle "1" to "5"1 representing importance, with "1" representing very important and "5"
repreventing irrelevent. Also check "yes" if you would like the data to be compared with other cities.
RANKING OF IMPORTANCE
IV.) PROPERTY INDICATORS:
1.) Percentage of land publicly owned:
2.) Trends in vacancy rates for commerical
property:
3.) Trends in vacancy rates for residential
property:
4.) Average annual absorption rate of
commercial office space:
5.) Assessed taxable valuation of commercial
property:
6.) Assessed taxable valuation of residential
property:
7.) Estinated market value of commercialproperty:
8.) Estimated market value of residential
property:
9.) Percentages of properties exempt from
taxation by type of property and
adjusted assessment:
-10.) Age of residential housing stock:
DON'T KNOW
Volume of luxury and prestige housing:
Percentage of rental housing which is
owner occupied:
13.) Volume of rental housing:
14.) Changes in types of structures used for
residential purposes:.
15.) Changes in types of structures used for
commercial purposes:
16.) Average '.nveqtment in recently
rehabilitated dwelling units:
17.) Average investment in recently
.rehabilitated office space:
18.) Average value of building permits by
type and volume in last 5 years:
19.) Map showing locations of property uses:
20.) Assessment practice information:
Of the twenty property indicators listed above,
the most iaportant!
A.) B.) C.)-
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 - 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 . 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2
1 2
3 4 5
3 4 5
1 -2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 4 .5 .
WOULD YOU LIKE
A COMPARISON.
WITH OTHER CITIES?
YES NO
please list the numbers of the three which you think are
(cont. ) ,
11.)
12.)
The remainder of this survey is devoted to a few questions dealing with information. They are short and
self-explanatory.
1) Listed below are seven possible sources of information you may use to evaluate the credit worthiness
of a city's specific debt issues. Please rank them in importance with "1" being the most- important.
If you are unable to decide which of two is more important, mark each item with the same number.
(i.e. if both are the second most important items, both would receive a "2".)
A.) Moody's and Standard & Poor's published bond ratings
B.) The prospectus statement of the bond issue
C.) Informal recommendations of colleagues
* E.) In-house research
F.) Yields of comparable issues
G.) Other, please specify:
D.) Limited circulation reports
2.) Listed below are major informational components of a municipat prospectus. PJfase rank'the items
in importance in evaluation of a city's credit worthiness with "1" being the most important group.
As before, if you are unable to decide which of two is more important, mark each item with the same
number.
A.) Analysis of debt and revenue structures
B.) Analysis of expenditures
C.) Analysis of economic trends
D.) Analysis of demographic trend
E.) Statement of bond counsel
F.) Other, please specify:
3.) Has the poor quality of information in a prospectus issue of a municipality, independent of other inputs,
ever detered you from purchasing a security? (check one)
A.) YES B.) NO C.) UNCERTAIN
4.) If the sources of information which you usually rely upon still leave you uncertain as to whether to buy
a specific issue, would you? (check one)
A.) NOT BUY THE BONDS B.) OBTAIN MORE INFORMATION
5.) If you would obtain more information, what source(s) would you go to? (More than one answer may be
appropriate. Check all those which apply.)
A.) The underwriter
C.) Other, please specify
B.) The municipality which is issuing the bonds
D.) I would not bother to look for more information.
6.) Assume that the economic, social and political circumstances of two municipalities are essentially
equivalent and that each is issuing a debt offering in the same time period. If the prospectus of
one municipality is inferior in information content to that of the other, how do you think this will
affect the relative interest rates? (check one)
A.) The municipality with the inferior prospectus will be forced to pay significantly higher
interest rates.
B.) The municipality with the inferior prospectus will be forced to pay somewhat higher interest
rates.
C.) The difference in prospectus informational quality will not affect interest. rates.
D.) Other, please specify:
7.) How much time do you, your staff and/or your client usually spend reviewing a prospectus? (check one)
A.) Less than one hour B.) Several hours C.) More than several hours
Comments on above?
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8.) Would a short document with notice of a bond sale and key information be useful to you if you also
had access to a detailed prospectus? (check one)
A.) YES B.) NO C.) DON'T KNOW
9.) Regarding the composition of your municipal bond portfolio(s), would you please assign approximate
percentages to the following categories: (The total should add to 100%)
A.) Holdings from the municipality (city or town) within which I am located.
B.) Holdings from other municipalities within my state and of my state itself.
C.) Holdings from state and local authorities outside of the state in which I am located.
Dj.) - This question is not applicable.
0.) Further regarding the composition of your municipal bond portfolio(s), would you please assign approximate
percentages to the following categories: (The total should add to 100%)
A.) Bond anticipation notes E.) Moral obligation bonds
B.) Tax anticipation notes F.) General obligation bonds of municipalities
C.) Other revenue anticipation notes G.) General obligation -bonds of state governments
or guaranteed by state governments
D.). Revenue bonds
H.) This question is not applicable.
1.) Leaving aside considerations of yield and risk, are you more reluctant to buy if the issuing municipality
ia located outside of the region of the country in which you are located? (check one)
A.) I am much more reluctant to buy a bond if it is issued from a different area of the country.
B.) I am somewhat more reluctant to buy a bond if it is issued from a different area of the country.
C.) I am indifferent in deciding to buy a bond that it is issued from a different area of the country.
D.) This question is not applicable.
Thank- you for the time and thought you have used in answering this survey.
Do you have any general or specific comments relating to any of the issues raised in this survey?
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Table A-I (1)
Importance of Various Types of Information
According to Results of Indicator Survey
Indicator as listed on survey form
Total debt outstanding
Debt per capita ratio
Funded debt outside of legal debt limit
Net indebtedness
Records of tax collections
compared to tax accruals
Assessed taxable valuation of
commercial property
Summary of revenues sources for five years
Assessed taxable valuation of
residential property
Debt retirement schedule
Excesses in operating expenditures over
originally approved budgets
Ten largest industries in the city
Growth of revenues by source over
five years
Total state.and federal aid to city
and as percentages
Median household income
Estimated market value of commercial
property
Estimated market value of residential
property
Relative . Adjusted
Importance . Mean
Ranking** Importance
(out of 74) Ranking*
1/74 1.2
2/74 1.2
3/74 1.2
4/74 1.3
5/74
6/74
7/74
8/74
9/74
10/74
11/74
12/74
13/74
14/74
15/74
16/74
Category
financial
financial
financial
financial
1.3 financial
1.4 property
1.4 financial
1.4 financial
1.4 financial
1.4 financial
1.5 economic
1.5 financial
1.6 financial
1.6 social
1.6 property
1.6 property
(cont.)
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Table A-I (1) (cont.)
Indicator as listed on survey form
Combined debt as a percentage
of market value
Assessment practice information
Unemployment rate
Projected capital expenditures
for public facilities
Pension liabilities and funding provisions
Total population
Number of overlapping jurisdictions
with debt issuing capacity
Statement of assets and liabilities
over five years
Total welfare
Changes in welfare expenditures
in last five years
Percentages of property exempt from tax-
ation by type of property and adjusted
assessment
Number of industries by type and dollar
value that opened or entered in last
five years
Percentage change in median household
income in last five years
Employment by the city and other govern-
mental units over the last five years
Number of industries by type and dollar
value that left or closed in last
five years
Trends in vacancy rate for
commercial property
Relative
Importance
Ranking**
(out of 74)
17/74
18/74
19/74
20/74
21/74
22/74
23/74
24/74
25/74
26/74
27/74
28/74
29/74
30/74
31/74
32/74
Adjusted
Mean
Importance
Ranking* Category
1.7 financial
1.7 property
1.7 economic
1.7 financial
1.7 financial
1,7 social
1.8 financial
1.9 financial
1.9 financial
2.0 financial
2.0 property
2.0 economic
2.1
2,1
social
social
2.1 economic
2.2 property
(cont.)
(242)
Table A-I (1) (cont.)
Relative
Importance
Ranking**
Indicator as listed on survey form (out of 74)
Average value of building permits by
type and volume in last five years 33/74
Trends in vacancy rates for residential
property 34/74
Racial distributions 35/74
Cost of living indicators 36/74
Value of commercial bank deposits 37/74
Financial institutions with home offices in
the city, by rank, type, size 38/74
Educational level and skilltraining
of work force 39/74
Percentage of land publicly owned 40/74
Migratory trends by economic class 41/74
Energy costs 42/74
Educational level of population 43/74
Average age of public facilities 44/74
Trends in retail trade 45/74
Number of strikes in city in last five
years affecting major industries 46/74
Age of residential hcusing stock 47/74
Labor participation rate 48/74
Percentage of city work force living
inside city limits 49/74
Average annual absorption rate of
commercial office space 50/74
Trends in wholesale trade 51/74
Educational level of population 52/74
Adjusted
Mean
Importance
Ranking** Category
2.2 property
2.3
2.5
2.5
2.5
property
social
economic
economic
2.5 economic
2.6
2.6
2.6
2.6
2.7
2.7
2.7
2.7
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.8
social
property
social
economic
social
financial
economic
economic
property
economic
social
property
economic
social
(cont.)
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Table A-I (1) (cont.)
Indicator as listed on survey form
Percentage of work force that is union
affilitate
Worker productivity
Crime rates
Volume of luxury and prestige housing
Number of "Fortune 500" firms with repre-
sentative offices in the city
Percentage of rental housing that is
owner occupied
Volume of rental housing
Population by age group
Percentage of census tracts with median
incomes above city median
Sector analysis or production
Commuting trends
Average investment in recently rehab-
ilitated dwelling units
Shipping tonnage and traffic
Average investment in recently rehab-
ilitated office space
Rail tonnage and traffic
Map showing location of property uses
Truck tonnage and traffic
Air-flight tonnage and traffic
Changes in types of construction used for
commercial purposes
Changes in types of construction used for
residential purposes
Relative
Importance
Ranking**
(out of 74)
53/74
54/74
55/74
56/74
57/74
58/74
59/74
60/74
61/74
62/74
63/74
66/74
65/74
66/74
67/74
68/74'
69/74
70/74
71/74
72/74
Adjusted
Mean
Importance
Ranking*
2.8
2.9
2.9
3.0
Category
economic
economic
social
property
3.0 economic
3,0
3.0
3.1
3.1
3.3
3.3
property
property
social
social
economic
economic
3.4 property
3.4 economic
3.4
3,4
3.4
3.4
3.4
property
economic
property
economic
economic
3.4 property
3.5 property
(cont.)
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Table A-I (1)(cont.)
Indicator as listed on survey form
Air-quality readings
Average- commute by city work force
Relative Adjusted
Importance Mean
Ranking** Importance
(out of 74 Ranking* Category
73/74
74/74
3.8
3.9
social
social
* The Adjusted Mean Importance Rankings were computed using the survey
results of questions in which the respondents marked "11, "2", "3 ", "4", or
"5" for the importance of each indicator with "1" representing "very impor-
tant" and "5" representing "irrelevent", The mean was computed by averaging
these values, excluding "don't know" responses, and rounded off to two sig-
nificant digits,
** The Relative Importance Rankings were computed by ranking all seventy-
four indicators by their adjusted mean importance rankings using those
values in four significant figures,
(245)
Table A-I (2)
Information for which Comparisons with
other Cities are Most Desired
According to Results of Indicator Survey
Proportion of
Respondents
Desiring
Indicator as listed on survey form Comparison (%)
Median household income* 80
Debt per capita ratio* 80
Unemployment rate* 70
Total debt outstanding* 67
Net indebtedness* 68
Total welfare 66
Cost of living indicators 65
Total state and federal aid to the city and as percentages 65
Combined debt as a percentage of market value 64
Pension liabilities and funding provisions 62
Employment by the city and other governmental units
over the last five years 58
Records of tax collections compared to tax accruals* 58
Funded debt outside of legal debt limit* 56
Crime rates 56
Changes in welfare expenditures in the last five years 55
Trends in vacancy rates for commercial property 54
Educational level of population 54
Energy costs 54
Total population 54
Percentage of property exempt from taxation by type of
property and adjusted assessment 52
(cont.)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(246)
Table A-I (2) (cont.)
Indicator as listed on survey form
Indicator as listed on survey form
Assessed taxabke valuation of commercial property*
Population by age group
Assessed taxable valuation of residential property*
Educational level and skill-training of work force
Trends in vacancy rate for residential property
Proportion of
Respondents
Desiring
Comparisons (%)
52
51
51
51.
50
* Was also rated as one of the twenty-four most important indicators out of
the seventy-four indicators on the survey form
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
0 0
Relative
Importance
Ranking*
(out of 15) Ind
1/15 Median h
2/15 Total pc
3/15 Percenta
income i
4/15 EmploymE
mental u
5/15 Racial d
6/15 Educatio
the wor
7/15 Migrato
Table A-I (3)
Comparisons of Indicator*Survey Results of Relative Importance Rankings
and Frequencies of Mentions as Among Most Important Social Information
Relative
Frequency
of Mentions**
icator as listed on survey form (out of*15) Indicator as listed on sury
ousehold income 1/15 Median household income
pulation 2/15 Total population
ge change in median household 3/15 Percentage change in median household
n last five years income in last five years
nt by the city and other govern- 4/15 Employment by the city and other govern-
nits over the last five years mental units over the last five years
istributions 5/15 Migratory trends by economic class
nal level and skilltrainina of 6/15 Racial distributions
k force
ry trends by economic class 7/15
8/15
9/15
8/15 Educational level of the population
9/15 Percentage of city work force living
inside city limits
10/15 Population density
Educational level and skilltraining of
the work force
Educational level of the population
Population by age group
10/15 Percentage of city work force living
inside city limits
(cont.)
Table A-I (3)
Relative
Importance
Ranking*(out of 15) Indicator as listed on survey form
(cont.)
Relative
Frequency
of Mentions**
(out of 15) Indicator as listed on survey form
11/15 Crime rates 11/15 Crime rates
12/15 Population by age group
13/15 Air-quality readings
14/15 Average commute by city work force
15/15 Percentage of census tracts with median
income above city average
12/15 Population density
Air-quality readings
CL Percentage of census tracts with median
income above city average
15/15 Average commute by city work force
* The Relative Importance Rankings were computed by ranking the indicators by their adjusted mean
importance ratings in each section of the survey.
** The Relative Frequencies of Mentions were computed by dividing the number of respondents who listed each
indicator as one of the three most important indicators in each of the four sections of the survey by the
number of respondents who had answered the question that asked them to rate the importance of that indicator.
Table A-I (4)
Importance Ratings of Social Information According to Results of Indicator Survey
Indicator as listed on survey form
(1) Total population
(2) Population by age group
(3) Migratory trends by economic class
(4) Population density
(5) Educational level of population
(6) Educational level and skilltraining of
work force
(7) Percentage of city work force living
inside city limits
(8) Average commute by city work force
(9) Median household income
(10) Percentage change in median household
income in last five years
(11) Percentage of census'tracts with median
incomes above city median
(12) Crime rates
Number
of
Answers1
169
167
165
164
168
168
168
166
168
168
165
168
Adjusted Standard
Mean Deviation
Importance Importance
Rating 2 Rating 3
1.7
3.1
2.6
2.8
2.7
2.6
2.8
3.9
1.6
2.1
3.1
2.9
1.07
1.23
1.41
1.21
1.22
1.20
1.28
1.03
.79
1.10
1.27
1.29
Number Adjusted
Mentions Frequency
as Most Mentions as
Important4 Most Important5
96
23
43
15
27
33
20
0
104
66
4
17
.49
.14
.26
.09
.16
.20
.12
0
.62
.39
.02
.10
(cont.)
~9-- .- ~ 4
Table A-I (4)
Indicator as listed on survey form
(13) Air-quality readings
(14) Racial distributions
(15) Employment by the city and other
governmental units over the last
five years
Number
of
Answers1
168
73
72
(cont.)
Adjusted
Mean
Importapce
Rating4
3.8
2.5
2.1
Standard
Deviation
Importagce
Rating
Number Adjusted
Mentions Frequency
as Most Mentions as
Important4 Most Important5
1.17
1.26
1.15
.02
.22
.31
1 When asked to rate the indicator's importance on a 1-5 scale
2 Excludes "Don't Know" responses and uses a gradient from "1"="most important" to "5"="irrelevent"
3 Computed using the adjusted mean importance rating and the frequencies of each response from "1" to "5"
representing importance
4 In response to a question at the end of the social indicators section asking which three of the fifteen
population and other indicators are the most important
5 Number of mentions as one of the three most important divided by the number of answers to the question
asking respondents to rate the importance of that indicator
90
Table A-I (5)
Indicator Survey Results on the Desirability of Comparing Social and other Characteristics with other Cities
Number of / Count / Frequency /
Indicator as listed on survey form Answers YES NO YES(%) NO(Yf)
(1) Total population 108 58 50 54 46
(2) Population by age group 105 54 51 51 49
(3) Migratory trends by economic class 99 45 54 45 55
(4) Population density 96 46 50 48 52
(5) Eductional level of population 105 57 48 54 46
(6) Educational level and skill-training
of work force
(7) Percentage of city work force
living inside city limits
(8) Average commute by city work force
(9) Median household income
(10) Percentage change in median household
income in last five years
(11) Percentage of census tracts with median
incomes above city median
(12) Crime rates
(13) Air-quality readings
101
102
88
119
113
86
99
96 (cont.)
0 *
Table A-I,(5) (cont.)
Indicator as listed on survey form
Number of
Answers
/~Count 7
YES NO
/.Frequency_/
YES(%) NO(%)
(14) Racial distributions*
(15) Employment by the city an other governmental
units over the last five years*
* Listed on the survey form on only the second mailing
Relative
Importance
Ranking*
(out of 18)
1/18 Total
2/18 Debt
3/18 Funde
4/18 Net i
5/18 Recor
tax a
6/18 Summa
years
7/18 Debt
8/18 Exces
origi
9/18 Growt
Table A-I (6)
Comparisons of Indicator Survey Results of Relative Importance Rankings
and Frequencies of Mentions as Among Most Important Financial Information
Relative
Frequency
of Mentions**
Indicator as listed on survey form (out of 18) Indicator as listed on survey form
debt outstanding 1/18 Total debt outstanding
per capita ratio Debt per capita ratio
d debt outside of legal debt limit Net indebtedness
ndebtedness - Combined debt as a percentage of
market value
ds of tax collections compared to Summary of revenue sources over five
ccruals years
ry of revenue sources over five Excesses in operating expenditures over
originally approved budgets
retirement schedule 7/18 Number of overlapping jurisdictions with
debt-issuing capacity
ses in operating expenditures over Records of tax collections compared to
nally approved budgets tax accruals
h of revenues by source over five Debt retirement schedule
years
10/18 Total state and federal aid to the
city and as percentages 0-A
Funded debt outside of legal debt limit
(cont.)
Table A-I (6) (cont.)
Relative
Importance
Ranking*
(out of 18) Indicator as listed on survey form
11/18 Combined debt as a percentage of
market value
12/18 Projected capital expenditures for
public facilities
13/18 Pension liabilities and funding provisions
14/18 Number of overlapping jurisdictions with
debt issuing capacity
15/18 Statement of assets and liabilities
over five years
16/18 Total welfare
17/18 Changes in welfare expenditures
in last five years
18/18 Average age of public facilities
* The Relative Importance Rankings were computed by ranking the
ratings in each section of the survey.
Relative
Frequency
of Mentions**
(out of 18) Indicator as listed on survey form
11/18 Pension liabilities and funding provisions
12/18 Growth of revenues by source over five
years
13/18 Statement of assets and liabilities
over five years
14/18 Total state and federal aid to the
city and as percentages
15/18 Projected capital expenditures for
public facilities
16/18 Total welfare
17/18 Changes in welfare expenditures
in last five years
18/18 Average age of public facilities
indicators by their adjusted mean importance
** The Relative Frequencies of Mentions were computed by dividing the number of respondents who listed each
indicator as one of the three most important indicatorspf each of the four sections of the survey by the
number of respondents who had answered the question that asked them to rate the importance of that indicator.
Table A-I (7)
Importance Ratings of Financial Information According to Results of Indicator Survey
Adjusted Standard Number
Number Mean Deviation Mentions
of Importance Importance as Most
Indicator as listed on survey form Answersi Rating 2  Rating3  Important4 M
Total debt outstanding 166 1.2 .52 86
Debt per capita ratio 167 1.2 .51 .42
Funded debt outside of legal debt limit 165 1.3 .56 24
(4) Combined debt as a percentage of
market value
(5) Projected capital expenditures for
public facilities
(6) Average age of public facilities
(7) Total welfare
(8) Change in welfare expenditures in
last five years
(9) Pension liabilities and funding provisions
(10) Net indebtedness
(11) Total state and federal aid to city
and as percentages
(12) Summary of revenue sources for five years
167
167
166
165
164
166
166
165
166
1.7
1.7
2.7
2.0
2.0
1.7
1.3
1.6
1.4
1.04
.78
.98
1.03
1.11
.92
.65
.74
.67
Adjusted
Frequency
Mentions as
ost Important5
.52
.25
.15
.20
.08
.02
.05
.04
.14
.25
.08
.20
(cpnt.)
(1)
(2)
(3)
c-I,
0~
0 0
Table A-I (7) (cont.)
Indicator as listed on survey form
(13) Statement of assets and liabilities
over five years
(14) Growth of revenues by source over
five years
(15) Debt retirement schedule
(16) Excesses in operating expenditures over
originally approved budgets
(17) Numbers of overlapping jurisdictions
with debt issuing capacity
(18) Records of tax collections compared
to tax accruals
Number
of
Answers1
166
166
166
167
166
Adjusted Standard
Mean Deviation
Importance Importa ce
Rating 2 Rating9
1.9
1.5
1.4
1.4
1.8
1.3
1.06
.68
.64
.67
1.01
.57
Number Adjusted
Mentions Frequency
as Most Mentions as
Important4 Most Important5
.10
.11
.15
.20
.16
.15
1 When asked to rate the indicator's importance on a 1-5 scale
2 Excludes "Don't Know" responses and uses a gradient from "1"="most important" to "5"="irrelevent"
3 Computed using the adjusted mean. importance rating and the frequencies of each response from "1" to "5"
representing importance
4 In response to a question at the end of the financial indicators section asking which three of the eighteen
financial indicators are the most important
5 Number of mentions as one of the three most important divided by the number of answers to the question
asking respondents to rate the importance of that indicator
9
Table A=I (8)
Indicator Survey Results on the Desirability of Comparing Financial Indicators with other Cities
Number of / Count / /-Frequency_/
dicator as listed on survey form Answers YEi NO YES(%) NO(
tal debt outstanding 98 66 32 67 33
bt per capita ratio 112 89 23 80 21
nded debt outside of legal debt limit 91 51 40 56 44
mbined debt as a percentage of market value 98 63 35 64 36
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
86
82
96
92
96
98
101
88
87
33
26
63
51
59
67
66
42
31
53
56
33
41
37
31
35
46
39
32
66
55
62
68
65
48
Projected capital expenditures for
public relations
Average age of public faci.lties
Total welfare
Changes in welfare expenditures
in last five years
Pension liabilities and funding provisions
Net indebtedness
Total state and federal aid to city
and as percentages
Summary of revenue sources for five years
Statement of assets and liabilities
over five years
In
To
De
Fu
Co
36 64 (cont.)
'~'
0Table A-I (8) (cont.)
Indicator as listed on survey form
Number of
Answers
/ Count 7
YES N0
/ Frequency 7
YES(%) NO(%)
(14) Growth of revenues by source over five years
(15) Debt retirement schedule
(16) Excesses in operating expenditures over
originally approved budgets
(17) Number of overlapping jurisdictions
with debt issuing capacity
(18) Records of tax collections compared to
tax accruals *
* Listed on the survey form on only the second mailing
0Relative
Importance
Ranking*(out of 21) Inc
1/21 Ten larg
2/21 Unemploy
3/21 Number c
value th
years
4/21 Number c
value th
years
5/21 Cost of
6/21 Value of
7/21 Financia
in the c
8/21 Energy c
9/21 Trends i
Table A-I (9)
Comparisons of Indicator Survey Results of Relatiye Importance Rankings
and Frequencies of Mentions as Among Most Important Economic Information
Relative
Frequency
of Mentions**
icator as listed on survey form (out of 21) Indicator as listed on survey form
est industries in the city 1/21 Ten largest industries in the city
rment rate 2/21 Unemployment rate
f industries by type and dollar 3/21 Number of industries by type and dollar
at opened or entered in last five, value that opened or entered in last five
years
f industries by type and dollar 4/21 Number of industries by type and dollar
at left or closed in last five value that left or closed in last five
years
living indicators 5/21 Cost of living indicators
commercial bank deposits 6/21 Value of commercial bank deposits
l institutions with home offices 7/21 Financial institutions with home offices
ity, by rank, type, size in the city, by rank, type, size
osts 8/21 Worker productivity
n retail trade 9/21 Number of strikes in city in last five
years affecting major industries
(cont.)
Table A-I (9)
Relative
Importance
Ranking*(out of 21) Indicator as listed on survey form
10/21 Number of strikes in last five years
affecting major industries
11/21 Labor participation rate
12/21 Trends in wholesale trade
13/21 Percentage of work force that is
union affiliated
14/21 Worker productivity
15/21 Number of "Fortune 500" firms with
representative offices in the city
Relative
Frequency
of Mentions**
(out of 21) Indicator as listed'on survey form
C' - Energy costs
rNO 1W
Number of "Fortune 500" firms with
representative offices in the city
12/21
r%) ~)
~ ~
0~
15/21
16/2116/21 Sector analysis of production
17/21 Commuting trends
18/21 Shipping tonnage and traffic
19/21 Rail tonnage and traffic
"
NO?*
El
Percentage of work force that is
union affiliated
Sector analysis of production
Labor participation rate
Trends in retail trade
Trends in wholesale trade
Commuting trends
Air-flight tonnage and traffic
Rail tonnage and traffic
(cont.)
N,
(cont. )
Table A-I (9) (cont.)
Relative
Importance
Ranking*
(out of 21) Indicator as listed on'survey form
Relative
Frequency
of Mentions**
(out of 21) Indicator as listed on survey form
20/21 Truck tonnage and traffic
21/21 Air-flight tonnage
20/21 Shipping tonnage and traffic
21/21
* The Relative Importance Rankings were computed by ranking the
importance ratings in each section of the survey
Truck tonnage and traffic
indicators by their adjusted mean
** The Relative Frequencies of Mentions were computed by dividing the number of respondents who listed each
indicator as one of the three most important indicators of each of the four sections of the survey by the
number of respondents who had answered the question that asked them to rate the importance of that indicator.
Table A-I (10)
Importance Ratings of Economic Information According to Results of Indicator Survey
Adjusted Standard Number Adjusted
Number Mean Deviation Mentions Frequency
of Importance Importance as Most Mentions as-
Indicator as listed on survey form Answers1  Rating 2  Rating3  Important4 Most Important5
(1) Number of industries by type and dollar
value that opened or entered in last
five years 167 2.1 .99 68 .41
(2) Number of industries by type and dollar
value that left or closed in last
five years 165 2.1 1.07 51 .31
(3) Ten largest industries in the city 166 1.5 .86 113 .68
(4) Number of "Fortune 500" firms with
representative offices in the city,
by rank, type, size 164 3.0 1.26 15 .09
(5) Financial institutions with home offices
in the city, be rank, type, size 165 2.5 1.10 24 .15
(6) Value of commercial bank deposits 167 2.5 1.10 16 .16
(7) Cost of living indicators 166 2.5 1.17 28 .17
(8) Number of strikes in city in last five
years affecting major industries 167 2.7 1.16 24 .14
(9) Percentage of work force that is
union affiliated 167 2,8 1.22 23 .07
(10) Worker productivity 166 2.9 1.26 20 .12
(cont.)
Table A-I (10) (cont.)
Indicator as listed on survey form
Trends in wholesale trade
Trends in retail trade
Energy costs
Commuting trends
Air flight tonnage and traffic
Rail tonnage and traffic
Shipping tonnage 'and traffic
Truck tonnage and traffic
Sector analysis of production
Unemployment rate
Labor participation rate
Number
of
Answers'
167
167
167
166
167
167
167
166
166
74
73
Adjusted
Mean,
Importance
Ratingj2
2.8
2.7
2,6
3,3
3.4
3.4
3,4
3,4
3,3
1.7
2.8
Standard
Deviation
Importange
Rating'
1.12
1.15
1.18
1.14
1.16
1,16
1,17
1.16
1.30
.91
1.25
Number Adjusted
Mentions Frequency
as Most 4 Mentions as
Important Most Important
5 .03
6 .04
15 .09
2 .01
2 .01
2 .01
0 0
0 0
8 .05
35 .47
4 .05
(cont.)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)'
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
Table A-I (10) (cont.)
1 When asked to rate the indicator's importance on a 1-5 scale
2 Excludes "Don';t Know" responses and uses a gradient from "1"="most important" to "5"="irrelevent"
3 Computed using the adjusted mean importance rating and the frequencies of each response from "1" to "5"
representing importance
In response to a question at the end of the economic indicators section asking which three of the twenty-
one economic indicators are the most important
5 Number of mentions as one of the three most important divided by the number of answers to the question
asking respondents to rate the importance of that indicator
aTable A-I (11)
Indicator Survey Results on the Desirability of Comparing Economic Indicators with other Cities
Number of /TCount / /~FreauencvT
Indicator as listed on survey form
(1) Number of industries by type and dollar
value that opened or entered in last
five years
(2) Number of industries by type and dollar
value that left or closed in last
five years
(3) Ten largest industries in the city
(4) Number of "Fortune 500" firms with
representative offices in-the city
(5) Financial instituions with home offices
in the city, by rank, type, size
(6) Value of commercial bank deposits
(7) Cost of living indicators
(8) Number of strikes in city in last five years
affecting major industries
(9) Percentage of work-force that is
union-affiliated
(10) Worker productivity
(11) Trends in wholesale trade.
Answers YES NO YES(%) NOi%)
(cont.)
40 OD
Indicator as listed on survey form
Trends in retail trade
Energy costs
Commuting trends
Air-flight tonnage and traffic
Rail tonnage and traffic
Shipping tonnage and traffic
Truck tonnage and traffic
Sector analysis of production
Unemployment rate*
Labor participation rate*
Table A-I (11) (cont.)
Number of LCountl
Answers YE NO
86 37 49
89 48 41
76 17 59
77 24 53
77 23 54
77 23 54
75 21 54
75 22 53
46 32 14
41 18 23
/Frequency_/
YES(%) NO(%)
43 57
54 46
22 78
31 69
30 70
30 70
28 72
29 71
70 30
44 56
* Listed on the survey form on only the second mailing
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
Table A-I (12)
Comparisons of Indicator $urvey Results of Relative Importance Rankings
and Frequencies of Mentions as Among Most Important Property Information
Relative
Importance
Ranking*
(out of 20) Indicator as listed on survey form
Relative
Frequency
of Mentions**
(out of 20) Indicator as listed on survey form
1/20 Assessed taxable valuation of commercial
property
2/20 Assessed taxable valuation of residential
property
Estimated market value of commercial
property
Estimated market value of residential
property
5/20 Assessment practice information
6/20 Percentages of property exempt from taxation
by type of property and adjusted assessment
7/20 Trends in vacancy rates for commercial
property
8/20 Average value of building permits by type
and volume in last five years
1/20
2/20
3/20
4/20
Assessed taxable valuation of commercial
property
Assessed taxable valuation of residential
property
Estimated market value of commercial
property
Assessment practice information
Trends in vacancy rates for commercial
property
Estimated market value of commercial
____ property
7/20
8/20
Percentages of property exempt from tax-
ation by type of property and adjusted
assessment
Average value of building permits by type
and volume in last five years
(cont.)
Table A-I (12), (cont.)
Relative
Importance
Ranking* -
(out of 20) Indicator as listed on survey form
Relative
Frequency
of Mentions**
(out of 20) Indicator as listed on survey form
9/20 Trends in vacancy rates for residential
property
10/20 Percentage of land publicly owned
11/20 Percentage of land publicly owned
12/20 Average annual absorption rate for
commercial office space
13/20 Volume of luxury and prestige housing
14/20 Percentage of rental housing that is
owner occupied-
15/20 Volume of rental housing
16/20 Average investment in recently
rehabilitated office space
17/20 Average investment in recently
dwelling units
18/20 Map showing location of property uses
t-h
N),
a0
CD
Percentage of land publicly owned
Trends in vacancy rates for residential
property
Age of residential housing stock
Average annual absorption rate for
commercial office space
13/20 Average investment in recently
rehabilitated office space
I-h
(31
I-A
Percentage of rental housing that is
owner occupied
Volume of rental housing
Average investment in recently
rehabilitated dwelling units
Map showing location of property uses
18/20 Changes in types of structures used
for commercial purposes
(cont.)
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Table A-I (12) (cont.)
Relative
Importance
Ranking*(out of 20) Indicator as listed on survey form
19/20 Changes in types of structures used
for commercial purposes
20/20 Changes in types of structures used
for residential purposes
Relative
Frequency
of Mentions**
(out of 20)- Indicator as listed on survey form
Changes in types of structures used
for residential purposes
Changes in types of structures used
for commercial purposes
N)
CD
* The Relative Importance Rankings were computed by ranking the indicators
importance ratings in each section of the survey.
by their adjusted mean ,
** The Relative Frequencies of Mentions were computed by dividing the number of respondents who listed each
indicator as one of the three most important indicators in each of the four sections-of the survey by the
number of respondents who had answered the question that asked them to rate the importance of that indicator.
Table A-I (13)
Importance Ratings of Property Information According to Results of Indicator Survey
Adjusted Standard Number Adjusted
Number Mean Deviation Mentions Frequency
of Importance Importance as Most Mentions as
Indicator as listed on survey form Answers Rating2  Rating3  Important4 Most Important5
(1) Percentage of land publicly owned 165 2.6 20 .12
(2) Trends in vacancy rates for commercial
property 165 2.2 1.12 35 .21
(3) Trends in vacancy rates for residential
property 169 2.3 1.11 20 .12
(4) Average annual absorption rate of
commercial office space 170 2.8 1.10 6 .04
(5) Assessed taxable valuation of
commercial property 165 1.4 .70 88 .53
(6) Assessed taxable valuation of
residential property 153 1.4 .73 79 .52
(7) Estimated market value of
commercial property 165 1.6 .90 58 .35
(8) Estimated market value of
residential property 165 1.6 .90 35 .21
(9) Percentages of property exempt from
taxation by type of property and
adjusted assessment 163 2.0 1.07 33 .20
(cont.)
Table A-I (13) (cont.)
Indicator as listed on survey form
Number
of
Answers1
Adjusted
Mean
Importa ce
Rating2
Standard
Deviation
Importance
Rating 3
Number
Mentions
as Most
Important4
Adjusted
Frequency
Mentions as
Most Important 5
(10) Age of residential housing stock
(11) Volume of luxury and prestige housing
(12) Percentage of rental housing that
is owner-occupied
(13) Volume of rental housing
(14) Changes in types of structures
for residential purposes
(15) Changes in types of structures
for commercial purposes.
(16) Average investment in recently
rehabilitated dwelling units
(17)
used
used
Average investment in recently
rehabilitated office space
(18) Average value of building permits
by type and volume in last
five years
.04
0
.01
.01
165
164
160
163
164
164
164
162
164
2.8
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.5
3.5
3.4
3.3
2.2
1.05
1.02
1.15
1.03
.98
1.06
.08
2.08
1.13
.01
.01
.02
.16
(cont.)
Indicator as listed on survey form
(19) Map showing location of property uses
(20) Assessment Practice Information
Table A-I (13) (cont.)
Adjusted Standard
Number Mean Deviation
of Importance Importance
Answers1  Rating2  Rating3
162 3.4 1.31
70 1.7 .98
Number Adjusted
Mentions Frequency
as Most Mentions as
Important4 Most Important5
2 .01
21 .30
When asked to rate the indicator's importance on a 1-5 scale
2 Excludes "Don't Know" responses and uses a gradient from "1"="most important" to "5"="irrelevent"
3 Computed using the adjusted mean importance rating and the frequencies of each response from "1" to "5"
representing importance
4 In response to a question at the end of the property indicators section asking which of the twenty
-property indicators are most important
Number of mentions as one of the three most important divided by the number of answers to the question
asking respondents to rate the importance of that indicator
0*- S
Q_ 0
Tabl
Indicator Survey Results on the Desirability o
Nu
Indicator as listed on survey form A
(1) Percentage of land publicly owned
(2) Trends in vacancy rates for commercial property
(3) Trends in vacancy rates for residential property
(4) Average annual absorption rate of
commercial office space
(5) Assessed taxable valuation of
commercial property
(6) Assessed taxable valuation of
residential property
(7) Estimated market value of
commercial property
(8) Estimated market value of
residential property
(9) Percentages of property exempt from taxation
by type of property. and adjusted assessment
(10) Age of residential housing stock
(11) Volume of luxury and prestige housing
(12) Percentage of rental housing that is
owner-occupied
e A-I (14)
f Comparing Property Indicators with other Cities
nber of / Count 7 / Frequencyj
nswers YES NO YES(%) NO(%)
91 41 50 45 55
94 51 43 54 46
92 46 46 50 50
67
48
49
55
54
47
62
73
64
(cont.)
9 9 0 9
Table A-I (14) (cont.)
Indicator as listed on survey form
(13) Volume of rental housing
(14) Changes in types of structures used
for residential purposes
(15) Changes in types of structures used
for commercial purposes
(16) Average investment in recently
rehabilitated dwelling units
(17) Average investment in recently
rehabilitated office space
(18) Average value of building permits
by type and volume in last five years
(19) Map showing location of property uses
(20) Assessment practice information*
Number of
Answers
79
74
74
77
76
89
76
40
/ Count 7-
YES NO
24 55
/ Frequency
YES(%) NO(%)
30 70
17
19
29
32
49
18
45
* Listed on the survey form on only the second mailing
9 9 *0 9.0
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Table A-I (15)
Results of Questions on the Indicator Survey
Concerning Information Use
(1) Listed below are seven possible sources of information you may use
to evaluate the credit worthiness of a city's specific bond issues.
Please rank them in importance with "1" being the most important.
If you are unable to decide which of two is more important, mark
each item with the same number (i.e. if both are the most important
items, both would receive a "2".)
(A) Moody's and Standard & Poor's published bond ratings:
Mean =.2.25, Standard Deviation = 1.30
Count Frequency (%)
Citations
Citations
Citations
Citations
Citations
Citations
Ci tati ons
importance of "1"
importance of "2"
importance of "3"
importance of "4"
importance of "5"
importance of "6"
importance of "7"
(B) The prospectus statement of the bond issue:
Mean = 1.51, Standard Deviation = .94
Count Frequency (%)
Citations as
Citations as
Citations as
Citations as
Citations as
Citations as
Citations as
importance of "1"
importance of "2"
importance of "3"
importance of "4"
importance of "5"
importance of "6"
importance of "7"
110
36
11
3
1
1
1
110
22
7
2
1
1
1
(C) Informal recommendations of colleagues:
Mean = 4;44, Standard Deviation = 1.62
Count-
Ci tati ons
Citations
Citations
Citations
Citations
Citations
Ci tati ons
Frequency (%)
as importance of "1"
as importance of "2"
as importance of "3"
as importance of "4"
as importance of "5"
as importance of "6"
as importance of "7"
(cont.)
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Table A-I (15) (cont.)
Limited circulation reports:
Mean = 4.06, Standard Deviation = 1.44
Frequency (%)Count
importance of "1"
importance of "2"
importance of "3"
importance of "4"
importance of "5"
importance of "6"
importance of "7"
5
12
17
21
31
15
1
In-house research:
Mean = 2.80, Standard Deviation = 1.32
Frequency (%)
Citations as
Citations as
Citations as
Citations as
Citations as
Citations as
Citations as
importance of "1"
importance of "2"
importance of "3"
importance of "4"
importance of "5"
importance of "6"
importance of "7"
20
49
42
18
10
6
1
(F) Yields of comparable issues:
Mean = 3.97, Standard Deviation = 2.22
Count Frequency (%)
Citations as
Citations as
Citations as
Citations as
Citations as
Citations as
Citations as
importance of "1"
importance of "2"
importance of "3"
importance of "4"
importance of "5"
importance of "6"
importance of "7"
(G) Other:
Count
Citations as importance of "1"
Citations as importance of "2"
Citations as importance of "3"
Frequency (%)
40
30
30
(cont.)
(1) (D)
Citations
Citations
Citations
Citations
Citations
Citations
Citations
(E)
Count
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Table A-I (15) (cont.)
(2) Listed below are the major informational components of a municipal
prospectus. Please rank the items in importance in evaluation of
a city's credit worthiness with "1" being the most important group.
As before, if you are unable to decide which of two is more important,
mark each item with the same number.
(A) Analysis of debt and revenue structure:
Mean 1.16, Standard Deviation = .46
Count Frequency (%)
Citations as importance of "1" 144 88
Citations as importance of "2" 14 9
Citations as importance of "3" 6 4
(B) Analysis of expenditures:
Mean = 2.12, Standard Deviation = .81
Count Frequency (%)
Citations as importance of "1" 36 22
Citations as importance of "2" 81 50
Citations as importance of "3" 37 23
Citations as importance of "4" 9 5
(C) Analysis of economic trends:
Mean = 2.44, Standard Deviation = .90
Count Frequency (%)
Citations as importance of "1" 27 17
Citations as importance of "2" 51 32
Citations as importance of "3" 68 43
Citations as importance of "4" 12 8
Citations as importance of "5" 2 1
(D) Analysis of demographic trends:
Mean = 3.49, Standard Deviation = 1.13
Count Frequency (%)
Citations as importance of "1" 10 7
Citations as importance of "2" 20 14
Citations as importance of "3" 26 18
Citations as importance of "4" 68 47
Citations as importance of "5" 20 14
Citations as importance of "6" 1 1
(cont.)
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Table A-I (15) (cont.)
(2) (D) Statement of bond counsel:
Mean = 4.14, Standard Deviation = 1.23
Count Frequency (%)
Citations as importance of "1" 8 6
Citations as importance of "2" 7 5
Citations as importance of "3" 17 13
Citations as importance of "4" 26 20
Citations as importance of "5" 67 52
Citations as importance of "6" 3 2
(E) Other:
Count Frequency (%)
Citations as importance of "1" 3 17
Citations as importance of "2" 2 11
Citations as importance of "3" 1 6
Citations as importance of "4" 0 0
Citations as importance of "5" 2 11
Citations as importance of "6" 10 57
(3) Has the poor quality of information in a prospectus issue of a munici-
pality, independent of other inputs, ever detered you from purchasing
a security?
Response Count Frequency (%)
Yes 120 74
No 22 13
Uncertain 23 13
* (4) If the sources of information which you usually rely upon still leave
you encertain as to whether to buy a specific issue, would you?
Response Count Frequency (%)
Not buy the bonds 73 44
Obtain more information 92 56
(cont.)
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Table A-I (15) (cont.)
(5) If you would obtain more information, what source(s) would you go
to? (More than one answer may be appropriate. Check all those
which apply.)
Proportion of
Respondents Citing
Response Count Frequency (%) as Source (%)
The underwriter 118 43 98
The municipality that
is issuing the bonds 110 40 91.
Other 27 10 22
Would not bother
to look for more
information: 18 7 15
(6) Assume that the economic, social, and political circumstances of two
municipalities are essentially equivalent and that each is issuing a
debt offering in the same time period. If the propsectus of one
municipality is inferior in information content to that of the other,
how do you think this will affect the relative interest rates?
(check one)
Response Count Frequency (%)
The municipality with the inferior prospectus
will be forced to pay significantly higher
interest rates. 30 19
The municipality with the inferior prospectus
will be forced to pay somewhat higher .
interest rates 91 54
The difference in prospectus quality will
not affect interest rates 27 17
Other 12 8
(cont.)
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Table A-1 (15) (cont.)
(7)* How much time do you, your staff, and/or you client usually spend
reviewing a prospectus? (check one)
Response Count Frequency (%)
Less than one hour 41 62
Several hours 22 33
More than several hours 3 5
(8)* Would a short document with notice of a bond sale and key information
be useful to you if you also had access to a detailed prospectus?
(check one)
Response Count Frequency (%)
Yes 65 85
No 5 7
Don't know 6 8
(9) Regarding the composition of your municipal bond portfolio(s), would
you please assign approximate percentages to the following categories:
(The total should add to 100%)
(A) Holdings from the municipality (city or two) within which
I am located.
(B) Holdings from other municipalities within my state and of
ny state itself.
(C) Holdings from state and local authorities outside of the
state in which I am located.
(D) This question is not applicable.
Results: This question. received a wide range of responses showing
no particular biases with most holding a large proportion
of nonlocal bonds.
* These questions were included on the survey form in only the second mailing.
(cont.)
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Table A-1 (15) (cont.)
(10) Further regarding the composition of your municipal bond portfolio(s),
would you please assing approximate percentages to the following
categories: (The total should add to 100%)
(A) Bond anticipation notes
(B) Tax anticipation notes
(C) Other revenue anticipation notes
(D) Revenue bonds
(E) Moral obligation bonds
(F) General obligation bonds of municipalities
(G) General obligation bonds of state governments or guaranteed
by state governments
(H) This question is not applicable.
Results: This question received a wide range of responses showing
no particular biaseswith most holding a large proportion
of revenue bonds and general obligation bonds of munici-
palities.
(11) Leaving aside considerations of yield and risk, are you more reluctant
to buy if the issuing municipality is located outside of the region
of the country in which you are located? (check one)
Response Count Frequency (%)
I am somewhat more reluctant to buy a bond
if it is issued from a different area of
the country. 24 16
I am much more reluctant to buy a bond if
it is issued from a different area of the
country 45 34
I am indifferent in deciding to buy a bond
that it is issued from a different area
of the country 65 49
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Appendix II
Survey Form and Tabulated Results of
The Perceptions Survey
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CITY OF BOSTON
OFFICE OF THE TREASURER
CITY HALL, BOSTON
JAMES V. YOUNG
TREASURER
June 23, 1976
Dear Municipal Bond Investor:
Earlier this year we asked you to complete a questionnaire
identical to the one attached, to help us identify investor
perceptions of the City of Boston. As we ncted then, the
Treasury Department of the City of Boston is fortunate to
have the assistance of a graduate student team from the Mass-
achusetts Institute of Technology in carrying out this survey
and analyzing the results. While we are heartened by the
substantial response to our first mailing, we nevertheless
would like to enlarge our data base, and once again ask for
your cooperation and encourage you to complete the questionn-
aire as the results of this survey will help Boston shape and
strengthen the disclosure information which accompanies its
municipal bond issues.
We would prefer to receive your answers as soon as possible.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Si erely,
J mes V. Y un
ollector- e surer
ity of Bost
Kent Col on
Assistant Professor of
Urban Studies and Planning
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
JVY/ja
SURVEY OF INVESTOR PERCEPTIONS OF BOSTON
This survey is intended to find out what investors think about Boston. Its purpose is to see if Boston
could present itself more accurately in prospectus statements and other literature. All data will be
analyzed in aggregate form in confidence. Most of the questions ask only your opinion.
1.) Have you ever been to Boston? (check one)
A.) MANY TIMES B.) SEVERAL TIMES C.) ONCE D.) NEVER
E.) HAVE LIVED IN BOSTON OR BOSTON AREA
2.) What are your perceptions about how the city of Boston's property values in'residential neighborhoods
are changing relative to property values in other cities? (check one)
A.) Residential property values in the city of Boston are rising faster than those in other cities.
B.) Residential property values in the city of Boston are changing evenly with those in other cities.
C.) Residential property values in the' city of Boston are lagging behindthdse in other cities.
3.) How attractive do you consider investments in real property in the city..of Boston to be? (check one)
A.) Investments in real, property in the city of Boston are more attractive than those in other cities.
B.) Investments in real property in the city of Boston are on par with those in other cities.
C.) investments in real property in the city of Boston are less attractive than those in other cities.
4.) Which, if any, do you perceive as- significant problems which the city of Boston must resolve to maintain
economic prosperiety? (check "problem" if you think the factor is a problem, check "not a problem"
if you think that the factor is not a problem, or check "don't know" -f you don't feel qualified to give
an opinion.)
PROBLEM NOT A PROBLEM DON'T KNOW
A.), Decline in manufacturing:
B.) Revaluation issues:
C.) Pension liabilities of city employeest
D.) Federal and state aid cutbacks:
E.) Cutbacks in military facilities:
F.) Carrying costs on existing city c.sbt:
G.) School administration and desegregation:
H.) Other, please specify
(Cont.)
5.) How would you rate the current situatiotis in the following areas in the city of Boston? (Circle
"1" if you rate to situation to be "very good", circle "5" if you rate the situation to be "very
poor", circle "2", "3", or "4" if you rate the situation to be "good", "average compared to other
cities", or "poor". Check'"don't know" if you don't feel qualified to give an opinion.)
VERY AVER- VERY
GOOD GOOD AGE POOR POOR DON'T KNOW
A.) Business activities: 1 2 3 4 5
B.) Public safety: 1 2 3 4 5
C.) Educational levels:: 1 2 3 4 5
D.) Medical care facilities: 1 2 3 4 5
E.) Effectiveness of city government: 1 2 3 4 5
F.) Quality of life/envi.ronment: 1 2 3 4 5
G.) Recreation, cultural facilities, art: 1 2 3 4 5
H.) Transportation and road systems: 1 2 3 4 5
6.) How do you perceive population trends in Boston? (check all appropriate categories)
A.) Significant out-migration to suburbs of Boston 0o
B.) Significant in-migration
C.) Stable population levels
D.) Significant out-migration to other areas than Boston area
E.) Stable population levels, but significantly changing population composition
F.) Don't know
7.) Are Boston's environmental qualities an economic asset? A.) YES, B.) NO, C.) DON'T KNOW
If you answered "YES" to the above, could you give an example?
8.) Are Boston's cultural amenities an econotic asset? 'A.) YES, B.) NO, C.) DON'T KNOW,
If you answered "YES" to the above, could ) u give an example?
(cont.)
0 0
9.) Please comp :e Boston to the following cities on'general economic characteristics: (check "better" if
you think that Bosto'n's economy is generally better than ~the'c i7nomyothat city, check "worse" if
you think that Boston's economy is not as good as that city's, check "similar" if the general.characteristics
of Boston's economy and that of the other city's seem to balance out,' or check "don't know" Af you don't
feel qualified to give an opinion.)
BETTER WORSE SIMILAR DON'T KNOW BETTER WORSE SIMILAR
A.) Atlanta - - -- H.) Milwaukee
. B.) ,Cincinnati I.) New Orleans .
C.) Cleveland -- . . .) Newark. --
D.) Dallas K.) Philadelphia ,
- 2.) betroit . . L.) Pittsburg
F.) Houston .......... X.) St. Louis
G.) Kansas City -- N.) San Francisco
10.) Please compare Boston to the' following cities on general quality of life as a city to live, work, or visit in:(check "better if you think that the quality of life in Boston' is generally better than the quality of life in
the other city, check "worse" if you think that Boston's life qualities are not as good as that of the other
city, check "similar" if the general characteristics of Boston's life qualities and that of the other city
seem to balance out, or check "don't know" if you don't feel qualified to give an opinion.)
BETTER WORSE SIMILAR DON'T X(1OW BETTER WORSE SIMILAR Do
A.) Atlanta H.) Milwaukee - .
B.) Cincinnati I.) Ncw Orleans
' C.) Cleveland -J.) Newark
D.) Dallas K.) Philadelphia .
Detroit
Houston
Kansas City
L.)
M.).
N.)
Pittsburg
St. Louis
San Francisco
E.)
F.).
G.)
(cont.)
N'T KNOW
011.) How would you project the following factors in the eity of Boston in the next five years? (check "much
greater" if you expect it to be much greater than current levels, "greater" if you expect it to be so,
"current" if you expect it to be very similar to the current situation, or "don't know" if you don't
feel qualified to give an opinion.)
MUCH
GREATER GREATER CURRENT LESS THAN DON I T KNOW
Economic well-being of major retail business:
Economic well-being of manufactoring industries:
Economic well-being of financial institutions:
Economic well-being of high technology, R.&D.
industries and specialized consulting firms:
Popularity ae'a convention location:
Popularity .as a home office location:
Overall population levels:
Would you consider buying a new issue of Boston'i
A.) YES B.) NO C.)
13.) In making your decision as to.whether or not to
addition to bond yield) af fect your decision?
s bonds if you were in the market for municipal bonds?
UNCERTAIN
buy, how would each of the following factors (in
(check ";mportant", "unimportant", or "don't know".)
IMPORTANT UNIMORTANT DON'T KNOW
Your personal confidence in the city of Boston:
Your estimation of the quality of the city's finances:
The goodwill of city politicians:
A colleague's recommendation:
Aspects of the city's prospectus:
Other, please specify:_
A.)
3.)
C.)
D.)
E.)
F.)
G.)
12.)
A.)
B.)
C.)
D.)
E.)
F.)
(cont.)
0 0. 0
14.) How would you rate the security of Boston's bonds compared to those of other cities?
A.) MORE SECURE1  B.) AS SECURE, C.) LESS SECURE, D.) DON'T'KNOW,
15.) How would you rate the security of Boston's bonds compared to other municipalities in Massachusetts?
A.). MORE SECURE, B.) AS SECURE, C.) LESS SECURE, D.) DON'T KNOW,
16.) How would you rate the security of Boston's bonds compared to state and suburban issues not in Massachusetts?
A.) MORE SECURE, B.) AS SECURE, C.) LESS SECURE, D.) DON'T KNOW,
17.) If you are familiar with previous prospectus statements for new bond issues by Boston, where and how
could the material be most improved?
A.) Presentation of Boston's demographic characteristics
B.) Presentation of characteristics of Boston's economy
C.) Presentation of Boston's expenditures and revenue structure
E.) Presentation o.f Boston's debt structure
Comments on above
18.) How do you think that news coverage of the city of Boston's school desegregation order and related events
have affected the city's financial reputation with potential investorsT (check one)
A.) The financial reputation which Boston has with potential investors has not been signifieantly affected.
B.) The financial reputation which Boston has with potential investors has been improved.
C.) The financial reputation which Boston has with potential investors has been somewhat damaged.
D,) The financial reputation which Boston has with potential investors has been greatly damaged.
E.) DON'T KNOW
(cont.)
0 a
19.) If you are familiar with the city of Boston's policy making cad adminietration, please rate the city I.n
these areas: (checL the appropriate category)
GOOD ADEQUATE POOR DON'T KNOW
A.) Negotiating arrangements with municipal unions and public
employees:
B.) Planning for educational programs and facilities and
implementation of desegregation order:
C.) Optimization of economic impacts of health care industry:
D.) Provision of police and fire protection services:
E.) Maintenance and improvement of roads, sewers, parks:
F.) Input into decisions of the Massachusetts Port
Authority regarding its financing and operation of
facilities such as Logan airport and the harbor:
G.) Input into decisions of the Metropolitan Boston
Transit Authority regarding its financing, service
levels, and capital improvements:
H.) Negotiating in securing federal funds: co
I.) Negotiating tax abatements at reasonable levels for
city interests:
J.) Do you have any additional comments on any, all, or missing items under the above?
The time and thought you have put into answering this survey are greatly appreciated.
Do you have any general or specific comments relating to any of the issues raised in this survey?
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Results of Perceptions Survey
(1) Have you ever been to Boston? (check one)
Response Count Frequency (%)
(A) Many times 19 13
(B) Several times: 37 24
(C) Once: 31 20
(D) Never: 32 21
(E) Lived in Boston or Boston area: 34 .22
(2) What are your perceptions about how the city of Boston's property
values in residential neighborhoods are changing relative to property
values in other cities? (check one)
Response Count Frequency (%)
(A) Residential property values in
the city of Boston are rising
faster than those in other
cities: 12 9
(B) Residential property values in
the city of Boston are changing
evenly with those in other
cities: 58 42
(C) Residential property values in
the city of Boston are lagging
behind those in other cities: 68 49
(3) How attractive do you consider investments in real property in the
city of Boston to be? (check one)
Response Count Frequency (%)
(A) Investments in real property
in the city of Boston are more
attractive than those in other
cities: 4 3
(B) Investments in real property
in the city of Boston are on a
par with those of other cities: 45 31
(C) Investments in real property
in the city of Boston are less
attractive than those in other
cities: 94 66
(cont.)
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(4) Which, if any, do you perceive as significant problems which the
city of Boston must resolve to maintain economic prosperity?
Count
Not Do
a Not
Problem Problem KnowResponse
Frequency (%)
Not
a
Problem Problem
(A) Decline in
manufacturing:
(B) Revaluation
issues:
(C) Pension
liabilities of
city employees:
(D) Federal and
state aid
cutbacks:
(E) Cutbacks in
military
facilities:
(F) Carrying costs
on existing
city debt:
71
54
102
76
43
111
18 54 50
6 84 38
1 45 69
12 55 53
30 67 31
9 28 75
13 38
4 58
1 30
8 38
21 48
6 19
(G) School
admi ni strati on
and
desegregation:
(5) How would you rate the
the city of Boston?
(A) Business activities::
Adjusted mean = 3.32
143 0 4 97
current situations in the following areas in
Count Adjusted frequency (%)
1 = Very good
2 = Good
3 = Average
4 = Poor
5 = Very poor
Don't know
(cont.)
Do
Not
Know
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(5) (B) Public safety:
Adjusted mean = 3.32
1 = Very good
Count
2
Adjusted frequency
2 = Good
3 = Average
4 = Poor 30 .
5 = Very poor
Don't know
(C) Education levels:
Adjusted mean = 2.86
1 = Very good
2 = Good
3 = Average
4 = Poor
5 = Very poor
Don't know
(D) Medical care facilities:
Adjusted mean = 1.83
1 = Very good
Count
15
34
56
Count
50
Adjusted frequency (%)
Adjusted frequency (%)
2 = Good
3 = Average
4 = Poor
5 = Very poor
Don't know
(cont. )
(%)
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(5) (E) Effectiveness of
city government:
Adjusted mean = 3.35
1 = Very good
2 = Good
3 = Average
4 = Poor
Count
1
10
64
31
Adjusted frequency (%)
5 = Very poor
Don't know
(F) Quality of life/environment:
Adjusted mean = 2.92 Count
1 = Very good
2 = Good
3 = Average
4 = Poor
5 = Very poor
Adjusted frequency (%)
5
28
40
25
2
Don't know
(G) Recreation, cultural
facilities, art:
Adjusted mean = 1.81
1 = Very good
2 = Good
3 = Average
4 = Poor
Count
46
63
16
3
Adjusted frequency (%)
5 = Very poor
Don't know
(cont.)
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(5) (H) Transportation and
road systems:
Adjusted mean
1 = Very good
2 = Good
3 = Average
Count
= 2.63
Adjusted frequency (%)
4 = Poor
5 = Very poor
Don't know
(6) How do you perceive
categories)
trends in Boston? (check all appropriate
Response: Count
(A) Significant out
migration to suburbs
of Boston:
(B) Significant in
migration:
(C) Stable population
levels:
(D) Significant out
migration to other areas
than the Boston area:
(E) Stable population levels,
but significantly
changing population
composition:
(F)
Frequency (%)
55
1
9
22
Don't know
(7) Are Boston's environmental qualities an economic asset?
Response Count
Yes
Don't know
Frequency (%)
29
26
45
(cont.)
(296)
(8) Are Boston's cultural amenities an economic asset?
Response: Count
Yes 101
Don't know
Frequency (%)
69
12
20
Examples given for questions (7) and (8) included: the Boston Pops, the
Commons and Public Gardens, Harvard, M.I.T., and the schools in the area,
the proximity to the ocean, and the architecture.
(9) Please compare Boston to the following cities on general economic
characteristics:
City of comparison: Count
Better Worse Similar Don't Know
Atlanta
Ci nci nnati
Cleveland
Dal1as
Detroit
Houston
Kansas City
Milwaukee
New Orleans
Newark
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
St. Louis
San Francisco
6 118 11
l0 79 37
1 23 68
6 130 3
14 9 44
7 131 1
15*
93 22
82 27
10 27
14 68
54 53
53 49
107 22
*Adjusted mean computed using: 3 = better, 2 = similar, and 1 = worse.
(cont.)
Adjusted
Mean*
1.17
1.45
2.14
1.11
2.55
1.11
1.28
1.30
1.41
2.65
2.29
1.68
1.74
1.26
23
24
9
9
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(10) Please compare Boston to the following cities on general quality oflife as a city in which to live, work, or visit:
City of comparison: Count
Better Worse Similar Don't Know
Atlanta
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Dallas
Detroit
Houston
Kansas City
Milwaukee
New Orleans
Newark
Philadelphia
Pittsburg
St. Louis
San Francisco
*Adjusted mean
8 106
112
computed using:
1.28
1.60
2.47
1.47
2.74
1.50
1.71
1.74
1.57
2.78
2.31
2.24
2.07
1.35
3 = better, 2 = similar, and 1 = worse.
(11) How would you project the f
in the next five years?
(A) Economic well-being
of major retail
business:
Adjusted mean = 1.87**
ollowing factors in the city of Boston
Count Adjusted Frequency (%)
Much greater
Greater
Current
Less than
Don't know
**Adjusted mean was computed using: 4 = much greater, 3 = greater,
2 = current, 1 = less than.
(cont.)
Adjusted
Mean*
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Economic well-being
of manufacturing
industries:
Adjusted mean = 1.62*
Count Adjusted frequency (%)
Much greater
Greater
Current
Less than
Don't know
(C) Economic well-being
of financial
institutions:
Adjusted mean = 2.23*
Much greater
Greater
Current
Less than
Don't know
(D) Economic well-being
of high technology,
R&D industries and
specialized consulting
firms:
Adjusted mean = 2.34*
Much greater
Greater
Current
Less than
Don't know
mean was computed using:
Count
2
45
63
19
Count
5
51
46
20
Adjusted frequency (%)
Adjusted frequency (%)
4 = much greater, 3 = greater,
2 = current, 1 = less than.
(cont.)
(11) (B)
*Adjusted
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Popularity as a
convention location:
Adjusted mean = 1.84*
Count Adjusted frequency (%)
Much greater
Greater
Current
Less than
Don't know
(F) Popularity as a
home office:
Adjusted mean = 1.67*
Much greater
Greater
Current
Less than
Don't know
(G) Overall population
levels:
Adjusted mean = 1.65*
Much greater
Greater
Current
Less than
Don't know
*Adjusted mean was computed using:
Count
6
7
45
71
-19
Count
6
8
50
65
Adjusted frequency (%)
Adjusted frequency (%)
4 = much greater, 3 = greater,
2 = current, 1 = less than.
(12) Would you consider buying a new issue of Boston's bonds if you were
in the market for municipal bonds?
Count
Yes
Uncertain
Frequency (%)
18
59
23
(cont.)
(11) (E)
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(13) In making your decision as to whether or not to buy, how would each
of the following factors (in addition to bond yield) affect your
decision?
(A) Your personal confidence in the City of Boston:
Count Frequency (%)
Important 125 85
Unimportant 16 11
Don't know 6
(B) Your estimation of the quality of
Count
Important 144
Unimportant 2
Don't know 3
(C) The goodwill of City politicians:
Count
Important 64
Unimportant 59
Don't know 23
(D) A colleague's recommendation:
Count
Important 33
Unimportant 85
Don't know 23
(E) Aspects of the City's prospectus:
Count
Important 121
Unimportant 7
Don't know
the City's finances:
Frequency (%)
97
1
2
Frequency (%)
44
40
16
Frequency (%)
23
60
16
Frequency (%)
85
5
10
(cont.)
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(14) How would you rate the security of Boston's bonds compared to those
of other cities?
Count Frequency (%)
More secure 2 1
As secure 31 22
* Less secure 95 68
Don't know 11 8
(15) How would you rate the security of Boston's bonds compared to other
municipalities in Massachusetts?
Count Frequency (%)
More secure 2 1
As secure 42 33
Less secure 76 53
Don't know 21 15
(16) How would you rate the security of Boston's bonds compared to state
and suburban issues not in Massachusetts?
Count Frequency (%)
More secure 3 2
As secure 15 11
Less secure 101 73
Don't know 20 14
(17) If you are familiar with previous prospectus statements for new bond
issues by Boston, where and how could the material be most improved?
* Response Number of checks
Presentation of Boston's demographic
characteristics 27
Presentation of the characteristics
* of Boston's economy 42
Presentation of Boston's expenditures
and revenue structure 55
Presentation of Boston's debt
structure 48
(cont.)
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** (18) How do you think that news coverage of the city of Boston's school
desegregation order and related events has affected the city's
financial reputation with potential investors?
Response Count Frequency (%)
(A) Has not been significantly affected 3 4
(B) Has been improved 1 1
(C) Has been somewhat damaged 39 48
(D) Has been greatly damaged 38 46
(E) Don't know 1 1
100% TOTAL
(19) If you are-familiar with the City of Boston's policy making and
administration, please rate the City in these areas:
(A) Negotiating arrangements with muncipal unions and. public
employees:
Adjusted mean=1.35*
Response Count Frequency (%)
Good 2 5
Adequate 10 25
Poor 28 70
Don't know 60 -
(B) Planning for educational programs and facilities and implement-
ation of the desegregation order:
Adjusted mean=1. 53*
Response Count Frequency (%)
Good 7 16
Adequate 10 22
Poor 28 62
Don't know 60 -
*Adjusted mean was computed using: 3 = good, 2 = adequate, 1 = poor
**This question was included on the survey form on only the second mailing.
(cont.)
a ~~(303)4L3piQ
(19) (C) Optimization of economic impacts of health care industry:
Adjusted mean=2.08*
Response Count Frequency
Good 55 50
Adequate 9 16
Poor 46 42
Don't know 45 -
(D) Provisions of police and fire protection services:
Adjusted mean=1.97*
Response Count Frequency
Good 8 24
Adequate 17 50
Poor 9 26
(%)
Don't know 66
(E) Maintenance and improvement of roads, sewers,
Adjusted mean=1.72*
Response Count
Good 4
Adequate 25
Poor 17
parks:
Frequency (%)
9
54
17
Don't know
*Adjusted mean was computed using: 3 = good, 2 = adequate, 1 = poor
(cont.)
1 1
304
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(19) (F) Input into decisons of the Massachusetts Port Authority regard-
ing its financing and operation of facilities such as Logan
Airport and the harbor:
Adjusted mean=1.85*
Response Count Frequency (%)
Good 8 24
Adequate 12 36
Poor 13 39
Don't know 66 -
(G) Input into decisions of the Metropolitan Transit Authority
regarding its financing, service levels, and capital improvements:
Adjusted mean=1.82*
Response Count Frequency (%)
Good 8 24
Adequate 11 33
Poor 14 42
Don't know 67 -
(H) Negotiating in securing federal funds:
Adjusted mean=1.66*
Response Count Frequency (%)
Good 5 19
Adequate 17 65
Pror 4 15
Don't know 75 -
*Adjusted mean was computed using: 3 = good, 2 = adequate, 1 = poor
(cont.)
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(19) (I) Negotiating tax abatements at reasonable levels for city
interests:
*0 Adjusted mean=1.60*
Response Count
Good
Adequate
Poor
Frequency (%)
8
44
48
Don't know
*Adjusted mean was computed using: 3 = good, 2 = adeqate, 1 = poor.
(307)
Appendix III
Survey Form and Tabulated Results of
The Survey of Financial Officers
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Department of Room 9-521 Phone 617 253- 7736
Urban Studies and Massachusetts
Planning institute
of Technology
Cambridge
Massachusetts
02139
August 29, 1976
[name and address of financial officer]
Dear [name of financial officer]
We are currently doing a study of the sources of information for
investors who are interested in municipal bonds.. We are interested in the
financial information which is compiled and made available by large cities
and this survey addresses this question. Your cooperation in answering the
attached questions would be very helpful. It should take you only about
ten minutes. The sooner we receive your response, the more opportunity we
will have to integrate it with other research. Please take a few minutes
to fill out the questionaire today and mail it in the enclosed envelope.
If you have any additionalcomments on this subject, they would certainly
be appreciated.
Sincerely,
Kent Col ton
Associate Professor
Department of Urban Studies
and Planning, MIT
Kay Anderson
Graduate student
Department of Urban Studies
and Planning, MIT
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Cities Responding to the Survey of Financial Officers
Atlanta
Baltimore
Boston
Chicago
Cincinnati
Columbus
Dallas
Denver
Detroi t
Fort Worth
Jacksonville
Kansas City
Long Beach
Los Angeles
Louisville
Memphis
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
Nashville
New Orleans
Oakland
Oklahoma City
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Pittsburgh
Portland
San Antonio
Seattle
St. Louis
San Fransisco
Toledo\
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Table A-III-1
Results of Survey of Financial Officers
(1) Did the city send out an annual report last year?
Response Count Frequency (%)
Yes 30 100
No 0 0
(2) Who wrote the City's last annual financial report? (check one)
Response Count Frequency (%)
Primarily, the City Treasury staff 5 16
Primarily, the staff of the underwriter
of the last bond issue 3
A combination of the staff of the City
Treasury and staff of the underwriter I
Other, please specify* 23 78
* Most specified either the comptroller's office or an auditor.
(3) How completely and by whom was the annual financial report autited?
Count responding
Checked Checked City
Complete Report Financial Section
An independent auditor 4 13
An auditor who is a city employee T 3
(4)
auditor who is a state employee 6 6
whom was the annual report distributed? (check all which apply)
Response Count (out of 30)
To local banks 29
To'nonlocal banks 22
To local bond dealers 26
To a few local citizens 17
To many local citizens 7
To more than a few nonlocal citizens 14
(In addition to these choices, a few respondents wrote in local
journal, local libraries, mailing list,, and municipal and state
governments). (cont.)
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Table A-III-1 (cont.)
(5) About how many copies of the annual financial report were distributed?
Mean = 369 copies, Range = 100 to 850 copies
(6) Who wrote the prospectus statement for the city's last bond issue?
Response Count Frequency (%)
Primarily, the City Treasury staff 5 12
Primarily, the staff of the underwriter
of the last bond issue 3 10
A combination of the staff of the City
Treasury and staff of the underwriter 3 10
Other, please specify* 19 68
*Responses included the bond counsel, financial consultant, and
auditor.
(7) About how many pages was the latest prospectus statement?
Mean = 44 pages, Range = 4 to 165 pages (Philadelphia had
the longest)
(8) About how many copies of the prospectus statement were distributed?
Mean = 467**, Range = 57 to 1800 and 3,000 copies
** Mean was tomputed not including distribution by Boston of 3,000
copies.
(9) Do you have a mailing list to which you regularly mail propsectus
statements?
Response Count Frequency (%)
Yes 29 90
No 1 10
(cont.)
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Table A-III-1 (cont.)
(10) How completely and by whom was the prospectus statement audited?
Count responding
Checked Checked City
Complete Report Financial Section
An independent auditor 2 10
An auditor who is a city employee 23 16
An auditor who is a state employee 1 6
()1) Was there significant input from ths state government into how the
prospectus statement should be written or what information should
be included? If so, please explain briefly:
Responses: Pittsburgh used a Pennsylvanis Guiding Statute; other
states provided no input.
(12) Does the city utilize any sort of occasional or regular newsletters
to bond buyers?
Response Count Frequency (%)
Yes* 1 3
No 29 97
No 29 97
*Philadelphia (see reference in bibliography to Moak, Lennox L.
"Statement of Lennox L. Moak Concerning Initiation of Series to be
Known as 'Financial Releases'". (August ]9, 1975))
(cont.)
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Table A-III-1 (cont.)
(13) What interest rate did the city pay
offering? (please give % and date)
City Rate(%) Date
Minneapolis
Kansas City
Louisville
Milwaukee
San Antonio
Fort Worth
Atlanta
Denver
Long Beach
Chicago
Baltimore
Seattle
Cincinnati
Los Angeles
Philadelphia
Detroit
4.45
4.96
5.17
5.19
5.34
5.58
5.71
5.86
5.93
6.02
6.14
6.30
6.50
6.69
7.69
9.78
4/76
1/76
9/73
5/76
5/76
2/76
6/76
12/74
8/73
7/76
5/76
5/76
4/76
5/76
9/76
6/76
on your last long-term debt
City Rate (%)
Oklahoma City 4.83
Dallas 5.13
Jacksonville 5.18
Portland 5.24
San Francisco 5.42
Toledo 5.66
Phoenix 5.72
Memphis 5.87
Oakland 6.00
Columbus 6.12
New Orleans 6.25
Nashville 6.3
St. Louis 6.52
Pittsburgh 6.77
Boston 7.86
(14) What interest
offering? (p
rate did the city pay
lease give % and date)
on your last short-term debt
City Rate (%) Date
Minneapolis
Kansas City
Louisville
Milwaukee
San Antonio
Fort Worth
Atlanta
Denver
Long Beach
Chicago-
Baltimore
Seattle
Cincinnati
Los Angeles
Philadelphia
Detroit
3.19
4.32
4.25
3.74
3.98.
4.75
3.50
4.25
8.07
7.00
4/76
5/76
6/76
1/76
6/76
4/76
2/74
7/76
7/76
Ci ty Rate (%) Date
Oklahoma City
Dallas
Jacksonville
Portland
San Francisco
Toledo
Phoenix
Memphis
Oakland
Columbus
New Orleans
Nashville
St. Louis
Pittsburgh
Boston
(15) In the last two years, has the city ever been unable to place all of
a bond issue? If so, why do you think this problem occurred?
Responses: Chicago and Detroit were the only two answering affirma-
tively and said that they were unable to sell at an accept-
able interest rate because of the New York City situation.
Date
8/76
5/76
72
4/76
9/76
9/76
7/76
5/74
6/76
6/74
9/76
1/76
9/76
6/76
4.75
4.45
4.00
6.13
5.48
7.00
3.37
4.50
6.52
4.50
7.00
4/76
7/76
9/76
7/76
4/74
9/76
6/76
8/76
2/76
7/76
7/76
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Appendix IV
Key Sources Used --
Historical Disclosure Recommendations and the Summary of Reporting Practices
9 0
Table A-IV-(1)
Summary of Reporting Practices (in a Survey of Official Statements)
Number of Statements
Not Not
Type of Information
(1) Statement of Direct Debt Outstanding Dated within 120 Days of
Sale Date:
(2) Direct Debt Statement Dated in 1975:
(3) Statement of Overlapping Debt Dated in 1975:
(4) Statement of Direct Debt for Prior 5 Year Period:
(5) Statement of Annual Debt Serv.ice Requirements for all Direct Debt
(A) Principal Only:
(B) Principal and Interest:
(6) Audited Financial Reports:
(7) Accounting Methods Ident-ified:
(8) Operating Statement of Revenues and Expenditures for Most Recent
Completed Fiscal Year:
(9) Detailed statement or Explanation of Sources of Revenues and
Expenditures:
(10) Current Year Assessed Valuation of Taxable Property:
(11) Current Property Tax Rate:
(12) 1975 Population:
Reporting Reporting Relevant
149
165
138
7
25
9
20
167
108
138
157
167
130
149
22
60
64
25
139
109
110
Table A-IV(l) (cont.)
Number of Statements
Not Not
Type of Information Reporting Reporting Relevant
(13) 1970 Population: 114 60
(14) Data on Number of Employed Persons in Major Employment Categories: 10 164
(15) Data on Level or Rate of Unemployment: 4 170
(16) List of Major Industrial Firms Located in Area (with Employment
Figures): 50 119 5
(17) Personal Income Data
(A) Median Family Income -- Own Unit: 20 154
(B) Median Family Income -- Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area: 3 168 3
(C) Total Personal Income of Residents: 14 160 -
Source: (Taken directly from) Forbes, Professor Ronald. "Summary of Reporting Practices", as quoted in
U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Securities on S. 2969 to Amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to Require
the Preparation of Annual Reports and Distribution Statement by Issuers of Municipal Securities,
and for Other Purposes, S. 2574 To Amend The Securities Act of 1933 to Provide for the Reg-
istration of Securities Issued by State and Local Governments, February 24, 25, and 26, 1976.
94TH Congress, Second Session, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1976, p. 271.
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The Disclosure Recommendations of the
1951 New:York City Report
Minimum standards prescribed:
(1) Description of community -- Population for four years (census or
estimated); school census; area; citation of any special charter; type of
community in which bond issuer is located; and public and private facil-
ities in the area.
(2) Trends for preceding five years -- Debt as to total amount, de-
ductible items, and net debt; expenditure by major character classes;
assessed valuation of real estate (personal property exempt); state equal-
ization ratio of assessed to full value; real estate tax rate and levy;
other revenue, by major class.
(3) Selected tax detail -- Three-year record of property tax collec-
tions and delinquencies; description of tax collection machinery, espe-
cially regarding delinquencies, penalties, and tax sales; itemization of
local nonproperty tax revenue for three years.
(4) Assets of funds -- As of specified dates, assets of sinking, cap-
ital reserve, repair reserve, tax stabilization, debt reserve, and other
funds.
(5) Bond principal maturities -- Amounts maturing in each of next ten
years, excluding and including the bond issue to be sold.
(6) Revenue producing enterprises -- Confined to showing (a) principal
maturities for such enterprises excluded by State Comptroller's approval
from debt subject to limitation.
(7) Finances of overlying or related units -- For large cities fiscally
responsible for shcools, a separate itemization of school debt, expenditure,
debt service, and taxes; itemization of net debt of special districts sit-
uated in a city, village, or town; special improvement district debt in-
cluded in town debt; optional reporting of debt and tax records of all other
overlying school and special districts.
(8) *Other information -- Statutory authority for the purpose for which
bonds are to be issued; statement whether any debt principal or interest is
past due; statement whether procedure for validation of bonds has been or
is to be complied with.
Source: (Taken directly from) Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations. "State Technical Assistance to Local Debt Manage-
ment". Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, .
1965, pp. 37-38.
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The Disclosure Recommendations of the
1963 IBA Format
REPORT ON FINANCES - MUNICIPAL GENERAL OSLIGATION BONDS
Municipality or political subdivisior
County_ State
Form of Government (Commission, Mayor-Council, Manager, etc.)
Fiscal year begins
U. S. Census 19 : State Census 19 : Present Estimate:
Has this issuer defaulted on any debt obligation since 1930?
If so, give full particulars in a separate statement.
Part 1. Property Valuation (as of 19j
Current Year
Assessed Actual Ratio if assessed
to actual value
Real estate $ $ _%$
Personal property
Public utility
Other (specify)
Part 2. Bonded Debt and Related Information (as of 19_)
Amount
General obligations (not listed below)
Special assessments secured also by general tax
Utility and public enterprise debt secured also
by general tax: (a) Water
(b) Sewer
(c) Light and Power
(d) Other (specify)
Total General Obligation Bonds
$___________________
Previous Year
Assessed Actual
$___$__
Sinking Funds
4. Special assessments only
5. Utility and public enterprise revenue only:*
(a) Water
(b) Sewer
(c) Light and Power
(d) Other (specify)
Total Other Than General Obligations
*For utility and other public enterprise revenue bonds, please submit separate reports on
report form for municipal revenue bonds.
6. Legal debt limit of this issuer? Wof (describe base)_; $
7. Debt outstanding chargeable to debt limit? $ Unused borrowing margin? $
8. Bonds authorized but not issued: Purpose Amount $
9. Are utility and public enterprise bonds reported in item 3 fully supported by earnings of
the facilities? If not, what proportion of general taxes was necessary for debt
service on such bonds in the last fiscal year?
10. Total general obligation bonds outstanding year ago? $ Two years ago? S_
11. Amount of refunding bonds issued within last two years for the following purposes:
(a) To refund maturing bonds $ Maturities
(b) To refund callable bonds $ Maturities
Part 3. Overlapping Debt
That Part of Debt of Overlapping Entities (School or Special Districts, Counties, etc.)
Payable by Taxes Levied in this Municipality or Political Subdivision
Debt Gross Debt
Name of Overlapping Entity Limit % Loss Sinking Fund This Issuer's Share
(cont.)
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Part 4. Unfunded Debt Outstanding
Amount
1. Tax Anticipation Notes $
2. Delinquent Tax Notes $
3. Bond Anticipation Notes $
4. Bank Loans $
5. Warrants $
6. judgients $
7. Unpaid Bills 60 Days Past Due $ _
8. Miscellaneous Items $
Total $
9. Unfunded Debt One Year Ago $ ; Two Years
Part 5. Composition of Siitking Fuac
Cash on hand or in banks
United States Government securities
Bonds of this municipality
Bonds of states and other municipalities
Other investments (specify nature)
Total
Amount of Term Bonds for Which Sinking Funds Are Required
Due
Ago $
ds
$
$
$
$
$
Part 6. Debt Service Requirements For Next Five Years
(For principal, interest and sinking fund installments)
Authorized Source of Payment Viscal Year Bedinning
19 l9, 19 19 19
General Taxation $ $ $ $ - $
Special Assessments and General Taxation $ $ $ $ $
Utility Revenues and General Taxation $ $ $ $
Special Assessments Only $ $ $
Utility Revenues Only $ $ $ $ $
Part 7. Comparative Statement of Operating Revenues and Expenditures.
Do not include municipally operated utilities or public enterprises, unless
surplus revenues therefrom are transferred to general fund (in revenues) or
debt service on general obligations issued therefor are paid from general
fund (in expenditures).
1. Cash Balance at beginning of year
2. Revenues:
(a) Proceeds from notes and bonds
(b) From ad valorem taxes
(c) From other taxes
(d) From federal or state aid
(e) From other sources
Total Revenues
3. Expenditures:
(a) Government operating expenses
(b) Expenditures from bond proceedt
(c) Bond principal
(d) Bond interest
(a) Sinking Funds
(f) All other purposes
Total Expenditures
4. Cash Balance at and of year
Fiscal Year Beginning
19 19 19
$ $ $
$ $ $
$ $ $
$ $ $
S S $
$ $ $
$ $ $
$$ $
$ $ $
S $ $
$ $ $
$ $ $
$ $ $_ _ _
$ $ $
$$ - $
(cont.)
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Part 8. Tax Data
(a) Tax Collection Report - Ad Valorem or General Property Tax
For last 3 years. For tax or fiscal year ending___
Omit levies of other entities and special assessments.
Amount of Levy
By This Issuer
19 $_
19_ $_
19 $_
Delinquent Taxes From
Uncollected at Uncollected Latest Prior Years
End of Year Available Date Collected During Year
$ __ _ _ $__ _ _ $ __ _ _ _
$__ _ _ $__ _ _ $ __ _ _ _
$__ _ _ $ __ _ _ $ __ _ _ _
(b) Total Current Levy
For tax or fiscal year beginning
Include levies of other entities which are part of general property tax
Amount
Levied
This Issuer $_
School $_
Total general property tax County $_
(or ad valorem tax) State $_
is composed of: Other $_
Total $
*If any property included in your taxable assessed valuation is taxed
from real estate, specify
Rate Per $100 of
Assessed Value*
$$
$
$
$
$
at rate different
(c) General Tax Information
1. Taxes for fiscal year are due: Became delinquent:
2. If payable in installments give particulars
3. Discounts for prepayment and when applied?
4. Specific practice for delinquency?
5. Explain in detail any modifications of practice during the past two years
6. How are uncollected taxes handled?
(a) Anticipated as revenue in next year's budget? If yes, what percentage?
(b) Turned over to other governing bodies? If yes, when?
(c) Sale of tax certificates? If yes, when?
(d) Other methods
7. Has tax sale period been extended in last two years? If yes, explain
8. Accumulated total of uncollected taxes for fiscal years prior to those reported
above $
9. Are tax title liens included in uncollected tax totals above?
How much? $
10. Total tax title liens owned by municipality (years 19 to 19 inclusive) $
11. Is there a tax rate limit? How Much? Statutory or Constitutional?
12. Do tax rate limits apply to debt service? If yes, what are the limits?
13. Do you levy taxes in excess of actual requirements to provide margin against delin-
quences? Yes No
If yes, what ratio? Current year? %; Previous year? %; 2 years ago?
Part 9. Supplementary Information
Please furnish in a separate statement information regarding the location and
economic background of the issuer, the general character of industries and trans-
portation facilities in the area, and any other pertinent data or comments. If
additional space is needed to report fully the informo&on requested in this form,
please attach separate sheets with appropriate cross references.
Signed.
Officdil Title
Date
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. "State
Technical Assistance to Local Debt Management". Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965, pp. 64-66.
Source:
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The Disclosure Recommendations of the
1965 State Technical Assistance Report
Recommended for inclusion in all bond prospectuses:
(1) Legal authority and debt incurring power -- Common to all standard
forms should be the citation of the legal authority to borrow and spend
money for the purpose for which the bonds are to be sold. For general
obligations, a summary of debt incurring power could be confined to a comp-
arison of the amount permissible under the debt limit with the gross debt,
allowable deductions, and net limited debt. The bond attorney's favorable
opinion of the legality of the issue, even if preliminary, should be either
cited or summarized.
(2) Summary of past financial trends -- To depict the trend the finan-
cial condition of the local unit is taking, the forms should summarize
basic data for selected prior years by showing total debt as to character
of liability, revenue and expenditure as to major category, total assessed
and full valuation, property tax rates and levies, property tax collections
and delinquencies, and the record as to any defaults or refundings to avert
defaults. Trend data obviously differ among types of debt liability. Mean-
ingful trends are disclosed by comparisons of the tenth and fifth previous
years with the last two years.
(3) Detail for latest completed year -- The borrowing unit can readily
report detail, provided it is confined to the latest year, and the credit
analyst is helped by an itemization of outstanding issues, showing amount,
purpose, interest rate, and principal and interest due. For a metropolitan
center, however, the debt detail should be reserved for an accompanying an-
nual report. For all borrowing units, the revenue side for the previous
year requires itemization of each main source to reveal in particular the
relative size of each nonproperty tax, and revenue from State and Federal
governments classified as to use for operation, capital outlay, and debt
service. On the expenditure side, the credit analyst needs to learn not
merely aggregates by character (i.e. operation, capital outlay, etc.) but
the extent to which responsibility has been assumed for individual functions
in the previous year.
(4) Future trends -- Since the bonds to be sold will be paid in the
future, many credit reports now set forth the future debt service on out-
standing debt and on the bonds to be sold. While an itemization for all
years during which bonds will mature has advantages, a listfing for the next
10 years would be acceptable because of the likelihood that later issues
will change the maturity schedule. In any States adopting plans for the
review of prospective bond issues...the inclusion of a future capital budget
would be feasible in all credit reports. In the absence of the adoption of
the suggested plans, the credit report should (a) specify all bonds autho-
rized but not issued, and (b) summarize all capital improvements and bond
issues that are likely during the next six years. Indispensable to the
(cont.)
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sale of revenue bonds is an engineering estimate for the next six years of
revenue from the facility or service operating cost, other charges against
revenue, and the anticipated surplus margin.
(5) Overlying, coterminous, and underlying local units -- Usually
credit reports depict the net general debt, tax rate, and tax levy not only
for the borrowing unit but for all units levying taxes on the property
within the boundaries of the borrower. For municipalities and school dis-
tricts, except county systems, the additional data are for shares of over-
lying units; for counties and county school districts, the added data are
the totals for underlying units,and in some cases, usually municipalities -
and districts, added data may be for coterminous units.
In a simple governmental structure, the local officials alone can ob-
tain the aggregate statistics. In complex structures, and especially for
county brochures showing underlying units, the State agency should -- as
for any other aspect of the credit report -- cooperate with the local of-
ficials by making data available form State files. With the increasing
importance of local nonproperty tax revenue and intergovernmental revenue,
a realistic report would set forth similar summaries of classified revenue
and expenditure.
(6) Physical volume of services -- With standard forms tailored to fit
types of government, liability, and selected functions, credit reports
would acquire an added dimension by showing the physical volume of services.
For example, the debt prospectus outline for the Michigan Department of
Public Instruction calls for the concise analysis of present and future
school building needs of a school district. Elementary and junior and
senior high schools are separately reported as to capacity of (a) existing
adequate school houses. (b) existing unsatisfactory school houses, (c)
school houses under construction, and (d) school houses to be financed
by proposed bond issues. Additional school houses required during the next
two periods of five years are recapitualated as to number of buildings and
classrooms, capacity, and estimated cost.
Utility services are reported as to physical volume in some, though far
from all, credit brochures. Interyear comparions are feasible for electric
power systems as to KWH's generated, purchased, and classified number of
consumers. Highway and street mileage, classified by type of existing con-
struction and compared with programs for future surfacing, may be summarized
in many counties and cities.
(7) *Economic characteristics of the community -- Local governments are
handicapped in working up the necessary economic bace data for evaluating
debt and fiscal loacs. While the typical prospectus shows assessed valua-
tion (and should set forth estimated full valuation), the swing to non-
property taxes now requires the reporting of other economic characteristics
both for general obligations and revenue bonds. Conventional reporting in-
volves the identification of chief industries, if possible by dollar value
of production, and at times by the listing of the names and property value
of the leading companies. Transportation facilities are often listed.
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Among the assortment of data that have been urged for reporting and
scmetimes used to good advantage are retail and wholesale sales, service
establishment receipts, consumption and number of consumers of publicly
and privately owned utilities, and the number and value of building permits.
Local nonproperty taxes and State taxes derived from the local community
are often overlooked. Economic indicators are more often available on a
countywide basis than for smaller areas.
To the customary reporting of total population for several Census years
and an estimate for the latest year may well be added a classification by
age group, school enrollment, and in some areas of the employment and un-
employment rates. Mention of the area and density of population indicates
the compactness of the jurisdiction and the probable extent of development
of the area. Interyear comparisons, at times on a per capita basis, are
helpful in evaluating the stability, volatility, and diversity of the ec-
onomy, and prospect of economic growth of the community.
(8)' Quality of public administration -- A debt prospectus can provide
some clues as to the general character of the local government and the
quality of its administration. Among these are: an indication of the na-
ture of the local government organization and financial administration,
especially as to accounting and debt management responsibility, the exist-
ence or absence of planning and zoning ordinances and agencies, the account-
ing basis (cash, accrual, or combination thereof), and tax and revenue col-
lection methods and the handling of tax delinquency.
Source: (Taken directly from) Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations. "State Technical Assistance to Local Debt Manage-
ment". Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1965. pp. 41-43.
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The Disclosure Recommendations of the
1976. MFOA Disclosure Guidelines
...These guidelines suggest disclosure of information that is most likely to
be material to investors. It is possible that other information, not sug-
gested herein, may at times be material and in such cases should be provided.
In addition to the information suggested, there should be added such
further material information as may be necessary so as to make any statements
made not misleading under the circumstances. Care should be taken to review
the financial, historical, and other factual information as given so as to
determine whether qualifications or additional information should be stated.
If reliable information is available which indicates material changes in
trends or other disclosures, such information should be presented....
In some cases certain specific suggested information will not be material
under the circumstances. In such instances, there is no need to report...
The degree of detail may be related to the term of the obligations...If
reliable information is unknown and not reasonably available, the information
may be omitted...Financial and accounting information should be prepared and
presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles...
Furnish appropriate financial statements of the issuer, or in the case
of an offering of revenue securities, the enterprise, to indicate the
issuer's financial ability to fulfill its obligations to the holders of the
securities being offered....Those financial statements reflecting assets and
liabilities should be presented as of the end of each of the last two fiscal
years, and those financial statements relating to operations should be pre-
sented for each of the last five fiscal years. In the case of an offering
of revenue securities, interim financial statements reflecting assets and
liabilities should also be presented as of a date within the last 120 days
and as of the comparable date in the preceding fiscal year, and those finan-
cial statements relating to operations should be presented for the interim
period between the end of the last fiscal year and the date of the interim
financial statements reflecting assets and liabilities and for the comparable
period of the preceding fiscal year. Receipts and assets which cannot be
used to discharge the issuer's obligations to the holders of the securites
being offered and expenditures chargeable against such receipts should be
clearly indicated....
The financial information should reflect the retroactive adjustment of
any material items affecting the comparability of the results. State the
basis on which the financial statements have been prepared, such as a cash,
accrual or modified accrual basis. Data for all undertakings which individ-
ually or together are material sources of payment for the principal of or
interest on the securities being offered should be shown on a consolidated
basis, and where informative, may also be shown separately for specific under-
takings or groups of undertakings...
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Disclose the effects in dollar amounts of extraordinary receipts or
expenditures and describe the nature and purpose of the receipts or expend-
itures...
In connection with the financial statements, whenever necessary, reflect
information or explanations of material significance to investors in apprais-
ing the results shown, including analyses of material increases or decreases
in significant categories during the last two fiscal years and any compara-
tive period.
In an offering of general obligation securities, if more than 15 per-
cent of the receipts of the issuer in either of its two most recent fiscal
years comes from a single enterprise owned or operated by the issuer (such
as a public utility or transportation system), or a number-of such enter-
prise(s)engagi:ng in essentially similar functions or operating as a inter-
grated enterprise, and if the receipts from such enterprise(s) may be
used for payment of principal of or interest on the securities being offered,
provide an appropriate financial summary regarding such enterprise(s).
If payment of principal or of interest or premium on the securities
being offered is guaranteed or insured in any respect, furnish appropriate
financial or other information as to the guarantor or insurer, Under normal
circumstances, it is unnecessary to include more than a very brief financial
summary as to a state guarantor..,
Furnish the information called for by the following table as to appro-
priate categories of long-term and short-term securities and other indebted-
ness of the issuer (other than unpaid bills fewer than 90 days past due):
Category of Amount Amount outstanding as of (date) AmYount to be
indebtedness authorized (less sinking fund installments u tstanding
paid to such date)
Debt should be regarded as "authorized" when all material discretionary
legal steps have been taken by the issuer for its authorization for issuance,
such as required approval of the city council council or the voters. Actions
tending to be of a ministerial or judicial nature, such as validation in some
jurisdictions, should not be regarded as discretionary for this purpose...
Furni.sh a debt service schedule for total principal, interest and prem-
ium requirements of the issuer under outstanding indebtedness, and where ap-
propriate, under authorized indebtedness, to the final maturity date of all
outstanding securities. Include debt service on the securities being offered.
Indicate in footnotes to the schedule any assumptions, such as interest rates
on authorized but unissued debt, on which information in the schedule is
based, The schedule may be presented in substantially the following tabular
form:
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Fiscal
year General Special Utility Other
ending obligation assessment revenue indebtedness
(date) indebtednes indebtedness indebtedness (describe) Total
State the total amounts of indebtedness of the issuer outstanding as of
the end of each of its last five fiscal years.
Describe any legal debt or tax limit of the issuer, the legal source of
the limit, the indebtedness or tax rates of the issuer chargeable to the
limit, and the unused borrowing or taxation margin. Describe legal require-
ments, such as voter approval, which must be met in connection with debt
issuance.
If any refunding securities have been issued by the issuer within the
last 25 years for the purpose of preventing a default in principal or inter-
est payments on securities then outstanding, describe the circumstances giv-
ing rise to the issuance, including the amounts involved.
If any securities of the issuer have been in default as to principal
or interest payments or in other material respects at any time in the last
25 years, state the circumstances givina rise to each default, including
descriptions of the relevant provisions of the securities and authorizing
and governing instruments and the amounts involved. State whether such
default has been terminated or waived, and if so, the manner of such termin-
ation or waiver.
If any outstanding revenue, special assessment, or limited obligation
securities have not been fully supported by earnings of the relevant facil-
ities or by other relevant receipts at any time in the last ten years, state
for each such year in which additional general receipts of the issuer were
used or required to be used for payments on such securities, the amount due
on such securities and the amount of such additional funds. Describe any
contract or arrangement, such as a lease, services, contract or deficiency
subsidy agreement, requiring application of general tax or other receipts
of the issuer for the benefit'of other governmental entities.
If the proceeds from the sale of any securities (other than tax anticip-
ation notes issued against revenues of a current fiscal year) have been used
for current operating expenses at any time in the last ten years, describe
the circumstances giving rise to such use, including the amount used in each
of such years.
Describe briefly the issuer's or the enterprise's pension and other em-
ployee retirement plans and the methods by and basis (e.g. actuarial or "pay-
as-you-go") on which the plans are funded. State the issuer's or the enter-
prise's contributions to the plans for, and the unfunded accrued pension
liability as of the end of, each of the last five years. State the annual
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benefit payments, net of employee contributions and interest earnings of the
plans, for each of the last five fiscal years, unless the plans are fully
funded. State the date of the most recent actuarial study, if any, and de-
scribe briefly the assumptions upon which the study was based. If contribu-
tions are made on an actuarial basis, state the year in which such basis was
first used to determine contributions prior to such times have been elimi-
nated.
Describe briefly the manner in which property valuations and assessments
are determined and principal taxes are levied and collected. Include descrip-
tions of (i) the manner in which delinquent taxes are collected; (ii) the in-
terest charged on delinquent taxes; (iii) important changes during the last
five fiscal years and as of a recent date. Describe briefly the procedures
followed in foreclosure, includina extension of foreclosure dates. Describe
the priority of tax claims of the issuer over other indebtedness of taxpayers.
I Give in tabular or other appropriate form with respect to the issuer as
of the end of each of its last five fiscal years and as of a recent date, in-
formation as to (i) its assessed valuation of taxable real property; (ii) its
estimated true valuation of taxable real property; (iii) its assessed valua-
tion of taxable personal property; (iv) the assessed valuation of taxable
real property expressed as a percentage of the estimated true valuation there-
of. Segregate such information as to industrial, commercial, utility and res-
idential properties.
Give information as of the end of each of the isssuer's last five fiscal
years andas of a recent date in respect of the issuer's (1) debt per capita;
(ii) debt expressed as a percentage of total assessed valuation of taxable
real and personal property; (iii) debt expressed as a percentage of estimated
per capita income of individual taxpayers residing in the jurisdiction.
State whether real estate, sales, income or other taxes are levied in
excess of actual requirements to provide a margin against delinquencies and,
if so, give the amount of such excess taxes expressed as a percentage of
total taxes levied for the issuer's last fiscal year. State in tabular or
other appropriate form the total tax levy and the accumulated amount of delin-
quent taxes as of the end of each of. the issuer's last fiscal year. State in
tabular or other appropriate form the total tax levy and the accumulated
amount of delinquent taxes as of the end of each of the issuer's last five
fiscal years and as of a recent date and the tax delinquency rate for each of
such fiscal years and for the current fiscal year to date. Describe any an-
ticipation of collection of delinquent taxes in budgets for current or fut-
ure years. State whether borrowing is made against delinquent taxes, and
if so, state the percentage of delinquent taxes so financed as of the end of
such prior fiscal years and as of a recent date. Describe the accounting
principles applied in writing-off delinquent taxes, and state the period for
which delinquent taxes are reflected on the issuer's books before they are
written off,
Name every taxpayer providing through tax payments more than 10% of the
tax receipts of the issuer in the issuer's most recent fiscal year. State
the amount of taxes levied against each such taxpayer and the percentage of
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the total tax levy represented by such amount.
Furnish the information called for by the following table as to indebt-
edness of overlapping governmental entities.
Amount of Amount of out- Percent of outstanding
Name of authorized standing debt debt chargeable to per-
overlapping debt as of (less sinking fund) sons or property in is-
entity (date) as of (date) suer's boundaries
State the year in which the issuer was established, give the name of
the state or other jurisdiction under th-e laws of which it was established,
describe its form of government, such as mayor-council or city manager, and
if the issuer is a municipality, state the county in which it is located....
State the principal purposes for which the net proceeds of the offering
are authorized or proposed to be used and the approximate amount authorized
or proposed for each purpose...
If any material amounts of other funds are to be used in conjunction
with the proceeds, state the amounts and sources of such other funds...
Sufficient information should be given to provide background and general
information concerning the issuer. At times, data on other population areas
in the issuer's vicinity may be informative, either in addition to or, where
information on the issuer is unavailable, in subsitution for information on
the issuer. Investors should be informed of factors which indicate the
ability of the issuer to impose and collect, and the ability-of its citizens
to pay, taxes and other receipts which can be used to discharge the issuer's
obligations. Certain trends provide useful indications in these regards.
Factors which may have a significant, though indirect, effect on these trends,
such as the types and levels of services provided by the issuer and demands
for services, may also be helpful. In many cases, information suggested in
this Section is available in reports of the U.S. Government. Indicate infor-
mation obtained from sources other than the issuer. Examples of the types
of information which may be appropriate when reliable and reasonably avail-
able are:
(1) The last official estimate, and the most recent estimate, of the
issuer's population, school enrollment, per capita income, median age, and
unemployment rate, and the number and value of residential and nonresidential
contruction permits issued during each of the issuer's last five fiscal years
and the current fiscal year to date.
(2) A brief statement or description of (i) the principal industries
and commerical entities in the issuer's immediate geographical area; (ii)
the number of persons employed by such industries or entities; (iii) the
economic stability of such industries or entities; and (iv) the economic ef-
fects of any addition or loss or major industrial or commercial entities in
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the last five years.
(3) A brief description of (i) the principal governmental services
performed by the issuer; (ii) the extent to which similar or differing
governmental services are performed by overlapping governmental entities;
and (iii) major changes in such services in the last five years...
State briefly the general character of the principal facilities of the
issuer...If any such property is leased or otherwise not held in fee or is
held subject to any major encumbrace, so state and briefly describe how
held....
Briefly describe any pending legal proceedings to which the issuer...
is a party or to which any of its property is subject and which may materi-
ally affect the issuer's ability to perform its obligations tothe holders
of the securities being offered...Include the name of the court or agency
in which the proceedings are pending, the date instituted, the principal
parties thereto, a description of the factual basis alleged to underlie
the proceedings, and the relief sought. Include similar information as
to legal proceedings which have been threatened to a degree which consti-
tutes a material possibility that they will be instigated. An opinion of
counselwith respect to such legal proceedings may, with the consent of
counselbe included or summarized in the official statement. State the
name and address of such counsel.
Describe the manner in which the governing body and executive officials
of the issuer.. .are chosen, their respective terms, the general means by
which policy and executive decisions are made on behalf of the issuer...
and the parties possessing the authority to make such decisions. Name each
executive official...
Describe briefly any priority of claims available to citizens in re-
spect of services performed by the issuer, to employees in respect of
wages, or to any other party which would require expenditures of funds of
the issuer prior to payment of principa-l of or interest or premium on the
securities....
State all ratings of the securities being offered and the -names of
the rating agencies. If the ratings are provisional, that should be
stated. In addition, there should be stated ratings of any other out-
standing securities of the issuer secured similarly to the securities being
offered. If no ratings have been obtained on any such securities, a state-
ment should be made to such effect. Changes in any ratings of any secur-
ities of the issuer during the preceding two years should be described.
Source: (Excerpted from) Municipal Finance Officers Association,
"Disclosure Guidelines for Offerings of Securities by State
and Local Governments", Chicago, Illinios: MFOA, (November
10, 1975). (Recommendatons for disclosure of information
pertaining to revenue bonds, enterprise finance, and secur-
ity provisions not cited here.)
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The Proposed Disclosure Requirements of the
1976 Williams-Tower Bill
Sec. 13A (a)(1) Any issuer of municipal securities which has out-
standing during any portion of a fiscal year an aggregate principal amount
of municipal securities exceeding $50,000,000 shall prepare for such fiscal
year an annual report and reports of events of default in accordance with
such rules as the Commission may prescribe as being necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
"(2) The annual report required by paragraph (1) shall contain the
following information, if applicable:
"(A) An identification and description of the issuer of the sec-
urities outstanding;
"(B) A description of any legal limitation on the incurrence of
indebtedness by the issuer or the taxing authority of the issuer;
"(C) A description of the issuer's debt structure, including in-
formation with respect to amounts of authorized and outstanding funded debt,
estimated amount of short-term debt, character of amortization provisions
of funded debt, sinking fund requirements, security for debt, nature and
extent of guaranteed debt, and debt service requirements;
"(D) A description of the nature and extent of other material con-
tingent liabilities or commitments of the issuer;
"(E) If any payment of principal or interest on any security of
the issuer or any predecessor thereofhas been defaulted on, or has been post-
poned or delayed, within the past twenty years, a description of the date,
amounts, and circumstances of such event and of the terms of any succeeding
arrangements thereof;
"(F) A description of the issuer's tax authority and structure
over the past five years including the nature of taxes levied, tax rates,
property (real and personal) valuation and assessments, amounts of tax .
levies, amounts of tax collections and delinquent tax procedures and exper-
ience;
"(G) A description of the issuer's major taxpayers;
"(H) A description of the principal governmental and other services
provided or performed by the issuer, the extent to which similar or differing
services are performed by other governmental entities which serve the same
geographic area and any major changes in such services in the last ten years;
"(I) A description of the nature and extent of Federal or other
assistance programs available to the issuer;
"(J) Financial statements of the issuer in such detail and form and
for such periods beginning not earlier than the fifth previous fiscal year
as the Commission may prescribe, which statements for any fiscal year commenc-
ing on or after December 31, 1978 shall be audited and reported on by an in-
dependent public or certified accountant in such manner as the Commission may
prescribe.
"(3) The reports of events of default referred to in paragraph (1)
shall contain such of the information required by paragraph (2) as the Com-
mission may by rule or regulation prescribe.
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"(4) The reports required by paragraph (1) shall, in addition,
contain such other similar and specific information as the Commission may
by rule or regulation prescrive as being necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the proection of investors.
"(b)(1) Except as provided in subsection (c), any issuer that
offers or sells an issue of municipal securities, the aggregate principal
amount of which exceeds $5,000,000 to or through a municipal securities
broker, municipal securities dealer, or bank acting acting as agent, shall,
prior to such offer or sale, prepare a distribution statement in accordance
with such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as being
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or the protection of in-
vestors.
"(2) The distribution statement required by paragraph (1) shall
contain such of the information pertaining to the issuer required by sub-
section (a)(2) as the Commission may by rule or regulation prescribe, and
the following:
"(A) A description of the offering, including amount to be offered,
price, plan of distribution, and underwriting arrangements and compensation;
"(B) A description of the security to be offered, including pro-
visions as to security, events of default, payment of principal and interest,
sinking fund, redemption, debt reserve funds, priority, legality and author-
ization for issue and rights of security holders to bring suit against
issuers;
"(C) A description of any project or enterprise of the issuer to
be financed from the proceeds of revenue or special assessment securities,
and any engineering or financial flexibility reports or studies on the con-
struction and operations of the project or enterprise;
"(D) A description of the intended use of the proceeds of the
offering;
"(E) A statement of counsel'skopinion as to-the legality of the.
issuance of the securities to be offered;
"(F) A statement of the availability of the reports required by
this section; and
"(G) Such other similar and specific information as the Commission
may by rules or regulations require as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors; except that, prior to any sale,
the information specified in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (E) may be set forth
in prelimi-nary form.
"(C) The provisions of subsection (b) shall not apply to an issuer
soley by reason of an offer or sale of municipal securities --
"(1) the disclosure with respect to which has been approved, after
hearing, as adequate for the protection of investors by a State governmental
authority (other than the issuer) expressly authorized by law or granted
such approval, or
"(2) which would meet the criteria set forth in sections 3(a)(9),
3(a)(10), 4(1), 4(2), 4(3), 4(4) of The Securities Act of 1933 if such offer
or sale were not within the scope of section 3(a)(2) thereof.
"(d) The Commission may from time to time by its rules and regula-
tions, and subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed therein,
change the minimum amounts set forth in subsections (a)(1) and (b)(1) if,
giving due regard to such factors as general economic conditions, costs in-
volved, and the nature of the distribution system for municipal securities,
such change is deemed to be appropriate in the public interest;
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"(e) The Commission may prescribe, in regard to reports and dis-
tribution statements made pursuant to this section, the form or forms in
which the required information, including the financial statements, shall
be set forth, and the accounting methods to be followed in the preparation
of financial statements.
"(f)(1) The issuer shall make the reports required by subsection
(a)(1) of this section available upon request to security'holders'at the
issuer's expense and to others at their expense and shall give appropriate
public notice of such availability.
"(2) The issuer shall make the distribution statement required
by subsection (b)(1) of this section available to municipal securities
brokers, municipal securities dealers, and banks acting as agent for del-
ivery to prospective purchasers in accordancc withsuch rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
"(3) The reports and distribution statement required by this sec-
tion shall also be maintained by the issuer at a designated location for
examination by the public in accordance with such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public in-
terest or for the protection of' investors. The Commission may also contract
to establish a central repository which shall receive and maintain such
reports, and may require the contractor to adhere to such rules and regul-
ations as the Commission may prescribe in furtherance of the purposes of
this section. Each person subject to the requirements of this section shall,
upon the establishment of any such repositorythereaftet file copies of re-
ports and distribution statements required to be prepared by this section
with the repository in accordance with such rules and regulations as the
Commission finds are necessary or appropriate in the public interest.
"(g) In no event shall any underwriter of an issue of municipal
securities (unless such underwriter shall have knowingly received from the
issuer for acting as an underwriter some benefit, directly or indirectly,
in which all other underwriters similarly situated did not share in propor-
tion to their respective interest in the underwriting) be liable in, or as
a consequence of, any suit for damages in excess of the total price at which
the issue was sold by it to the public."
Source:- (Taken directly from) U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Hearings before the Subcommit-
tee on Securities on S. 2969 to Amend the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 to Require the Preparation of Annual Reports and Distrib-
ution Statements by Issuers of Municipal Securities, and for
Other Purposes, S. 2574 to Amend the Securities Act of 1933 to
Provide for the Registration ofSecurities Issued by State and
Local Governments, February 24, 25, and 26, 1976. 94th Congress,
Second Session, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1976, pp. 5-13.
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